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ABSTRACT 
TITLE: The South African print media, 1994-2004: An application and critique 
of comparative media systems theory 
BY: Adrian Hadland 
DATE: February 2007 
Daniel C Hallin and Paolo Mancini's Comparing Media Systems (2004) has 
been hailed as an important contribution to understanding the inter-relationship 
between the media and political systems. The work was, however, based on a 
study of 18 stable, mature and highly developed democracies either in Europe 
or in North America. As an emerging democracy that has recently undergone 
dramatic change in both its political system and its media, South Africa's 
inclusion poses particular challenges to Hallin and Mancini's Three Models 
paradigm. This thesis focuses on the South African print media and tests both 
the paradigm's theoretical underpinnings as well as its four principle dimensions 
of analysis: political parallelism, state intervention, development of a mass 
market and journalistic professionalisation. A range of inSights and a number of 
modifications are proposed. This thesis is based on interviews with South 
Africa's most senior media executives and editors, a comprehensive study of 
the relevant literature and 15 years of personal experience as a political analyst, 
columnist and parliamentary correspondent covering South Africa's transition 
from apartheid to democracy. The thesis sheds new light on the functioning and 
applicability of the Three Models comparative paradigm as well as on the 
development and future trajectory of South African print media journalism. 
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION 
As different areas of the globe are drawn into inter-connection with 
one another, waves of social transformation crash across virtually the 
whole earth's surface (Giddens 1990, 6). 
South Africa: waves of change 
There will be few years in South African history with as much significance as 
1994, the year the country became a democratic state, held its first elections 
with universal franchise and elected its first black president. Though the world 
had begun to warm up to the idea of a new South Africa in the lead up to the 
election of April 27th 1994 - sanctions had eased and foreign investment had 
started to trickle in - the doors to the world were well and truly flung open in the 
heady days after the poll. The country's shift from global pariah to universal icon 
of hope and reconciliation was as rapid as it was largely peaceful. 
Naturally and inevitably, the switch had massive repercussions on many 
aspects of the South African polity, not least on the purveyors of the country's 
newspapers and magazines. For more than a century, the print industry had 
enjoyed a tightly structured fraternity with barriers to entry as high as the barbed 
wire fences surrounding the country's military establishments. In spite of the 
fact that 80% of South Africa's population was black in 1994, a genuinely black 
press had not been allowed to develop. Indeed, laws had been framed during 
the apartheid era that expressly forbade newspapers and magazines from 
reporting on black political leaders or parties or even from covering important 
political and social developments if they occurred in zones designated as black 
living areas. 
With television only arriving in the mid-1970s (very late by world standards) and 
the broadcast sector tied up in a state monopoly until the early 1990s, there 
was little opportunity for the convergence of technologies or for the 
amalgamation of multi-media empires that was in full force in the rest of the 
world by the beginning of the period. Apartheid isolation ensured no substantial 
foreign investment in the mainstream print sector until 1993, leaving largely 
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undisturbed a language- and race-based oligopolistic division of the spoils 
between two major Afrikaans newspaper companies, Nasionale Pers and 
Perskor, and two English ones, Times Media Limited (previously South African 
Associated Newspapers) and the Argus Publishing and Printing Company. The 
sector was clearly ready for a major overhaul. Change was looming fast. 
Media Change 
In the days following South Africa's first democratic election in April 1994, an 
extraordinary development occurred in the country's print media sector. People 
stopped buying newspapers. Across the board, virtually every title, whether 
daily, weekly, metropolitan or provincial, experienced a significant decline in 
circulation (see Table 1). Cape Town's major afternoon daily, the Cape Argus, 
lost almost 20% of its readership between mid-1994 and the end of 1995. 
Durban's Oaily News dropped from just under 100,000 in the first half of 1993 to 
75,960 in the last six months of 1995 and South Africa's flagship Johannesburg-
based daily, The Star, fell from 216,684 for the period January to June 1993 to 
165,171 for the last half of 1995 (ABC 2006). 
Collectively these declines - total daily newspaper circulation fell by 11 %, or 
134,564 copies between June 1994 and December 1995 (ABC 2006) -
signalled a huge loss of revenue and a dramatic shift within the market and its 
audience. In most cases, existing titles have been unable to reclaim the lost 
ground. Recent figures for the Cape Argus, for instance, indicate the paper was 
selling barely 74,000 a day for the period July to September 2006, still a long 
way from the 105,000 sold little more than 10 years ago (ABC 2006). 
But it was not just the quantity of sales that fell in the wake of the birth of a new 
democracy. It was the quality of print media products too. In 2002, an 
investigation was launched into the diminishing quality of newspaper and 
magazine reportage. The South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) 
commissioned a comprehensive skills audit of relatively senior (3 to 5 years of 
experience) local journalists. It was hoped the audit would provide important 
indicators concerning the state of South African journalism. It did, and the 
11 
result, according to the then Sanef chairman and City Press Editor Mathatha 
Tsedu, was "not a nice picture" (2002, 5). 
Table I: TIle ABC of declining Sales 
Title 
Cape Argus 
Mercury 
Sowetan 
The Star 
Daily News 
1994 
Jan-Jun 
106,574 
62,925 
217,823 
208,185 
93,247 
Jul-Dec 
97,996 
57,813 
190,586 
191,332 
87,814 
1995 
Jan-Jun 
89,014 
49,874 
208,358 
182,119 
81,032 
Jul-Dec 
82,774 
42,690 
207,849 
165,171 
75,960 
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations 2006 
The poor skills' levels were worse than expected and pointed to deteriorating 
work force quality and thus outputs at key levels in the sector. Among the 
results of the Sanef audit: 82% of the South African journalists surveyed 
showed poor interviewing skills, many demonstrated a weak grasp of general 
knowledge (in the science category, 60% did not know who formulated the 
theory of relativity and 72% did not know who formulated the theory of 
evolution) while a low level of reporting skills in general was common (De Beer 
& Steyn 2002). 
Sanef conducted a follow-up study into the skills of first-line managers in news 
organisations, dubbed Skills Audit 2, in 2004. The results this time showed 
substantial management skills' weaknesses. First-line (newsroom) managers 
felt less positive than their reporters about their working environments, 
particularly in relation to career development and remuneration, were aware 
they didn't communicate as well as they should and demonstrated significant 
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skills' gaps in self-management, teamwork, strategic initiative and in coping with 
multiculturalism and multilingualism (Barratt 2006, 46). 
Neither were poor skills' levels the only evidence of a diminishing journalistic 
professionalism in this period. The major trade union for practicing journalists, 
the South African Union of Journalists (SAUJ), collapsed and was finally 
liquidated in 2005. Other trade unions, such as the Media Workers Association 
of South Africa (Mwasa) and the South African Typographical Union (SATU) 
continued in the sector, but accounted for only a small proportion of working 
journalists. Both Mwasa and SATU were intended primarily for the print shop 
employees working in the presses. By 2007, no genuine alternative association 
to the SAUJ had been established or seemed likely. Some newspaper houses, 
such as Independent Newspapers Cape retained the services of former SAUJ 
officers (such as Ronnie Morris) to represent their staff informally (McKay 
2006). 
But, in general terms, the support and regularisation of professionalism in the 
industry has now been left largely to the editors (who have traditionally and 
historically been antagonistic to the rights of journeymen journalists in South 
Africa), through their organisation Sanef. Sanef itself suffered various crises of 
division and disagreement from its inception in 1998 (Barratt 2006). Nor was it 
only poor skills and the collapsing state of the unions that indicated serious fault 
lines were appearing in journalistic organisation and reducing professionalism. 
Repeated and public ethical blunders such as cases of plagiarism, biased 
reportage in support of political factions (as evidenced in the Hefer Commission 
of 2003-4, see below) and wide scale inaccuracy embarrassed the industry in 
the post-1994 period (see Chapter Six). The Sanef executive declared in a 
statement after its AGM in 2004: "It can be safely said that trust in the media 
and journalism among the broader public ... and other key stakeholders is not 
what it should be" (Barratt 2006, 55). 
Major cutbacks of staff and of training budgets by most media companies in the 
wake of a gathering recession in the sector from 1999 to 2002 further 
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undermined the professionalisation of South African journalists. This was 
worsened once more by the poor remuneration packages that still prevail in the 
industry (but for which there is no reliable data1) that made offers from the 
private or public sector particularly appealing to young, degreed journalists still 
serving their apprenticeship in the industry. The result of these trends was the 
"juniorisation" of newsrooms and the diminishment of the role of editors relative 
to management (see Chapter Six). A further significant factor in the 
development of these trends was government's urgent challenge to the media 
to transform the racial profiles of their organisations. 
Clearly, a great deal of change has taken place in the media workplace in South 
Africa since 1994. This thesis includes within it an explanation for this change. It 
makes use of a theoretical framework, Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini's 
Three Models paradigm (2004), that is comparative by nature and which 
therefore does not leave analysts pondering the Significance of these 
developments in isolation (as has been the case certainly in South African 
scholarship). Taken as a whole, the trends South Africa's media has 
experienced can be weighed up against the experiences of other nations' 
media. Indeed, it can be seen that diverse nations can be clustered according 
to the commonalities of their experiences. This comparability infers 
predictability, as similar systems experience similar paths of development. The 
Hallin-Mancini framework explains the features of a country's media system by 
matching them to the characteristics and history of the country's political 
system. In this way, the trends make holistic sense as they relate to 
occurrences in the broader political, social, economic and global environment. 
We will consider this in more detail below. 
It was not only journalistic skills, circulation figures and the race of newsrooms 
that began to change in South Africa from 1994. The structure and dynamics of 
the media market itself started to shift. The alternative press, consisting of 
around a dozen foreign-funded or supported but influential anti-apartheid 
newspapers, was closed down in the face of funding and positioning problems 
1 No data. but I CCUl personally attest to the low scales. As the assistant editor and then acting editor of the 
Cape Argus from 1999 to 2002 I was privy to journalists· salary and benefit scales 
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(Opatrny 2007). Only one alternative title, the Weekly Mail, remains. The 
mainstream sector itself underwent a massive overhaul as black and foreign 
capital entered the marketplace for the first time seizing control of a variety of 
significant media enterprises, including Times Media Limited (TML) and the 
Argus Publishing and Printing Company. By contrast, Nasionale Pers 
(Naspers), a formerly unilingual and politically partisan newspaper group, 
expanded into an imposing, multi-platform, multilingual global presence with 
media activities in some 50 countries. 
At present, in 2007, South Africa has 43 daily, weekly and bi-weekly 
commercial newspapers representing a wide range of different audiences and 
interests (Milne & Taylor 2006). They are owned by four media groups 
(Naspers2, Johnnic Communications Ltd, Caxton & CTP Publishers and 
Printers Ltd, and Independent News & Media Plc3). In addition, the country has 
more than 50 "knock-and-drops", or local "free sheets", owned and distributed 
by the major media groups as vehicles for local advertising (Milne & Taylor 
2006). According to the most recent survey, there are around 1 00 authentic 
community-run newspapers dotted around the country ranging from regular 
weekly papers to sporadic newsletters distributed by hand (Hadland & Thorne 
2006). 
The South African newspaper market has seen rapid growth since the year 
2000, marked by new entrants into the market and rising overall circulation and 
readership (ABC 2006; SAARF 2006 cited by Milne & Taylor 2006). Between 
2000 and 2005, total circulation of daily newspapers increased by 38.4% from 
1.13 million per day to 1.57 million (ABC, 2006, cited by Milne & Taylor 2006, 
39). Much of the circulation growth was due to newly launched titles, however, 
leaving the established mainstream papers in a steady downward curve, 
reflecting global trends. 
: Naspers reorganised its print media business in 2000 and renamed this part of the company Media2-l. 
With the date of the change falling in the middle of the research period. I haye had to use whichever 
name is appropriate for the citation. This is more accurate. but possibly confusing. 
3 I will refer to Independent Ne\\spapers & Media Pic for the rest of this thesis by the name by which it is 
commonly referred. Independent Newspapers. 
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Overall, circulation levels and market diversity are both at low levels in South 
Africa, in spite of the relatively sophisticated nature of the print media industry. 
By 2000, South Africa had the second-lowest number of print titles in the world 
relative to population and a circulation per capita that is the world's fifth-lowest 
(Duncan 2000, cited in Berger 2004, 59). 
One of the most striking trends in the post-1994 period has been the 
commercialisation of the South African print media sector. This has been 
evident in the rapid development of the niche, client magazine or contract 
publishing sector. Circulation figures from ABC show unprecedented growth in 
the publishing and sales of magazines. By 2005, there were about 350 ABC-
audited magazine titles (or 20 million magazines) being distributed in South 
Africa every month. Many of these were "custom" magazines published on 
behalf of corporate clients for distribution to their own customers (Milne & Taylor 
2006, 39). While this thesis deals specifically with the mainstream news media4 
in South Africa, developments in associated sectors can have an impact. An 
important aspect of the upward trend in custom magazines, for instance, has 
been the challenge it has presented to ethical standards in the industry. The 
blurring of advertising material and editorial content has become endemic in the 
print sector as a whole with significant consequences for media status as well 
as for the industry's long-term financial health (Hadland et ai, 2007). 
According to All Media and Products Survey (AMPS) figures from the South 
African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), 40.4% of the adult 
population read a newspaper at least once a week in 2000, rising only very 
fractionally to 40.6% by 2005 (cited in Milne & Taylor 2006, 39). This is of 
course low by developed world standards but is skewed by the large proportion 
of rural dwellers (almost half of the population) in South Africa, many of whom 
are beyond the reach of newspaper distribution chains, or who simply cannot 
afford to purchase regular newspapers. Poverty is also endemic in the rural 
areas. 
I By mainstream I use Jacobs' (200-1-) definition as follows: "national and regional commercial English 
and Afrikaans-language print media in South Africa". 
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But few developments have been more significant to the South African media 
marketplace in the post -1994 period than the arrival of mass-market tabloid 
newspapers. In 1994, the biggest selling daily newspaper - which sold an 
average of 191,322 copies per day in the first half of the year - was The Star of 
Johannesburg (ABC 2006). By 2006, South Africa's top-selling daily was a 
tabloid, the Daily Sun, currently selling about 450,000 copies a day. Indeed, a 
closer look at the rise in the circulation of South African newspapers between 
2000 and 2005 reveals that the 38.4% increase is entirely accounted for by the 
Daily Sun and by the new Zulu language paper Iso/ezwe (which had an average 
daily circulation of 86,232 in 2006). 
Excluding these two publications, there has been a decline of 10.8% in the total 
circulation of the remaining 17 dailies monitored by the ABC (Milne & Taylor 
2006). Between them, the 11 major metropolitan daily newspapers lost 121,179 
in daily sales over the period. The mainstream newspaper market is generally 
considered by media executives to be a mature market in which products are 
largely competing against each other for the same audience (Malherbe 2006). 
As the Naspers annual report stated in 2003, "most sectors of South Africa's 
magazine and newspaper markets are overtraded" (Naspers 2003, 10). 
The success of the Daily Sun from its inception in 2003 spawned other similar 
tabloid titles such as the Sunday Sun and the Son, both owned by Naspers and 
publisher Deon Du Plessis, and the Daily Voice (Independent Newspapers). 
Similar to their British predecessors, the South African titles were all aimed at 
the blue-collar market: in this case, lower-middle class black and coloured 
readers. They are all largely apolitical in the party sense and rarely engage in 
national political analysis or partisan reportage. The figures and trends suggest 
that rather than cannibalise the readerships of other mainstream titles, the new 
titles reached many readers who previously did not buy a newspaper regularly 
(Du Plessis 2006). In this way, a mass newspaper market was genuinely 
constructed from scratch in South Africa's recent past5. 
:' It is worth noting that antecedents for South Africa· s tabloids existed. according to some. in publications 
like Bantu World of the 1950s. 
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A final key trend during the period has been realignment in the relationship 
between the media and the state. This was inevitable with the regime change 
from apartheid state to democracy, but it is clear in retrospect that both sides 
have struggled to come to terms with their new roles and responsibilities (see 
Chapter Four). The consequence has been heightened tension between the 
majority party in government, the African National Congress (ANC), and the 
media. Johnston identifies a series of "points of conflict" that have developed 
between the ANC and the print media and characterises these as follows: "At 
best, the ANC's relationship with the political press has been distant and 
neurotically suspicious; at worst, pathologically hostile" (2005, 13). A number of 
developments serve to illustrate this shift of relations. They include the state's 
growing willingness to intervene in the media in various ways, its reluctance to 
reform legislation affecting the media, its entree into mass newsletter publishing 
and the establishment of a variety of clientelist-type bonds between government 
and the nascent community media sector (see Chapter Four). 
The shift is also evident from the challenge both to and within the media to 
revisit its traditional, liberal role of Fourth Estate watchdog in a favour of a more 
conciliatory, less adversarial voice. This has corresponded with an increasingly 
cosy relationship between majority party political leaders and media owners 
(see Chapter Three). 
Clearly, wide-ranging and important changes have taken place in the South 
African media in the post-1994 period. And while few would dispute the broad 
themes of change - journalistic professionalisation, state-media relations, the 
proximity of the media to the political system and the structure of the market - it 
is no coincidence that these are the very dimensions singled out by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) as the key indicators for comparative media system analysis. 
We will return to this below. 
Political change 
Of course, it is not merely South Africa's media that has undergone 
fundamental change in the last decade-and-a-half. Perhaps more evident to the 
world at large has been the seismic change in South Africa's political life. The 
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country's relatively peaceful and rapid transition from apartheid pariah to 
constitutional democracy was heralded around the world as a massively 
important moment of human achievement. The "miracle" of racial reconciliation 
delivered Nobel peace prizes to Nelson Mandela and his counterpart, then 
deputy president, F.W. De Klerk. It also set South Africa on a new path of 
political and economic development. 
There were many hallmarks of this political journey. Some were clearly evident 
to the whole world, others only to the new breed of legislator who set about 
reforming three hundred years of statutory discrimination. As Calland observed 
after the country's first five years of democracy: "South Africa's Parliament is 
unrecognisable from the one that preceded it before 1994. The pictures on the 
wall are different, the atmosphere in the building is far less stuffy and the 
buildings are certainly far more lively. Not only does its membership comprise a 
majority of black people who suffered under apartheid, serving political parties a 
number of whom were banned until 1990, but its institutional construction has 
been almost entirely overhauled" (1999, 100). 
Key among these statutory hallmarks were the adoption of an interim 
democratic constitution in 1993 and its finalisation in 1996. These two 
documents encompassed a total overhaul of the country's political culture and 
its political, social and judicial system encompassing a Bill of Rights, broad 
equality and universal suffrage. This new vision of political practice was 
embarked upon when Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) achieved its 
anticipated and substantial electoral majority in 1994 and began a systematic 
recreation of the country's entire legislative framework, abolishing, amending or 
creating hundreds of laws. In fact, South Africa's first democratic government 
passed 534 Acts of Parliament in its first five years, in itself a "huge 
achievement" (Calland 1999, 5). As Nelson Mandela said in his farewell speech 
to Parliament: "These have been no trivial laws or mere adjustments to an 
existing body of statutes. They have created a framework for the revolutionary 
transformation of society and of government itself' (cited in Calland 1999, 5). As 
we will see later (in Chapter Four), not all of the laws that contained anti-press 
freedom elements were abolished by the new democratic state. 
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Horwitz has surveyed the considerable volume of literature - particularly in the 
post-1990 period - that considers political transitions and the evolving 
architecture of new democratic institutions (2001). This '''transition theory', as it 
is loosely referred to, is the product of reflection upon, and abstraction from, the 
historically disparate paths to democracy followed in central and southern 
Europe and Latin America" (2001, 6). Horwitz identifies South Africa as an 
example of a "transplacement" transition, according to Huntingdon's classic 
1991 analytical paradigm (The Third Wave: Democratisation in the late 20th 
century). This form of transition is usually ushered in as the result of 
negotiations between powerful groups and most frequently occurs in conditions 
of stalemate. A common factor is the consensual terrain enjoined by both 
reformers within the ruling regime and moderates in the opposition (2001, 6-7). I 
would concur with Horwitz that this does seem to encapsulate important 
features of South Africa's political transition. In addition, his observation that 
most successful transitions from this category "produce a dispensation that is 
economically and socially conservative, thus maintaining the central pillars of 
capitalist society" is cogent (2001, 7). The citation of the transition theory 
literature serves to underline a point made at various times within this thesis: 
Democracy has many different forms and encapsulates many different 
processes. For Hallin and Mancini's paradigm to gain universal acceptance, it 
needs to be able to absorb, and explain, these diverse and often divergent 
elements. 
Comparative Media Systems theory 
It is indisputable even from the brief sketch above that profound change 
affected the development both of South Africa's political system and of its 
media system in the post-1994 era. But can they be linked? And, if so, "which is 
the tail and which is the dog?" (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 267). These questions lie 
at the heart of Hallin and Mancini's Three Models of Media and Politics (2004). 
In the work, which I describe as comparative media systems theory, a new 
paradigm for understanding and critiquing the media is presented. 
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The Hallin and Mancini paradigm naturally has its antecedents, including the 
important pathfinding comparative analysis of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995). 
This was one of the first to present "a systems outlook" of the media in which 
"the interactions of various actors occur within an overarching framework of 
organising principles that are designed to regularise the relationships of media 
institutions to political institutions" (1995, 11). Hallin and Mancini lean heavily 
on the four "dimensions" identified by Blumler and Gurevitch as representing 
the key points of intersection between media and political systems and which in 
many ways preempt or overlap with the four dimensions of the Three Models 
theory. The Blumler and Gurevitch work, however, was principally America-
Great Britain specific and also focused strongly on the important but narrowly 
literal inter-relationship between political journalists and politicians. 
Also deeply influential to Hallin and Mancini's paradigm are Weber's work on 
rational legal authority, Lijphart's writings distinguishing consensual from 
majoritarian democracy, the differentiation theory of Parsons and Durkheim and 
its derivative interpretations by Habermas, Alexander and Bourdieu. The field 
theory of the latter, in which agents within a field6 act with what Bourdieu terms 
fundamental complicity, provides an important theoretical corroboration of the 
Three Models paradigm. Habermas, too, with his deeply influential concept of 
the public sphere, is another key theoretical ally. According to Hallin, 
"Habermas's initial argument on the structural transformation of the public 
sphere was that the media, which were originally rooted in the emerging public 
sphere, were eventually absorbed into the market and the arena of political 
power" (2005, 236-7). This notion of the media's vulnerability to "colonisation" 
by social systems that concentrate economic and political resources "seems 
correct", according to Hallin (2005, 237). 
A particularly influential predecessor in comparative media scholarship was the 
classic Four Theories of the Press by Siebert et al (1956). According to this 
work, the press "reflects the system of social control" evident in a country 
A Bourdieu defines a field as: '"a field of forces within which the agents occupy positions that statistically 
determine the positions they take with respect to the field. these position-takings being aimed either at 
conserving or transfonning the structure of relations of forces that is constitutiye of the field" (2005. 29). 
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(Siebert et al 1956, 1). Thus, in an authoritarian state, the press is controlled in 
its functions and operations by organised society through the institution of 
government (1956, 10). While the Siebert text was the first of its kind, its 
comparative element was abstractly theoretical and somewhat limited. Its idea 
of social control being the key determinant was, for instance, just one of the four 
dimensions cited by Blumler and Gurevitch. Four Theories also assigned great 
import to the Soviet Communist theory of the press, a notion that crumbled for 
good at about the same time as the Berlin Wall. 
Hallin and Mancini's work is not unaccompanied by other contemporary 
contributions on comparative media analysis. Indeed, three other major works 
of synthesis were produced within the last two or three years that form the peer 
group for Comparing Media Systems. These are the work of McChesney 
(2004), Hardt (2004) and Starr (2004). According to Mark Hampton, "a common 
thread of these four works is the assumption that the American media's 
development has a particular relevance as it represents the current and future 
trajectory of other nations' media" (2005, 240). All the works highlight tensions 
between capitalism and democracy and all allude to conflicts between media 
consumers and their responsibilities as citizens and all emphasise a new 
interest in media history (Hampton 2005, 240). None of the other works, 
however, attempt anything like the scale of Hallin and Mancini's enterprise 
(which uses data from 18 countries), nor do they present a whole, new 
theoretical framework with which to conduct comparative media systems 
analysis. 
The primary focus of Hallin and Mancini's paradigm is the relationship between 
a country's media system and its political system while its underlying purpose is 
to answer the fundamental question, to paraphrase Siebert et al (1956), of "why 
is the press as it is?" (2004, 2). To find an answer to this critical question, Hallin 
and Mancini turned to comparative analysis, identifying three clusters of state-
media inter-relationships that they call the three models. These are the Liberal 
model, typified by the US and Great Britain but also encompassing former 
colonies and territories such as Canada and Ireland; the Democratic Corporatist 
model that largely represents northern continental Europe (Scandinavia, 
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Germany, Holland); and the Polarised Pluralist model occupied by the 
Mediterranean states of southern Europe such as Italy, Portugal and Greece. 
The three clusters are represented as the three tips of a triangle with the 
various individual countries arrayed according to their proximity to one or the 
other cluster (see figure 1). 
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(figure 1: The Hallin-Mancini Matrix, or Relation of Individual Cases to the Three Models 
Source: Hallin and Mancini, 2004, 70) 
It is immediately evident that the limited North American and European 
geographic spread of the 18 countries that populate the Three Models paradigm 
together with their collectively high degree of economic and social development, 
presents a substantive challenge to the applicability of comparative media 
systems theory. This is readily acknowledged by the authors who indeed 
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express their hope that their "models will be useful to scholars working on other 
regions as points of reference" (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 16). This thesis 
responds to this call and attempts to test the theory's plausibility by introducing 
its assumptions to South Africa's idiosyncratic political and media matrix. This is 
not a task undertaken lightly with even Hallin and Mancini urging that their work 
is not used "as a set of categories to be imposed on systems developed in very 
different contexts, in a way that would actually prevent us from analysing other 
systems on their own terms and understanding their distinctive logics" (2004, 
305). 
The authors do go on to say, however, that they suspect scholars working on 
media systems in other parts of the world (including in Africa) "will find much 
that is relevant" in their analysis and they express the expectation that 
"substantial modifications and perhaps new models" will be derived (Hallin & 
Mancini 2004, 306). 
In the end, and with due attention to the warning against its misapplication, 
Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm was simply too important not to 
apply to the media system of a key emerging democracy in Africa. All too often, 
contemporary theoretical and critical writing fails to take adequate cognisance 
of the experiences and knowledge of the developing world. This becomes all 
the more cogent when the "democratisation" literature that has developed to 
explain the recent wave of developing nations' transition to democracy, has 
largely failed to link the media and democratic processes (Jacobs 2004, 24). 
This situation has replicated itself in South African scholarship where, once 
again, "surprisingly little has been done by social scientists to connect the dots 
between media and democratic politics" (Jacobs 2004,25). 
Comparing Media Systems is a significant advance in media theory and it 
simply has to be stacked up against not only Africa's media and political 
environments, but also against the systems of other regions, not least the 
emerging democracies of formerly communist eastern Europe. Only by doing 
so, by testing the universality of its underlying principles when applied to 
diverse systems, will the true authority of the paradigm be assessed. Such an 
endeavour requires a degree of faith in the likelihood that the model will work. 
24 
There is, too, an inherent expectation that the Hallin-Mancini paradigm will 
generate new insights and understandings into the functioning of inter-related 
media and political systems and into the nature of change within them. Such 
expectations would not sit comfortably on a flimsy hypothesis that had been 
exposed critically. So what do the critics say about Hallin and Mancini's 
paradigm? How significant does it have the potential to be? 
Since its publication in 2004, critics have hailed Comparing Media Systems as 
one of the most important theoretical contributions to comparative media 
studies in a generation. While a variety of reservations have been raised (see 
below), none who reviewed or cited the work (by early 2007) failed to 
appreciate its place at the cutting edge of comparative media studies. Writing in 
Political Studies Review, Nick Couldry describes Hallin and Mancini's 
Comparing Media Systems as a "remarkable work": 
The book's virtue lies not in formalism, but in its comparative analysis 
of how journalistic norms originated, and why they matter for politics. 
As a theoretically acute and historically precise account of what now 
drives the international commercialisation of journalism, this book has 
no rival (Couldry 2005, 308). 
Some critics noted the work's resonance among not just media scholars but 
also those working in a number of related fields. In a review in the journal Media 
History, Hampton describes the work as "a pathbreaking book of great 
significance" (Hampton 2005, 245). The study, which is "deeply grounded" in 
communications, politics, sociology and Twentieth Century history, "will set the 
agenda for comparative scholarship" (Hampton 2005, 245). 
Dennis McQuail, reviewing Hallin & Mancini in the European Journal of 
Communication, says there is no doubt the work presents "a useful set of tools 
for analysis" and adds that the Three Models paradigm amounts to "a valuable 
contribution to the comparative study" of media systems (2005, 266-268). In 
another review, this time in the Journalism and Mass Communications 
Quarterly, Robert L Stevenson calls Comparing Media Systems "a thoughtful 
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analysis, long in gestation, worth careful reading, full of useful insights" (2005, 
985). 
For Doris Graber, the Hallin and Mancini work is "an example of the 
tremendous insight that comparisons can produce when they clarify how the 
same tasks can be effectively performed in many different ways" (Graber 2006, 
935). While the research within Comparing Media Systems is "imaginative, 
meticulous and theoretically sophisticated", the work itself provides "clear 
insights" into the many ways in which media systems emerge, develop and 
change over time, according to Graber (2006,935-936). Comparing Media 
Systems is "a path-breaking volume that will serve as a model for today's 
comparative communication analyses" (Graber, 935). 
Finally, in her work examining the extent of political parallelism between political 
parties and newspapers in Austria, Britain, Germany and France, Barbara 
Berkel found convincing evidence for the applicability of the Comparing Media 
Systems' Three Models paradigm (Berkel 2006). Patterns from each of the four 
countries she studied did indeed support Hallin and Mancini's understanding of 
political parallelism (2006, 99), one of the pillars of their hypothesis. 
There is no question, then, even though a relatively short period of time has 
passed since the publication of Comparing Media Systems that Hallin and 
Mancini's paradigm has won the respect of media scholars around the world. In 
time, more detailed studies will further test its assumptions and conclusions. 
Can South Africa be located in the Three Models paradigm? If so, how does its 
application alter or develop it? If the Three Models paradigm is relevant, what 
does this say about the future direction of the state, of the media and of their 
inter-relationship as inferred by the assumptions of the model? These are key 
questions in this thesis and each will be tackled in some depth during the 
course of the work. 
It will be found that South Africa can indeed be located within the paradigm, 
though the inherent flexibility of the model facilitates the application. As the 
authors indicate, the Three Models are "ideal types" and the media systems of 
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individual countries fit them only roughly (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 11). In 
addition, the paradigm makes assumptions about media and political systems in 
general and more specifically about the nature of change within those systems 
that this thesis will challenge. Modernisation theory argues, for instance, that all 
media systems are caught up in an inevitable homogenisation and 
commercialisation process that leads to the ultimate triumph of the Liberal 
model. I call this "Liberal drift". This thesis will dispute that contention, as 
evident as the trend may be within the stable, developed world systems 
informing the Hallin-Mancini thesis. South Africa's experience would suggest 
that in some developing countries and possibly emerging democracies, media 
systems are indeed headed away from the Liberal model toward Polarised 
Pluralism. Whether or not they eventually backtrack once more and resume the 
path to Liberalism has particular implications for those societies. 
Uniquely, South Africa brings to the Three Models theory the happenstance of a 
cataclysmic political event that occurs prior to any significant structural change 
within the country's media system. The first structural change of substance in 
the South African media, the liberalisation of the broadcast sector, took place 
only months before the 1994 election and was only realised properly over the 
course of another decade. The radical transformation of South Africa's media 
system that did begin in earnest from 1994 can then be considered a direct 
response to the revolution that took place within the political arena, as complex 
a process as that was. Hallin and Mancini ask, "is media system change simply 
one result of ... changes in society and politics, or might it play some 
independent role?" (2004, 267). The answer, from the South African case study, 
would seem to suggest that media system change is very much the dependent 
variable in a context of rapid political and social realignment. This is not to say 
that a media system does not act upon its environment, accelerating or 
negating a range of social process including democratic consolidation, political 
participation, social cohesion and globalisation. This is indeed something with 
which Hallin and Mancini would agree. 
Events in South Africa in the post-1994 period offer a number of further 
opportunities to respond to assumptions or questions posed by Hallin and 
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Mancini. They declare, for instance, that "so far as we know, no country that did 
not develop mass circulation newspapers in the late 19th century or early 20th 
century has ever subsequently developed them" (Hallin and Mancini 2004,4). 
Well, welcome to the South African case study. Here, mass circulation 
newspapers replete with new and willing audiences exploded on to the scene 
for the first time in 2002, arguably the standout phenomenon of the country's 
print media sector over the past century. 
It also becomes evident in using the Hallin-Mancini paradigm that South Africa's 
print media is headed in the wrong direction, if one supposes that the Liberal 
model has come to constitute a consensual position on the role and function of 
the press. Instead of groping its way, along with the other 18 countries cited, 
toward utopian media Liberalism, South Africa is slipping deeper in to the 
Polarised Pluralism cluster with its characteristic traits of rising state 
intervention, instrumentalism, political parallelism and falling journalistic 
professionalism. In addition, the Hallin-Mancini paradigm provides an 
interesting answer to a question that has vexed South African media studies 
practitioners and journalists for decades. This is the question surrounding the 
extent of the South African media's role in the consolidation of its pre-1994 
political system, namely apartheid. I will consider this below. 
It is necessary to say at the outset of this thesis that I will be focusing almost all 
my efforts on South Africa's print media sector. This is not to negate the 
importance of the broadcast sector nor of the new media forms that have arisen 
in recent years. The broadcast element of a country's media system certainly 
features frequently in Hallin and Mancini's model, often as an apparent 
tiebreaker when it comes to the task of clustering. However, while I will allude in 
passing to the development of the broadcasting sector in South Africa, I cannot 
hope to absorb its complexity and rapid evolution within the scope of this work. 
That must wait for a follow-up investigation. I can say that the indications 
certainly suggest a correlation with the findings of this thesis in regard to the 
print media and I will draw these connections where appropriate. 
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In addition, scholars have noted the paucity of literature and research 
concerning contemporary Afrikaans newspapers (Botma 2006). And while I 
have endeavoured at every opportunity to include these titles and their parent 
companies in the current work, it is unavoidable that there is an emphasis on 
the English-language mainstream press that reflects the topography of the 
available scholarship. I do mean by South Africa's media "system", however, all 
print media titles and their supporting organisations, including the growing 
community media sector, along with broadcast (television, radio and community 
radio) and new media outlets. I will largely narrow my focus on to the news-
oriented print media within the South African media system and trust that this 
will serve as an opening gambit in the far greater task of grappling 
comparatively with the entire system and its myriad components and dynamics. 
Along with reference to the considerable corpus of literature regarding the 
development of the South African media and of its political system, this thesis 
makes use of two unique resources. The first is the one-on-one interviews 
conducted with two dozen top-ranking South African media company 
executives and editors. This roots the thesis in practicality and cross-tabulates 
the often observational, qualitative nature of the research with the first-hand 
experience of top-level management. This aspect of the methodology reflects 
Hallin and Mancini's approach which is also pragmatic and interview-driven. 
The second resource is the intimate familiarity of the candidate with South 
Africa's political system and with the country's transition from apartheid to 
democracy. As a parliamentary and political correspondent for over 15 years, 
including periods as the parliamentary correspondent for Business Day, senior 
writer for the Sunday Independent and Political Editor of the Cape Argus, I have 
direct, personal experience of the development and functioning of political 
institutions, personalities and trends over the period. 
This thesis has a number of tasks. It seeks, initially, to outline the Hallin-Mancini 
Three Models paradigm and to contrast this with alternate critical 
methodologies. It will then locate the South African media and political systems 
within the paradigm with a view to testing the framework's theoretical 
assumptions and practical inferences. Weaknesses will be identified where they 
29 
occur and a set of modifications will be proposed where appropriate with the 
aim of developing the paradigm further. The thesis, finally, will ponder what the 
model, and South Africa's location within it, means for the future of media and 
political systems in general but also for emerging democracies in particular. 
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Chapter Two 
THEORETICAL PARADIGMS AND A DISCUSSION OF COMPARATIVE 
MEDIA SYSTEMS THEORY 
Introduction 
The study of the media began to constitute itself as a formal discipline in the 
years following the Second World War. Until then, there existed a "broad 
consensus ... that the mass media exercised a powerful and pervasive 
influence" (Curran 1982, 22) on their social and political context. This 
consensus was derived in part from the work of the Frankfurt School who, from 
the mid-1930s, linked the rise of fascism in the world to the growing influence of 
the mass media. Rejecting what they saw as the manipulation of mass society 
by a vulgarising and corrupt mass media, the school's leading intellectuals, 
Adorno, Marcuse and Arendt, argued the new mass media was not merely a 
tool of totalitarianism, but a major reason for its existence (Mosco 1996, 12). 
The Frankfurt-informed "mass society" consensus imagined newly-industrialised 
modern society to be deeply vulnerable to the propagandistic tools of the 
powerful. Urbanisation and industrialisation had created a "volatile, unstable, 
rootless, alienated, manipulable society" (Curran 1982, 12). No longer anchored 
in the stolid network of pre-industrial social relations, mass audiences had been 
gathered on an unprecedented scale through new technologies. Newspapers 
were thus powerful propaganda weapons to be used on a helpless, alienated 
urban community and media analysis was geared to measuring the "depth and 
size of penetration through modern scientific techniques"(Curran 1982, 12). 
From the 1940s to the late 1960s, this position was reversed. The "mass 
society" model depicting helpless, alienated citizens was rejected (within 
several disciplines including politics, social-anthropology and psychology) in 
favour of stable networks of group, family and peer supports. People, it was 
argued, exposed themselves to and remembered information selectively and 
newspapers, therefore, had little direct influence or bearing (Curran 1982, 12). 
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Media theory since the 1960s has split essentially into two camps: Liberal and 
Marxist. However, "the conventional characterisation of Liberal and Marxist 
traditions in mass communications research as constituting two opposed 
schools tends to obscure both the internal differences within each of these 
traditions and the reciprocal influence which each has exerted upon the other" 
(Curran 1982, 15). 
Liberal theory, deriving particularly from developments in positivist theories of 
political culture, has attempted to be more empirical in its investigation of the 
press. The major analytic tool utilised during the 1960s and 1970s by Liberal 
theoreticians has been the "effects theory" postulated by writers such as Melvin 
DeFleur, Joseph T Klapper, Wilbur Schramm and JD Halloran. As DeFleur 
explains: "The all-consuming question that has dominated research and the 
development of contemporary theory in the study of mass media ... is 'what has 
been their effect?" (cited in Chimutengwende 1978, 11). 
The difficulty with effects theory, however, is that in attempting to measure the 
political and social effects of the media through surveys and the collection of 
empirical data, many unquantifiable variables are excluded. How, for instance, 
does one measure the impact of media separately from the familial, cultural or 
social factors? It has simply proved impossible to isolate the variables of the 
"Effects" equation and thereby trace the direct impact of newspapers - to the 
exclusion of all else - on aspects of social and political life. This critical method 
also omits any analysis of the structure of newspaper and printing industries 
and their relation to broader social and economic systems. As Davis has 
argued: "Effects are difficult to isolate and establish, media texts are complex 
and contradictory, and audiences are active and influenced by other social and 
cultural factors ... The vast majority of studies conclude that the evidence 
suggests no more than the occurrence of minimal effects" (Davis 2003,254). 
Some effects theory has managed to find its way into South African media 
analysis methodology. Chimutengwende, for instance, claimed the utility of 
DeFleur's maxim ("what has been their effect?") was a "major factor when 
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looking at the limitations and possibilities of the mass media as instruments of 
change in society" (Chimutengwende 1978,125). Acknowledging the "tentative 
generalisations" of effects theory, Chimutengwende concluded "in short, the 
media are important but not decisive in influencing people"(1978, 1 0). Little else 
was possible given the theoretical framework utilised. 
Marxist media analysis is essentially divided into three, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, areas of concern. The Structuralist approach, founded upon the 
semiotics of Roland Barthes and Lacan's working of psychoanalytic theory, 
focuses on "the systems and processes of signification and representation" at 
work within the texts (newspaper discourse) themselves (Curran 1982, 23). The 
nature of ideology as a system of themes and representations through which 
people relate to the real world (as discussed initially by Althusser and the 
Frankfurt School) is of particular importance to the Structuralist approach 
(Curran 1982, 24). 
The second method, the Culturalist approach of writers such as Raymond 
Williams, E.P. Thompson and Stuart Hall, investigates newspapers as a means, 
in Herman and Chomsky's words, of "manufacturing consent" (1989). For Hall, 
the important questions are: "How did a dominant discourse warrant itself as the 
account and sustain a limit, ban or proscription over alternative definitions? ... 
How did the institutions which were responsible for describing and explaining 
the events of the world - in modern societies, the mass media, par excellence -
succeed in maintaining a preferred or delimited range of meanings in the 
dominant systems of communication?" (Hall 1982, 67-68). 
The final method, the political economy approach, attempts to consider the 
question of the power of the press in terms of a "concrete analysis of economic 
relations and the ways in which they structure both the processes and results of 
cultural production" (Curran 1982, 25). The ideological or cultural message, as 
evidenced by the existence and contents of a particular newspaper, is assumed 
to be a product of the underlying and complex patterns of ownership, control 
and economic location. The South African newspaper industry is thus depicted 
as an industry operating within a specific economic and political context. It is 
argued that, more often than not, it is the economic decisions and 'relations' 
characteristic of the newspaper industry that have determined the shape and 
direction of its development. 
I have found that political economy paradigm plays a potentially useful role 
when considering the development of South Africa's media market, in particular 
the rise of a mass press. This is the subject of Chapter Three in the course of 
which I will attempt to make use of the methodology and assumptions of 
political economy to prove this dimension of Hallin and Mancini's hypothesis. I 
will also present a more detailed consideration of the political economy method 
in Chapter Three and will discuss its relevance and applicability to the Three 
Models paradigm. 
South African critiques 
Until the early 1980s, South African critiques of the press were "few and far 
between", according to Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli and Muller in The Press in 
South Africa (1989, 39). The authors identified five broad categories of 
published studies in the pre-early 1980s period: "reminiscences of retired 
journalists and editors"; uncritical descriptions which by and large ignore the 
very existence of a black press; works within the "orthodox western Liberal 
framework" generally lacking analysis of structural conditions; the more rigorous 
works of writers such as Elaine Potter and Alex Hepple, which again exclude an 
analysis of the black-oriented press, while studies in the fifth category, 
incorporating structural analysis, "have only appeared since the late 1970s" and 
even then have been limited (1989: 39-42). 
While these categories are useful in summarising the type of studies 
undertaken with regard to the South African press, they obscure more 
fundamental differences or similarities. Commentators are more generally split 
over the question, for instance, of whether the newspaper industry was helpful 
or harmful to the establishment or maintenance of the apartheid system. Most 
of the "reminiscences of retired journalists and editors" fall into the latter 
category. Ex-Sunday Times editor Joel Mervis, for example, in his work The 
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Fourth Estate (1989), writes that "even though statecraft and the craft of 
journalism have much in common, they are, like opposing barristers in court, 
basically adversaries" (Mervis 1989, ix). H Lindsay Smith's publication Behind 
the Press in South Africa, despite asserting that "it has been the policy of the 
daily press .,. that ipso facto whatever is best for the gold mines is best for 
South Africa as a whole, and that end is kept ever foremost in mind" concludes 
that capital exerts only a benign influence on the autonomous press (1945, 72-
73). By not abusing its power, argues Smith, the press remains a responsible, 
free agent capable of opposing the state. 
Elaine Potter sets out in considerable detail some of the structural links 
between the English-language press and mining capital. She classifies that 
sector of the press, though, as an "external opposition" that "uniformly opposes 
the government, its ideology and its supporters" (1975, 7). This stance is taken 
up by a range of writers including Hepple (1960), Neame (1956) and Richard 
Pollak: "Newspapers serve as the lone megaphone of dissent. Without the still 
moderately free press to promulgate news and unpopular ideas, the country's 
political lopsidedness would be near complete ... More than any powerful force 
in the country these newspapers stand almost alone between the Afrikaans 
government and totalitarian darkness" (Pollak 1981, 2). 
A number of writers take the opposite viewpoint. Chimutengwende, for instance, 
argues that newspapers "represent the forces of the status quo ... None of the 
media can publish or broadcast material undermining the principles of their 
owners or the elements upon which they depend financially" (Chimutengwende 
1978, 48). For Hachten and Giffard, the press "essentially serve the narrow 
class interests of the dominant whites" (1984, 97), while the Tomasellis state 
that "all sectors of the established (South African) media support one or more 
factions of the hegemonic alliance" (1989, 33). 
On the question of where to locate the South African print media both in the 
apartheid era as well as in the current democratic dispensation, Guy Berger 
offers a useful "Four Perspectives" model (1999). At root, he argues that the 
choice of an analyst's political framework together with the chosen methodology 
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will have a profound impact on the conclusions one draws as to whether the 
media worked for or against apartheid and whether it does the same for 
democracy. In his model (Table 2), Berger identifies four perspectives: 
structural functionalism, abstract historicism, the media as vested instrument 
and the media/state partnership (my labels, based on his description). 
Table 2: Berger's Four Perspectives 
Name Historical nature 
1 Structural functionalism Continuous 
Media reinforces ruling class power 
2: Abstract historicism Continuous 
Media as 4th Estate 
3 Vested instrument Discontinuous 
Media reflects control 
4 Media/state partnership Discontinuous 
No need to oppose government 
50 U R C E 5: http://journ . ru .ac.za/stafflberger. htm I; http://journ.ru.ac.za/staff/guylindex . html; 
Transformation (38) 
In brief, the structural functionalism model is a class-based perspective 
suggesting little has changed or is likely to change concerning the media's role 
in society given its continuing structural bias in favour of the ruling, bourgeois 
class. The second perspective also remains unchanged whether in the pre- or 
post-apartheid periods. This perspective, Berger refers to it as "abstract 
historicism", is classic Liberal theory. Here the media is the Fourth Estate vital 
to the balance of powers in society and perpetually critical of government, 
whether racist or democratic. 
In the third, "vested instrument" perspective, Berger suggests the media's role 
has changed fundamentally. Pre-1994, the print media were owned by white 
media and supported apartheid. Post-1994, there is a significant degree of 
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black-ownership and management and therefore support for the new 
democratic dispensation7. The media, in other words, has switched allegiances. 
This is probably the perspective that matches most closely the Hallin-Mancini 
paradigm which links change in the nature of political systems with change in 
media systems. The fit, however, is neither neat nor sufficient. The fourth 
perspective identifies the healing of a fundamental rift between the (apartheid) 
state and the (white) media and the creation of a new partnership between the 
(democratic) state and the (black) media. This perspective argues for a different 
set of rules to be put in place in which the media is more supportive of a new, 
representative state. Depending on which perspective one chooses, Berger 
suggests that "crazy and conflating conclusions" can be drawn (1999, 5). 
Berger's model also involves a "fifth perspective", "the mix". This acknowledges 
the complexity of the media's role and the probability that it has played positive 
and negative roles in both the pre- and post-apartheid eras. "The media is 
integrated into the dominant social relations, but as a contested part," he argues 
(1999, 5). Berger's four perspectives model is certainly a useful analytical tool, 
in particular prompting consideration of the continuity or otherwise of the match 
between media and political systems. What the model does demand is the clear 
definition of one's theoretical paradigm together with an acknowledgment that 
this choice will have a significant bearing on the conclusions that are drawn 
from it. 
Since the 1980s, there has been a steady growth in the quantity and range of 
South African critiques of the media. These correspond broadly with the 
different methodologies adopted globally. They include Lynette Steenveld's 
work using a culturalist approach (2004), Luthuli's support of textual and 
discourse analysis (2004) and the political economy research conducted by 
Grove (1996), Mabote (1996), Tomaselli (1997), Berger (1999), Krabill (2001), 
Boloka (2004), and Jacobs (2004). There has been no engagement with Hallin 
and Mancini's Three Models Theory by South African scholars and indeed only 
a handful of critiques in the global literature, mostly in the form of book reviews. 
Some scholars (Tomaselli 1997. Boloka & Krabill 2000) ha\"e argued that due to the pyramidal nature 
of the South African corporate environment the extent of genuine black ownership is debatable. 
37 
These are referred to in some detail below. Perhaps the closest any South 
African scholar has come has been in the work of Guy Berger (2002). In his 
essay on "Theorising the media-democracy relationship in Southern Africa", 
Berger finds that the hallmark of much of the scholarly writing on subject is its 
reliance "upon unreflective, conventional wisdoms about the way that 'media' is 
an important element in democracy" (2002, 22). Berger, along with several 
authors he cites such as Manyarara, Martin and Ngugi, warns too of the 
dangers of "lifting concepts like media and democracy from western conditions 
and applying them unthinkingly to Africa" (2002, 21). He goes on, however, to 
say that "what is needed, arguably, is a more wide-ranging conceptual 
framework" and bemoans the limited scope of Siebert et ai's dated Four 
Theories of the Press (1956). "The quest is therefore for universally applicable 
concepts, which are relevant and explanatory in Africa and which designate 
broad processes and functions" (Berger 2002,22). Hallin and Mancini's more 
contemporary and far-reaching paradigm, together with what is hopefully its 
thoughtful application within this work, may serve as a response both to 
Berger's concerns and his appeal for a more appropriate conceptual framework. 
The Three Models Theory 
The Hallin and Mancini Three Models paradigm is indeed founded on Siebert et 
ai's landmark Four Theories of the Press (1956) which argued that a country's 
press always takes on the "form and coloration" of the social and political 
structures within which it operates (2004, 8). But while Four Theories "betrayed 
its Cold War origins" (Couldry 2005, 308) in the design of its press categories, 
Hallin and Mancini took comparative media system analysis a big step forward 
by stressing the need for empirical enquiry and also for the genuine 
comparative analysis that was lacking in Four Theories (McQuail 2006, 266). 
The "primary focus" of Hallin and Mancini's Comparing Media Systems is the 
relationship between media systems and political systems (2004, 1). They ask 
whether it is possible to identify systematic connections between these two 
structures. They also seek to identify variations in the structure and political role 
of the news media, try to account for how these variations occurred and ponder 
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their implications for democratic political systems. They attempt, in brief, to 
answer the question Siebert et al posed in 1956: why is the press as it is? 
Hallin and Mancini's answer, equally succinctly, is that the news media cannot 
be understood without understanding the nature of the state, the system of 
political parties, the pattern of relationships between economic and political 
interests and the development of civil society, among other elements of the 
social structure (2004, 8). Comparing the media and political systems of 18 
countries in Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini found these 
countries could be clustered into three broad groups, or 'ideal types'. These 
they called the Liberal model, the Democratic Corporatist model and the 
Polarised Pluralist model. Each ideal type had a pattern of historical 
development and displayed features of a media-political matrix that many of its 
often geographically proximate 'member' countries shared. 
Thus, for example, the countries of the Polarised Pluralist model are to be found 
in the Mediterranean region (Greece, Italy, Spain, France), had similar, late, 
contested transitions from Catholic absolutist states into industrialised 
democracies and developed an environment in which party politics and the 
media were frequently closely integrated. The Democratic Corporatist model is 
made up of countries from north and central Europe (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Holland, Germany) that tend to have a long tradition of limits on state 
power, strong social welfare policies and a history of Protestantism and 
Calvinism. This model is characterised by a historical coexistence of 
commercial media and media tied to organised social and political groups. The 
Liberal model is made up of the United States, the United Kingdom and various 
connected territories (Canada, Ireland) in or around the North Atlantic. In these 
countries, commercial newspapers developed early and expanded with little 
state involvement. The relative dominance of market mechanisms and of 
commercial media are common features. 
Hallin and Mancini stress that these clusters are "ideal types" and are not meant 
to describe every trend and quirk of the countries that are clustered around 
them. Indeed, they sympathise broadly with McQuail's contention that "in most 
countries, the media do not constitute any single system with a single purpose 
39 
or philosophy, but are composed of many separate, overlapping, often 
inconsistent elements, with appropriate differences of normative expectation 
and actual regulation (McQuail 1994, 133). Hallin and Mancini contend, 
however, the primary purpose of the ideal types "is not classification of 
individual systems, but the identification of characteristic patterns of 
relationships between system characteristics" (2004, 11). They argue, 
furthermore, that the characteristics that define the models are interrelated, that 
they result from a meaningful pattern of historical development and "do not 
merely occur accidentally" (2004, 11). 
Hallin and Mancini identify four "major dimensions", the tools by which they 
allocate different countries to the appropriate ideal type. These dimensions are: 
1. The state of development of a country's mass media market; 
2. The closeness of the links between political parties and the press (political 
parallelism); 
3. The state and stage of journalistic professionalisation; and 
4. The degree or level of state intervention in the media. 
These four dimensions collectively constitute Hallin and Mancini's "attempt to 
make sense of the patterns of difference and similarity ... and to link these 
patterns to the social and political context in which they evolved" (2004, 21). 
In the course of this thesis, South Africa's media and political systems will be 
held up to the four major dimensions, each of which is the subject of a chapter. 
Hallin and Mancini found that very often, countries clustered into the same 
model had virtually interchangeable answers to the questions posed by the four 
dimensions. For instance, countries falling into the Polarised Pluralist cluster 
generally do not have mass circulation newspapers, have a high degree of 
political parallelism, have relatively low levels of journalistic professionalism and 
the state has historically played a central, interventionist role in the media. The 
countries of the Democratic Corporatist model also have a high degree of 
political parallelism but have a strongly developed mass circulation press. They 
also enjoy a high level of journalistic professionalism and strong limits on the 
extent to which the state is permitted to intervene in the media. The countries of 
the Liberal Model have high levels of journalistic professionalism, a limited state 
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role in regulating the media, highly developed mass circulation newspapers and 
varying attitudes on political parallelism. 
Critics have seized on the heterogeneity of countries within the ideal-type 
clusters as a sign of weakness in the paradigm. The United States and Britain, 
for instance, have strongly contrasting attitudes to the political neutrality of the 
media. In the United States, party political neutrality is a lodestone of domestic 
political news coverage. In Britain, the major dailies are not only unabashed in 
their advocacy of political parties, they are often bought and read for that very 
reason. "When such large countries are problematic ... one begins to doubt the 
usefulness of the models," writes Nick Couldry (2005,308). Hallin and Mancini 
argue, however, that the models were not meant to describe a fixed set of 
characteristics, "but identify some of the underlying systemic relationships that 
help us to understand" the manner in which media systems change: "Media 
institutions evolve over time; at each step of their evolution, past events and 
institutional patterns inherited from earlier periods influence the direction they 
take" (2004, 12). In doing so, suggests Hampton, Hallin and Mancini have 
created a theoretical map of the contemporary European and American media 
systems (Hampton 2005, 243). 
McQuail also expresses his concern at the many subjective judgements that are 
required in outlining the topography of the model. At what point do you 
conclude, for instance, that a particular country's state of journalistic 
professionalism falls into one category as opposed to another? McQuail raises 
his discomfiture that some countries, including major ones like Germany, have 
been placed in the wrong model. And while Hallin and Mancini go to some 
lengths to argue the non-specificity of the ideal-types and readily concede 
exceptions and contradictions even within individual country's systems, McQuail 
worries that "continually being cautioned on this point. .. does tend to undermine 
confidence in the viability of the classifications" (McQuail 2005,268). McQuail 
argues, in addition, that Hallin and Mancini have neglected some important 
system-differentiating factors such as country size and the impact of 
regionalism. 
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It is true, however, that in spite of these limitations (many of which are dealt with 
below) and along with the other critics both McQuail and Couldry acknowledge 
the import of the Comparing Media Systems paradigm with McQuail calling it 
"useful" and "valuable" and Couldry giving the "remarkable" work a maximum 
five star rating in the Political Studies Review (McQuail, 268; Couldry, 308). 
There is an additional, but fundamental caveat that Hallin and Mancini add to 
their own thesis. This is that, over time, the difference between the three 
models is gradually reducing. This process of homogenisation, or convergence, 
has as its pole an international media culture best represented by the Liberal 
model. It is a process driven by a number of factors such as technology, the 
global interaction of journalists, the free press agenda of powerful media 
organisations and by what Hallin and Mancini call secularisation, ie the decline 
of representative institutions such as political parties and churches and their 
replacement by a broad church mass media. 
And while the reduction of all media systems to a Liberal model will never be 
perfect or complete (there are too many "counter-tendencies", according to 
Hallin and Mancini), this Americanisation of the media is the direction in which 
the global media is inexorably heading. Hallin and Mancini are quick to add that 
they believe changes in European media systems are driven "above all" by 
processes of changes internal to European society (2004, 255), thereby 
evading what Stevenson calls the "tired" explanation of American cultural 
imperialism (2005, 985). Nonetheless, they predict that the victorious cluster of 
global media systems will be the one currently occupied by the United States. 
This conclusion will also be addressed later on in this thesis. 
While some critics have pointed at the uncomfortable fit of major countries 
within their allocated clusters (such as Germany and France), and while Hallin 
and Mancini have not sought to extend their paradigm beyond North America 
and Western Europe, further limitations are evident. Hampton has identified the 
lack of any (formerly) authoritarian states within the paradigm (2005, 243). 
Couldry wonders that if even big countries like Germany fit uncomfortably into 
the paradigm, "what if one looked globally?" (2005, 308). This is a major 
understatement as indeed the vast majority of countries and media systems do 
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not form part of the Three Models scenario. Of particular interest to this 
candidate is the place of emerging democracies in the paradigm and, if a fit can 
be found, what the implications of the Three Models assumptions are for the 
consolidation of those new democratic systems? 
Wisdom Tettey has described the recent rise in democratic fervour on the 
African continent as a result of the "third wave" of democratisation hailed by 
scholars such as Chabal (1998) and Ihonvbere (1996) (cited in Tettey, 2001, 5). 
"The media are among the forces that have shaped, and continue to define, the 
establishment of democracy in Africa," Tettey writes (ibid). The close 
connection between the media and democracy in Africa alluded to by many 
authors (Suarez 1996; Tettey 2001) further necessitates the continent's 
inclusion in comparative systems analysis. 
Finally, Hallin and Mancini acknowledge that media systems are not static and 
evolve over time. They point out that the media systems that populate their 
paradigm, those of Western Europe and North America, have changed "very 
substantially in recent years" (2004, 12). Of the systems included in the 
paradigm, Greece, Spain and Portugal were presented as the countries that 
had most recently undergone a significant process of regime change from 
authoritarian to democratic state. These were all at least three or four decades 
ago now. It is true, however, that some of the countries, particularly from the 
southern Mediterranean region, are less mature democracies than those 
populating the other clusters. There is an irony in suggesting Greece falls into 
this camp given the origin of the concept of democracy, but there is cogency in 
specifying that "modern" democracy far beyond the city-state version is a more 
recent phenomenon in that country. I would suggest, nonetheless, that the 
change experienced by other media systems, such as those in new or emerging 
democracies, have often undergone far more dramatic change than that 
experienced in the developed North that predominates in Comparing Media 
Systems. 
An objective of this thesis will be to explore whether the Three Models paradigm 
is adequately equipped to deal with rapid, dramatic media system change. Is it 
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possible that media systems that for years, decades or even generations 
operated in a context of authoritarian rule, run the risk of serious regression 
back toward their authoritarian practices once their host country has achieved 
democratic status? Such trends may amount to more than the 
'countertendencies' identified by Hallin and Mancini, and may actually signal at 
best a dilution of democratic governance, at worst may herald the return of a 
new form of authoritarian control. This contradicts the modernisation thesis that 
all media systems are inexorably headed toward democratic Liberalism. We 
shall explore this assumption and the light thrown on it by at least one emerging 
democracy during the course of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three 
'TACIT CONSENT': POLITICAL PARALLELISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PRINT MEDIA 
Introduction 
Political parallelism is one of four 'major dimensions' used to categorise 
countries and their media systems into one or other of Hallin and Mancini's 
three models of media and politics; Liberal, Polarised Pluralist or Democratic 
Corporatist. The concept of political parallelism refers in essence to the 
closeness of the links between a political system and the media and examines 
the extent to which media systems reflect the major political trends and 
cleavages of the host country. Hallin and Mancini contend that a high degree of 
political parallelism, in which the media very directly reflect the spectrum and 
culture of a country's political life, is most often the hallmark of either the 
Polarised Pluralist model or, alternatively, of the Democratic Corporatist model. 
The dominance of market mechanisms and of the commercial media within the 
Liberal model suggests it is unlikely that a country falling in to the Liberal cluster 
- other than the 'exception', Britain - would have a media so neatly connected 
with formal or informal political organisation. 
This chapter will spell out more precisely the concept of political parallelism as 
well as its theoretical and historical roots. It will set out the indicators of political 
parallelism, as described by Hallin and Mancini. It will then try to ascertain how 
South Africa's political and media system matches up to these benchmarks and 
therefore begin to plot where the country might sit within Hallin and Mancini's 
triangular comparative media system matrix (see Figure 1, page 20). It will need 
to do this both by analysing South Africa's political and media system prior to 
the advent of democracy and, in more detail, with events in the period since 
1994. 
Finally, it will consider whether the aggregated, post-1994 position is a more or 
less static one and therefore deduce where the first cross might be marked on 
the matrix. If there is perceived substantial movement, an indication of the 
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direction in which South Africa is shifting will be ascertained. The chapter will 
maintain constant critical vigilance concerning the appropriateness or otherwise 
of the concept of political parallelism in general and as it relates to the South 
African experience in particular. It will also interrogate the adequacy of the 
indicators as well as their applicability. 
Political Parallelism: origins 
Hallin and Mancini contend that from the beginning of the print era, and 
particularly from the time of the Reformation, political advocacy was a central 
function of the print media. Indeed, by the late 18th century and early 19th 
century, this was its principal function in everyone of the 18 countries studied in 
Comparing Media Systems (2004,26). According to Hallin and Mancini, a new 
and contrasting model of political journalism began to emerge in the late 19th 
century. According to this new trend, the journalist was seen as the neutral 
arbiter of political communications "standing apart from particular interests and 
causes" (2004, 26). Frequently, this was connected with the development of a 
commercial press whose purpose was to make money rather than serve a 
political cause. This commercial press was financed by advertisers, rather than 
subsidies from political actors and corresponded with the development of 
journalistic professionalisation (see Chapter Six). The "Whig" interpretation of 
Ango-American media history, recalls Hallin, is that the growing autonomy and 
independence of newspapers was based on their increasing value as an 
advertising medium (2005, 226). This counterposes the alternative view of 
critical. 
Earlier work in the area focuses on the relationship between the press and 
political parties rather than the political system as a whole. This has been 
termed 'party-press parallelism' (Seymour-Ure, 1974, Blumler & Gurevitch 
1975). A classic example of this form of party-press parallelism is Denmark. 
Until the early 20th century, each town in Denmark had four newspapers 
representing each of the country's four political parties (Hallin and Mancini 
2004, 27). This would naturally indicate an extremely high form of party-press 
parallelism. But while Hallin and Mancini's predecessors focused their attention 
on political parties, the emphasis in Comparing Media Systems is on political 
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orientation. This matches the work's theoretical assumptions of secularisation 
and differentiation, both of which anticipate the declining importance of political 
parties. 
The theoretical constructs of secularisation and differentiation are critical to 
Hallin and Mancini's comparative paradigm. Perhaps, to over-simplify, the 
differentiation theory espoused initially by Durkheim, then by Talcott Parsons, 
Jeffrey Alexander, Niklas Luhmann and others, envisages the increasingly 
specialised functions of a complex modern society being undertaken by 
increasingly specialised social bodies (cited in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 77). 
This requires an ever-greater role for an independent and effective 
communication system (the media). 
8y secularisation, Hallin and Mancini mean the separation of citizens from 
attachments to religious and ideological "faiths" and the decline of institutions 
based on these "faiths" such as churches, trade unions, interest groups, political 
parties and similar institutions (2004, 263). With the general decline of these 
institutions, the mass media become more autonomous and begin to take over 
many of the functions these goups once performed (2004, 263). 80th 
differentiation and secularisation, modernisation theory contends, contribute to 
the process of convergence - or drift - of media systems toward the Liberal 
model. It is worth noting that in the final sections of the their chapter on 
homogenization that Hallin and Mancini do question whether it makes sense to 
project this trend, inevitably, into the future. The South African case study casts 
further doubt on this assumption. 
Differentiation and secularisation both emphasise the increasingly important 
role of an autonomous, professionalised, "catch-all" mass media and the 
decline of other more traditional civic structures. According to Hallin, "The 
perspective of differentiation theory is implicit in much of the conventional 
wisdom about the relation of media to society ... and in some sense lies behind 
the common assumption that the Anglo-American model of journalism is the 
norm to which media systems naturally tend to evolve" (2005, 224-226). This 
contention will be tested further below. 
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Barbara Berkel puts Hallin and Mancini's relatively new notion of political 
parallelism to the test in her work on the Haider conflict (2006). In the Spring of 
2000, 14 member countries of the European Union decided to impose sanctions 
on Austria in response to the participation in that country's government of the 
rightwing populist party, the FPO. The conflict was primarily triggered by racist 
and xenophobic statements made by FPO chairman Jorg Haider (Berkel 2006, 
89). In her comparative analysis of the Haider debate as conveyed by eight 
quality newspapers in four different European countries, Berkel found that all 
leftist newspapers advocated a position that was close to that of the leftist 
political parties, while the conservative newspapers positioned themselves 
similarly to the conservative party speakers. Without direct connections 
between newspapers and specific parties this, in Berkel's analysis, amounted to 
a corroboration of Hallin and Mancini's revised concept of a broader parallelism. 
"It appears that the Haider debate was characterised by a 'political parallelism' 
of the press in the sense Hallin and Mancini (2004, 28) re-defined the concept 
of 'party-press parallelism'. Very similar patterns of political parallelism were 
observed in each country under study" (Berkel 2006, 99). 
At the time of writing, Berkel's was the only published peer-reviewed paper this 
candidate came across which critically reviewed Hallin and Mancini's notion of 
political parallelism and contrasted it with the Blumler and Gurevitch work on 
party-press pluralism that preceded it three decades ago (1975). 
South African experience supports both the decline of political parties and the 
growing role of the mass media. A national public opinion survey conducted in 
2006 by Markinor found that the number of people who supported South 
Africa's three biggest political parties, the ANC, the Democratic Alliance and the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, was decreasing over time. In a press release 
announcing the publication of the survey, Markinor reported that the fastest 
growing political group in South Africa was that of the ambivalent "undecided 
voters" (those who either did not know, would not vote, refused to respond or 
who spoiled their mock ballot paper). This group had grown to be the second 
largest political grouping behind the ANC and was bigger than any of the 
opposition parties. The 'undecideds' "grew substantially from 14.1 % in 
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November 2005 ... to 16.1 % in November 2006," the press release said 
(Markinor, Press Release, 21 December 2006, page 2). Estimates suggest that 
as many as seven million eligible voters may not have even registered to vote in 
the last election, the majority being potential first time voters (Calland 2006, 
266). 
In spite of growing proportional majorities at national election time, ANC party 
membership figures have consistently fallen in the 13 years of democracy. 
According to a report from party secretary general Kgalema Motlanthe to the 
party's national general council in 2005, paid-up branch membership had 
steadily but slowly declined from 416,000 in 2002 to 401,000 by 2005 (cited in 
Calland 2006,314). This decline has caused an interesting shift in party 
finances: "Such has been the change within the ANC that donations from 
corporate benefactors, black and white, now count for more than membership 
subscriptions. Inevitably this presents the danger of affluent donors having 
greater access to the party and its leaders than ordinary supporters" (Gumede 
2005, 126). Party leaders have repeatedly worried about deteriorating 
organisational efficiency at branch level. At the same high-level council meeting 
in 2005, Motlanthe told his senior party colleagues: 
In many of our branches there are no sustainable political 
programmes and community campaigns. They are conflict-ridden and 
unstable and in many instances fraught with fights over leadership 
positions, selection and deployment of councilors, tendering and 
control of projects and recruitment of membership in order to serve 
factional or selfish interests (cited in Calland 2006, 129). 
There have also been concerns voiced at important national occasions at the 
erosion of the ANC's traditional values (such as altruism and the supremacy of 
the collective) and of their usurpation by self-serving careerism and by party 
members' "lust for financial gain" (Paton 2007, 26). 
In an article published recently in the Financial Mail and headlined "Soul for 
Sale", reporter Carol Paton wrote of the "rot" that is currently undermining the 
49 
ANC: "Fights over who should get what contract are happening with growing 
frequency countrywide. It is a matter of embarrassment to the ANC, a party 
many members proudly think of in terms of its struggle legacy. That legacy is 
now being severely undermined, and the party seems paralysed" (Paton 2007, 
27). 
In his research, Anthony Butler has also found that generational turnover and 
careerism have significantly weakened the ANC's organisational and intellectual 
character (Butler 2006, 41). He also recalls aspects of Motlanthe's landmark 
address on his 2005 organisational concerns: 
The central challenge facing the ANC is to address the problems that 
arise from our cadres' susceptibility to moral decay occasioned by the 
struggle for the control of and access to resources. All the paralysis in 
our programmes, all the divisions in our structures, are in one way or 
another, a consequence of this cancer in our midst (cited in Butler 
2006,41). 
A revitalisation of the ANC's branches was undertaken in the lead-up to the 
2004 election in a bid to improve the functioning of the party's organisational 
structures and this appeared to have been a successful intervention, at least in 
the short-term (Southall & Daniel 2005, 43). It points, however, to genuine 
anxiety within the majority party and the resulting urgent formulation of 
strategies to respond to leadership concerns. 
With the ANC's political majority on the increase (in terms of the proportion of 
voters, rather than in overall numbers), it is natural that the "constellation of 
losers" that represents the country's other minority political parties are 
experiencing a gradual hemorrhaging of support (Southall & Daniel 2005,43). 
There is no better example of this than the New National Party, formerly the 
political organisation that held unfettered power in South Africa for almost 50 
years. Shortly after the 2004 election, the (New) National Party disappeared 
without trace. The other minority parties are faring marginally better but lurch 
from one crisis to the next. The opposition, writes Calland, is "in complete 
disarray and crisis" (2006, 268). 
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With such a powerful and increasing majority, it is commonly understood that 
the only challenge of significance to the continued dominance of the ANC lies 
from within: that one or more of the party's constituent parts (the party itself, the 
South African Communist party and a federation of sympathetic trade unions, 
Cosatu) will break away to establish a new, worker-based movement. Clearly, 
the political terrain has shifted during the era of democracy and the 
secularisation to which Hallin and Mancini allude, is very much in evidence in 
South Africa. 
The media, by contrast, has experienced enormous expansion, diversity and 
growth in the post-1994 period. The best examples of this are the liberalisation 
of the broadcast sector (including the creation of almost 100 community radio 
stations) as well as the birth of a mass print market with the emergence of 
tabloid newspapers. Government has not missed the potential of the community 
media and has moved fast to establish links with the sector. The Media 
Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) was established in 2004 with the 
specific purpose of nurturing non-mainstream titles and outlets. A formalisation 
of the relationship between the state and the community has taken place with a 
growing and largely unregulated array of contractual and financial relationships 
between community newspapers, community radio stations and various 
government departments and agencies (Hadland & Thorne, 2004). 
Nicola Jones et al have specifically argued that South Africa's new mass-
market tabloid newspapers serve a range of social functions that perfectly 
matches Hallin and Mancini's notion of secularisation (Jones et ai, 2007). Their 
research suggests the new tabloids are carving new terrain in the country's 
public sphere. They also appear to provide a new level of accountability and 
access to millions of people who, until recently, didn't buy or read newspapers. 
"By giving access to information [Tabloid newspapers provide] 'societal 
dialogues' and a 'marketplace of ideas' on common concerns essential for a 
working democracy" (Jones et al 2007,37). They also argue that as well as 
serving as a forum for an extended public sphere, tabloids contribute directly to 
societal change: 
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While tabloid journalism may have many faults, it can also be seen as 
an alternative arena for public discourse, wherein criticism of both the 
privileged political elites and traditional types of public discourse play 
a central role. Tabloid journalism has the ability to broaden the public, 
giving news access to groups that previously have not been targeted, 
and to effect societal change by redefining issues" (Jones et al 2007, 
43). 
Media24, the holding company for the Daily Sun, acknowledged the newfound 
and growing influence it was deliberately trying to achieve with all of its titles in 
2002: [Our] "newspapers now increasingly provide a forum for all the larger 
communities. The lively content reflects a dynamic community adapting to new 
situations, whilst rediscovering and reinventing itself. [Media24's] newspapers 
aim to be a mouthpiece for all opinions, being not only a messenger, but a 
companion" (Naspers 2002, 8). 
In his work on media coverage of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), Ron Krabill has come across a similar process in which the 
role of the press is broadening out beyond the traditional liberal notion of the 
dispassionate eyewitness: "South African mass media have served as both 
essential actors in the TRC drama, as well as the stage on which much of the 
drama has been performed" (2001, 568). This is endorsed by Verdoolaege who 
argues in an article on media representations of the TRC that "the success and 
prestige of the TRC of South Africa can largely be attributed to the media 
attention" (2005, 181). 
We referred earlier in the chapter to Hallin and Mancini's anticipation that the 
increasingly important role of an autonomous, professionalised, 'catch-all' mass 
media would lead to the decline of other more traditional civic structures. The 
notion of 'catch-all' mass media is something I wanted to dwell on briefly. The 
authors do not say in Comparing Media Systems whether they are suggesting 
that individual titles or broadcast outlets are becoming 'catch-all' or whether the 
media as a sector contains within it enough diversity to appeal to just about 
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anyone. There is an important difference, illustrated by the importance of 
'nicheing' in the South African context. 
Deon du Plessis, the publisher of South Africa's first tabloid, the Oaily Sun, 
argues that the reason for the gradual decline of mainstream newspapers in 
South Africa is exactly their tendency to aim too widely. The path to growth, he 
suggests, lies not in providing a long banquet table of options for readers to pick 
and choose, but in targeting specialised information for particular people with 
specific interests: 
That's him [pointing at a manikin in the doorway dressed in a hard hat 
and overalls]. We're interested in him. The question we ask ourselves 
is: Is this guy going to talk about this today at the tea urns in his 
Alberton factory. If the answer is yes, we do it. If it's no, we don't. The 
Star, the Argus and the other dinosaurs use the shotgun blast as their 
approach to capturing an audience. They flap about and try to 
capture all the fish in this big net. All that went in 1994 ... The bulge in 
the demographics occurs in the 25-38 age group with Std 4/5 
education, male, middle income (R5,OOO a month), with a partner (not 
married), who owns their own house, has bought a cell phone and 
now a new car. That's the niche. News is a commodity. I'm not saying 
you fuck around with it. You just apply one sort here and one there. 
They try to print everything" (Du Plessis 2005). 
The competition to Naspers, Independent Newspapers, agrees that while their 
titles retain their catch-all emphasis, "we are seeing now the fragmentation of 
the daily newspaper market" in South Africa (Williams 2005). This is a trend on 
which Vincent Mosco has pondered: "One of the major issues for political 
economy today is the significance of the tendency to organise production 
around specific rather than mass markets"(1996, 74). Similarly, Eric Louw has 
observed that "as mass industrial capitalism has mutated into post-Fordist 
network capitalism, mass markets have declined in importance, while niche 
markets have become more significant" (2001, 65). A complicating element in 
the South African context concerns language. While prior to 1994, language 
and political affinity were often closely attuned, in part due to the focus by 
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mainstream newspaper companies on white readers, this changed in the post-
apartheid era. The emergence of a mass black audience together with the shift 
in political affiliation (see Chapter Four) has diminished the strength of language 
as a predictor of political allegiance. 
While it may be true that the development of a 'catch-all' mass media may be 
an accurate description of media system trends in general, the term 'catch-all' 
itself requires a rather more nuanced treatment than is afforded in Comparing 
Media Systems. A media system that has been broken up into a thousand 
niches - thereby catering much more effectively for a mass public - may prove 
to be more legitimately 'catch-all' than the biggest, monopoly outlet. 
Developments both within South Africa's political party system and within its 
media do however suggest a broad corroboration of Hallin and Mancini's view 
of systemic change. Whether the end result of this change is the triumph of the 
Liberal model remains moot. 
Political Parallelism: where South Africa fits in 
Hallin and Mancini identify two environments which suggest the nature of 
particular media and political systems: external pluralism, in which different 
media reflect the different tendencies on display in the political arena, and 
internal pluralism, in which media organisations tend to avoid institutional ties to 
specific political groups and attempt to maintain neutrality and balance in their 
content (Hallin and Mancini 2004,29). Internal pluralism tends to indicate a low 
level of political parallelism, while external pluralism suggests a high level, 
according to Halliil and Mancini (ibid). There is, furthermore, a connection 
between political parallelism and journalistic professionalism. Where political 
parallelism is high, journalistic professionalism tends to be low (2004, 38). This 
connection will be explored further in Chapter Six. 
I contend that South Africa enjoys a state of internal pluralism stemming 
principally from the media system's strong historical ties to the liberal model 
system of the United Kingdom. While titles occasionally display partisan 
allegiances, such as at election time, on the whole South African newspapers 
do tend to avoid institutional ties with political parties and do attempt to maintain 
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neutrality and balance in their content. We will see that they are not always 
particularly successful in the latter endeavour. This is due to the powerful 
influence on political life and discourse that has been exerted by the dominant 
majority party, the African National Congress (ANC), in the post-1994 era. 
The ANC has won all three elections in the democratic era, each with growing 
majorities 1. In the last election in 2004, the party won in excess of two thirds of 
the electorate's support giving it effective and substantive power at all three 
levels of government. The two-thirds majority also gives the ANC the power to 
amend the country's Constitution. The distinction between party and state is not 
always evident in post-apartheid South Africa, even to senior party officials. 
Horwitz complains that from a policy perspective he has found it "essentially 
impossible to separate the ANC leadership's political or party positions from 
those of the government" (2001, 284). This is not an unusual refrain. There are 
indeed concerns, writes Johnston, that "South Africa is in danger of developing 
the pathologies of a one-party state" (2005, 29). 
The ANC is a 'broad church' political party that comprises not only its own 
grassroots membership and national structures but also its 'allies', the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). While there is an official opposition, the Democratic 
Alliance, and some resistance from the Inkatha Freedom Party in the region of 
KwaZulu-Natal, there is little hope of any of these parties unseating the ANC 
nationally at any time in the foreseeable future. 
Murmurings of single party 'dominance' were articulated soon after the ANC's 
overwhelming victory in the first democratic election of 1994, most particularly in 
the work of Giliomee and Simkins (1999), and Giliomee, Myburgh and 
Schlemmer (2001 ). Among the arguments they proposed was the existence of 
a fundamental tension between dominant-party rule and democracy, "for whilst 
party dominance can pave the way to competitive democracy, it can also lead 
to fa9ade democracy or barely concealed authoritarianism" (Southall & Daniel 
I The ANC s proportion of the Yote in national elections increased from 62.65% in 199-l to 66.35% in 
1999 to 69.68% in 200-l (Southall & DanieL 2005: -ll) 
55 
2005, 35). And though the ANC has disputed allegations of party domination-
arguing that the concept of dominance is inherently conservative and serves as 
a cover for white interests that have an inherent distrust of black governance -
few would question the scale or entrenchment of the party's position (ibid). 
Indeed, following the most recent national election, analysts Roger Southall and 
John Daniel concluded "there can be little doubt that the ANC has emerged 
from the 2004 election as, in the immediate future, more rather than less 
dominant" (2005, 54). 
The only significant opposition to the ANC comes from within. This unassailable 
political position has contributed to the party's ambivalent attitude toward the 
press. As Johnston observes: "At best, the ANC's relationship with the political 
press has been distant and neurotically suspicious; at worst, pathologically 
hostile" (2005, 13). This relationship will be discussed at greater length in the 
chapter dealing with state intervention in the media (Chapter Four). Suffice to 
say at this point, that while there are a number of political parties and social 
groupings, the state and its majority party exert overwhelming influence on the 
South African polity. Sixteen political parties are currently represented in the 
South African Parliament. At best, half a dozen find a voice on an ongoing basis 
somewhere in the press, but coverage overall is dominated by the state, the 
ANC and the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance. 
Just as the ANC dominates political life, so it is increasingly resilient to the 
demands of civil society. In spite of South Africa's large and diverse network of 
civil society organisations, very few succeed in impacting with any authority on 
state policy processes. Most of the time, the executive simply ignores them. 
What looked at first like a very promising and consultative process around 
media policy during the early 1990s (see Horwitz, 2001) soon fizzled out, 
particularly in regard to print media (see Chapter Five). A study conducted by 
the Open Democracy Advice Centre in 2004 found the overall level of 
responsiveness by the executive to requests from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to be very poor: over 50% of requests were ignored, 
despite the legal requirement to respond inside 30 days (cited in Calland 2006, 
245). Occasionally, organisations like the Treatment Action Campaign break the 
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mould and succeed in generating enormous publicity for its work (in this 
instance, the free distribution of antiretroviral drugs for the treatment of HIV-
Aids), but on the whole the civil society's sector is as limited on the state as it is 
on the press. ''The structures of the bureaucracy remain hostile to public 
participation and pressure. Policy processes often remain secretive and closed 
to the influence of alliance partners and the broader public, leading to mistaken 
and unpopular measures in some cases. People's organisations have only 
limited routes to participate in governance" (Gumede 2005, 135). 
While the South African print media can be categorised as internally pluralistic, 
the powerful position of the dominant party has constrained the scope of this 
pluralism. Reflecting the evident hegemony of the ANC, only a narrow range of 
political opinion is offered by a relatively small number of mainstream media 
organisations. The range of opinion emanating from the powerful ruling party 
itself is also relatively narrow, not least due to the party's emphasis on cadre 
discipline and adherence to the 'party line'. Collectively all the other political and 
social organisations enjoy only occasional moments of power. Indeed, the 
media's unwillingness to give these groupings much play in the press on an 
ongoing basis is a further indicator of the limits that have been imposed on what 
is essentially an internally pluralist, but distorted environment. 
The South African print media is broadly supportive of the social contract 
imposed by a powerful state. This is founded on the emotive appeal of 
overturning the country's apartheid legacy and of embracing democracy, human 
rights and equality. These are all difficult notions to contest. The South African 
media, as demonstrated by the Human Rights Commission hearings into racism 
in the media, is deeply vulnerable to allegations of skewed news values, 
Afropessimism (racism), overstepping the bounds of personal privacy, 
professional incompetence and a lack of respect and due deference for a 
democratically-elected government (Johnston 2006, 13). 
'Opposition', when it occurs within the media, has more often to do with the 
errors of individuals within government - such as corrupt members of 
parliament or errant members of the executive - than with the state, the party or 
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even policy as a whole. There is, therefore, a consensual position determined 
by the state and adopted by the media that reflects a poor level of internal 
pluralism. What might seem, or is projected as, neutrality and balance is, more 
often than not, tacit agreement with a status quo determined by the state and 
the ANC. 
Few better examples of this are evident than the wholehearted embrace by the 
media of the Mandela administration's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994. After little more than a year of massive media 
coverage and public support, during which the RDP became a household 
acronym, the ANC promptly dropped the programme and shifted Jay Naidoo, 
the minister responsible, elsewhere. "The ANC leadership was told by Mbeki 
that he feared the expansionist RDP was not inspiring market confidence. A 
new, market-friendly policy of growth before redistribution was needed" 
(Gumede 2005, 133). The development demonstrated both the power of the 
media to popularise policy but also its vulnerability and gullibility to the 
meaningless and soon jettisoned catchphrases of the powerful. 
Johnston concurs: "the print media - in varying degrees - canvasses the 
danger of the ANC becoming a political elite, made remote by the distance and 
prerogatives of office from the direct concerns of ordinary people, for whom the 
newspapers have become champions. This kind of 'opposition' is characteristic 
of media that do not have major ideological or even policy differences with 
governments, but practice vigorous populist interrogation of mismanagement, 
corruption and other pathologies of political systems that do not feature genuine 
competition" (2005, 29). 
The notion of a consensual contract between the media and a "dominant elite" 
was popularised by Herman and Chomsky's landmark work, Manufacturing 
Consent (1988, 1). It is a thesis that is certainly borne out by my understanding 
of developments within the South African polity. They argue, for instance, that 
"powerful sources regularly take advantage of media routines and dependency 
to manage the media, to manipulate them into following a special agenda and 
framework" (1988, 23). When newspapers, even those that consider 
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themselves independent, rely so heavily on the majority party and the state for 
information (see Chapter Three), it is hardly surprising the consent becomes so 
automatic, it's almost unconscious. This is something to which Stuart Hall has 
alluded in his work. The media, he suggests, "reproduce the definition of the 
powerful, without being in a simple sense in their pay" (cited in Curran & Seaton 
1991,269). 
In the South African context, this is illustrated by the various efforts made by 
what used to be known as the Afrikaans press "to move closer to the new 
power elite" (Botma 2006, 3). Thus when the ANC held its party congress in 
Stellenbosch in December 2002, Die Burger published a special edition with an 
English-language front page to distribute to all the delegates (ibid). The same 
paper, together with the Kaapse Sakekamer (Cape Town Business Chamber) 
also awarded former President Nelson Mandela its prestigious 'Business leader 
of the Year' award in 2004. Neither was the move by the English-language 
mainstream press to 'cosy up' to the new regime something that happened 
easily. Indeed, the press as a whole was caught by surprise at the animosity 
displayed toward them by some important people, not least then President 
Nelson Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki. As former Sunday Times editor 
Ken Owen recalls: "It came as a special shock for journalists of what was called 
'the opposition press' to discover, soon after liberation, that public hostility 
towards them was more widespread and more intense than they had imagined, 
and that it extended to key elites whose support was necessary to the survival 
and functioning of a free press" (1998, 175). The need to ingratiate or at least to 
accommodate, even for the 'opposition press', had evidently become a matter 
of life or death. 
It was a need to which mainstream owners and management responded quickly 
and seemingly without compunction. "The cultivation of a warm relationship with 
government came before all else," commented Martin Williams of various media 
executives' "obsequious, ingratiating and approval-seeking" behaviour in the 
post-1994 period (1998, 194). 
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Ben Bagdikian, in his brilliant analysis of the American media's influence on 
social and political life, The Media Monopoly, describes how in the United 
States, the social contract between state and media is characterised by a 
conservative political viewpoint: "Major media news and commentary are 
heavily concentrated on center-to-right politics, with an almost total absence of 
progressive views ... they (the news media) suffer from built-in biases that 
protect corporate power and consequently weaken the public's ability to 
understand forces that create the American scene (2000, 1) 
South Africa, therefore, has a media system that is essentially internally 
pluralistic, though it exhibits strong contradictory forces as a consequence of 
the powerful single party state. Usually, according to the Hallin and Mancini 
model, this would indicate a low level of political parallelism. In South Africa's 
case, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed internal pluralism distorted by a 
democratic hegemony may well reflect a high degree of political parallelism. 
This is because a self-consciously neutral press may still depict little more than 
a political context that is overwhelmed by the discourse, personnel and policies 
of the dominant political party and its allies. 
We will get a clearer picture by investigating the applicability of the indicators, 
as described by Hallin and Mancini, to determine where South Africa in the 
post-apartheid period might fit in terms of political parallelism. As interesting as 
apartheid South Africa's placement might be, I am more interested in the 
current state of affairs and in what the implications are of this for the future of 
the South African polity and of its media. We will start with a discussion of the 
political environment and will consider with whether external or internal 
pluralism is the defining characteristic. The extent of pluralism in the political 
environment provides, as Hallin and Mancini suggest, an important sympathetic 
background to the degree of political parallelism. 
Hallin and Mancini identify five media system indicators that test the 
closeness of a country's media to its political system: 
1. the degree to which newspaper content reflects the political orientation of 
the newspaper title or its parent company 
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2. the degree to which media personnel are active in political life, or where 
career paths are shaped by political affiliation 
3. the partisanship of media audiences 
4. the role or orientations of journalistic practice, and 
5. the voice and writing style of journalistic culture. 
I would like to take each indicator in turn to discuss its applicability to the South 
African media and political systems and then draw conclusions about the 
degree of parallelism and pluralism. 
Does newspaper content reflect owner's political orientation? 
Ton Vosloo, until recently the chairman of South Africa's biggest newspaper 
company, Naspers, described the newspapers in his stable as "independent, 
party politically-unshackled papers to serve the buying public" (Vosloo 2004, 
152/3). But the data of political coverage paints another picture. Research 
company Media Tenor conducted a major collection and analysis of media data 
in the lead-up to South Africa's third democratic election in 2004 (Media Tenor, 
2004). In a survey of 16 newspapers and 5 television channels over a period of 
four months (January 1 to April 1 ,2004), Media Tenor found as follows: 
• The ANC dominated political coverage in the South African 
media during the period. It received almost double the coverage 
received by the second most reported on party, the Democratic 
Alliance 
• The political coverage given to the ANC (39.3% of all coverage) 
was just less than the total coverage received by the other three most 
popular parties (40.2%) 
• Of all the political party leaders, ANC and national President 
Thabo Mbeki received the most favourable coverage and had the 
highest rating 
• Both the Democratic Alliance and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(the parties receiving the second and third most political coverage) 
were portrayed negatively overall by the media during the period, 
while the ANC coverage was neutral 
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• The Democratic Alliance chose to highlight the same issues as 
the ANC in its election campaign. While the ANC received balanced 
coverage on 'political system' and 'internal affairs', it was criticised on 
the economy. The DA received balanced coverage on the economy, 
but negative coverage on 'political system' and 'internal affairs'. 
• 65% of the media's reportage of the ANC during the lead-up to 
the 2004 election concerned non-policy issues. 
(Media Tenor 2004) 
The South African media has become increasingly reluctant to nail its political 
colours to the mast in the post-1994 period. It is true that almost all newspapers 
declared their preferences in that first, historic election in April 1994. Most 
English-language titles supported the Democratic Party (Silke & Schrire 1994, 
122) including all the titles of the biggest newspaper company in the country, 
Independent Newspapers. Some papers, such as The Star (which did have 
reservations), were more ambivalent than others, such as Business Day that 
declared that every vote for the DP was "a vote for the decent South Africa we 
all want" (Silke & Schrire 1994, 122). The two major Afrikaans-language 
newspapers, Die Burger and Beeld, both supported the National Party, as 
expected given their histories. Rapport, however, an influential Afrikaans-
language Sunday newspaper, and the Citizen both refused to declare. The 
Sowetan, the newspaper read by most black readers at the time, urged its 
readers to vote for 'any' of the liberation movement parties (Silke & Schrire 
1994, 124). The decision to announce political preferences in 1994 had 
probably been sparked by democratic 'election fever' and was also influenced 
by the ongoing example of the admired British press. For the long periods 
between national polls, however, newspapers seldom backed political parties 
per se. 
By the follow-up election five years later, only a few titles boasted their 
allegiance, some of which were in support of eccentrically marginal parties, 
such as the Financial Mail's controversial backing of the United Democratic 
Movement (which secured barely 2% of the electorate). In the 2004 poll, most 
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newspapers in South Africa remained quietly non-committal choosing to focus 
on the election process rather than on support for a particular party. Thus, the 
Saturday Star said in its editorial: "While the demographics in this country do 
indeed favour the ruling party, democracy demands of us to voice our opinion -
in favour or against the party in power" (April 102004,12). Similarly, the Cape 
Times pushed for a free and fair campaign that would boost investor confidence 
(January 20 2004, 8). Business Day indicated vague support for the Democratic 
Alliance (DA, formerly Democratic Party) but this was far from an enthusiastic 
endorsement: "It is up the DA to demonstrate whether there is any realistic 
chance of a multiparty democracy developing in SA any time soon ... But if it 
cannot gain significant black support, its future role will be limited" (January 14 
2004, 7). Certainly the broad and purposeful backing of opposition parties had 
all but vanished. 
Few, if any, editors or publishers of South African mainstream newspapers 
would accept that their individual titles or groups carry transient allegiances to 
particular political parties through into their day-to-day editorial content. One 
might argue, then, that the South African press is largely politically neutral and 
therefore that its content doesn't reflect the political orientation of individual 
titles or companies. The Media Tenor data again demonstrates a rather more 
partisan alignment. Here is a selection of the bigger and more influential of the 
newspapers in the sample: 
Figure 2 
Newspaper 
The Star 
Beeld 
Political slant of coverage 
ANC dominates coverage (1595:924 - this ratio reflects the 
number of statements concerning the ANC compared to the 
those concerning the second most covered party, in this case 
the DA); IFP and DA receive proportionally the most negative 
coverage 
ANC dominates coverage (1775: 1 040). ANC, DA and IFP all 
negatively received. The NNP and the FF, both traditionally 
Afrikaans parties, receive proportionally positive coverage 
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Sowetan ANC dominates coverage (1876:885). DA "very critically 
received". Dominates coverage (1125: 386 -ANC almost 
three times as much as the DA) and positive in tone. DA and 
NNP received negatively. 
Business Day ANC dominates ANC and NNP received very favourably. 
Mail & Guardian ANC coverage (1888:1054). All four major parties receive 
negative coverage. 
Sunday Times ANC garners 80% more coverage than the official opposition 
(1008:280). ANC also more positively received than DA. 
Rapport ANC receives most coverage (406:332), but four major parties 
generally get balanced reception and more or less equitable 
coverage. 
Sunday World ANC dominates coverage (though low level, 146:24). All 
coverage of DA and NNP is totally negative. 
City Press ANC dominates coverage with IFP second (877:387). Overall, 
negative reception for both and positive for range of smaller 
parties 
(Compiled from: Media Tenor, 2004) 
The overwhelming proportion of coverage, frequently positive, given to the ANC 
by the South African print media reiterates the contention that the South African 
media has largely 'bought in' to the post-apartheid political status quo and the 
hegemony of the majority party. Any challenge to this position is either 
individual- or issue-based. It is rare indeed when a South African newspaper 
calls for the replacement of the ANC by another political party in toto or even 
calls for the scrapping of hallmark policies, such as those regarding the 
economy. Calland refers to the unwritten alliance of mainstream media and the 
government as "a substantial coalescence of interests" (2006,204). 
The mainstream media in South Africa are influential not just because 
government does in fact care what is said about it, but because the 
media is such a useful ally" (Calland 2006,204) 
It is true that voices of dissent are aired in columns or on leader pages. But 
more often, demands are made in editorials for the shifting of policy objectives 
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or priorities or even in support of particular cliques or individuals that are more 
in keeping with an internal opposition than with one seeking wholesale, radical 
change. 'The press is free," writes Gumede, "although at times it dangerously 
mimics the unstated economic policy consensus around which the ANC and the 
main opposition parties have seemingly coalesced" (2005, 237). It is also worth 
adding here that the ANC planned, in the early 1990s, to launch its own daily 
newspaper (see page 93). This soon fell by the wayside but has been replaced 
by a magazine that the government now distributes to more than a million 
people across the country (see page 111). 
To what extent are media personnel active in political life? Are career 
paths shaped by political affiliation? 
I have mentioned above how, prior to 1994, a very direct political connection 
between media personnel and politics has been evident in one tradition of the 
South African press (Afrikaner-black). I have also alluded to the fact that even 
the Liberal tradition had within its ranks (printer unions) elements of political 
careerism. 
In the post-apartheid era, the direct connection continues. Several key media 
owners continue to hold senior executive positions in the ANC. Cyril 
Ramaphosa, chair of Johncom, is an elected member of the ANC's national 
executive council. So too is Saki Macozoma, who heads both New Africa 
Investments Limited (which sold off its media interests in 2005) but also owns a 
30% stake in major media house Safika Highbury Monarch, one of the largest 
independent publishers in southern Africa. Marcel Golding, an influential former 
trade unionist and ANC parliamentarian, is currently acting CEO at South 
Africa's newest, independent free-to-air television station, e-tv. Political 
economy terms this the "integration between capital and the state" and 
identifies it as a source of important debate within political economy. Marxist 
sociologist William Robinson calls it the 'congealing of elites' (cited in Calland 
2006, 268). A slightly different take on the issue, South African style, is the 
frequency with which the ruling party sends round the begging bowl to those on 
its membership or executive lists who have achieved super-riches: 
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When the ANC is really short of money, as it always is in the run-up 
to an election campaigns that routinely cost in the region of R120-
million or more, it sends the begging bowl around to the Comrades in 
Business, such as Tokyo Sexwale, Cyril Ramphosa, Patrice Motsepe 
and Ntatho Motlana. According to one Luthuli House source, it is less 
of a begging bowl and more of a knife-at-the-throat approach: 'We 
have created the conditions for you to be so wealthy, so you owe us; 
write a cheque for R2-million please. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
according to the source, these individuals are beginning to weary of 
these unrelenting demands upon their wallets" (Calland 2006, 130). 
This interconnection between media, business and political elites recalls Aeron 
Davis's work on mass media and power (2003). In his research, Davis makes 
use of elite theory to postulate quite perceptively that inter-elite communications 
and the culture of elites can be critical factors in sustaining political and 
economic forms of power in society (2003, 670). This would certainly seem to 
be supported by the South African case study. Jacobs argues that the media in 
post-apartheid South Africa "on balance serves the imperatives of factions in 
government that favour market-driven solutions to questions of inequality and 
poverty in South Africa (rather than favouring more interventionist models), as 
well as those of capital, both South African and international" (2004, 13). 
A whole cohort of newspaper reporters and editors, including the country's first 
black woman editor of a major daily title (Lakela Kaunda), have left the media in 
post-1994 period and joined government. They have usually taken up liaison or 
advisory positions within ministeries or departments or have been appointed 
spokespeople of parastatals. Connie Molusi, the CEO of Johncom, left 
journalism initially to become media liaison officer for the ministry of posts, 
telecommunications and broadcasting. He then went back into the media again. 
Rafiq Rohan, former parliamentary correspondent for the Sowetan, accepted 
the editorship of the government newsletter Vuk'uzenzele. 
Ironically, this migration of mainly black staff exposed media houses to charges 
of sluggish racial transformation from the very structure that had denuded them 
66 
of their senior black staff. But it wasn't just black journalists who moved from the 
newsrooms to the party or state. Senior white staff moved too. The former 
editor of the Cape Times, Tony Heard, joined the staff of the Presidency. Senior 
Business Day political correspondent, Stephen Laufer, joined the department of 
housing as the minister's spokesman. Independent newspapers trainer Chris 
Vick became the head of communications in the Gauteng province and 
spokesman for Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale. In the 'opposition press' 
tradition, such actions would never have been contemplated during the 
apartheid era, even in retirement. 
Johnston argues that there is a 'cultural basis' for collusion between journalists 
and politicians 'which does not exclude public hostility to each other' (Johnston 
2005, 17). As both the political and media worlds have professionalised, 'they 
have drawn together', he argues, citing Osborne (1999). In addition, they share 
a common, insider's knowledge of the system's imperfections, wedded to the 
self-interested imperative of keeping that information to themselves: In this 
sense, media and political worlds to some extent constitute a single, closed 
world, apart from the audiences of voters and readers and viewers. It is an 
uneasy and compromised world of co-option and mutual exploitation" (Johnston 
2005, 17). 
The advent of democracy saw another trend that narrowed the gap between 
politics and the media. This was the movement of dozens of senior journalists 
and editors from the pro-struggle advocacy-driven 'alternative press' into 
equivalent posts in the mainstream media. The shift was sparked by the 
realisation in some quarters in the mainstream press that the adequate 
coverage of a liberation movement destined for power required journalists who 
both understood the dynamics of the movement and who knew the personnel: 
Richard Steyn, the then editor of The Star, started hiring some of the 
alternative media guys, people like myself, Moegsien Williams and 
John Perlman, and brought them over into the so-called mainstream. 
Steyn realized that the content and the audience was changing 
(Johnson 2006). 
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It was further consolidated by the rapid collapse of the alternative press post-
1994 (see Opatrny 2007) and by the growing demand of government for more 
representative newsrooms. Many of the journalists who moved out of the 
alternative press and into the mainstream sector now hold editorships or 
management positions at South Africa's most influential titles (such as 
Moegsien Williams, editor of The Star, Mondli Makhanya, editor of the Sunday 
Times, and Mzimkulu Malunga, managing editor of Business Day). Not only did 
this new generation of progressive journalists take senior positions at 
newspapers (and in the broadcast sector too), they also took on the leadership 
of professional organisations such Sanef. Individually and collectively, a new 
group was shaping the political topography and news agenda of the country's 
media. 
It can be seen quite clearly that media personnel have gone on to take on 
influential positions in political structures and also that political affiliation, in the 
sense of proximity to the liberation struggle, has been a key marker of career 
progress among senior South African journalists. This is especially true at the 
public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (see Green 
2006). It is worth noting that some of the new generation of journalists fiercely 
defend their journalistic autonomy and political independence. Nonetheless, the 
trend supports the contention that, with the close connection between politics 
and media, that once again political parallelism can be seen to be high. 
How partisan are media audiences? 
By this Hallin and Mancini mean the degree to which supporters of different 
parties or tendencies buy different newspapers or watch different television 
channels. This is a problematic indicator in a situation of low internal pluralism 
and high external pluralism. Newspapers do reflect different parties and 
tendencies, but the majority party is so dominant in the South African scenario, 
that marginal or minority interests are not represented by specific titles or by 
particular television channels. This occurs to some extent in the community 
media sector, most especially in broadcasting (Radio Pretoria, for instance), but 
not to a degree that is significant. What is key, perhaps, is the general degree of 
partisanship of media audiences in general. Attitudinal studies indicate that 
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even in locations with extremely low levels of access to the media (such as in 
the rural, or 'tribal' areas of South Africa), levels of support for the ANC and the 
degree of trust in which people hold for formal political institutions are both very 
high (pillay 2005). The audience, in other words, with or without media, is highly 
partisan and also overwhelmingly in favour of the majority party. 
With mainstream newspapers (and the broadcast media) largely reflecting the 
interests and supporting the objectives of the majority party, there is no need for 
new titles or channels reflecting divergent political viewpoints. Instead, the 
media articulates and consolidates the political status quo. This suggests a high 
degree of audience partisanship, even though this is not demonstrated by a 
wide range of newspapers each read by groups with particular, diverging, 
political affiliations. Partisanship in South African media history is generally 
conceptualised on the basis of linguistic and racial difference. It is worth 
interrogating, and indeed modifying, this notion. 
Just as Hallin and Mancini concede that in most countries, the media is not a 
single system (2004, 12), so South Africa bears this out with its own history. 
Scholars have identified three traditions that have evolved semi-autonomously 
of one another in the South African media. These traditions have been named 
the English-language press, the Afrikaans press and the black press. During the 
colonial and apartheid eras these categories provided reasonably useful means 
for differentiating the varying political cultures, languages and histories that lay 
behind each tradition. But what was once conceptually porous has now become 
obsolete. 
There are, for instance, many newspapers and magazines published in 
Afrikaans, but these are by no means the sole domain of the ideologues 
formerly known as the Afrikaans press. In fact, the largest of what used to be 
the Afrikaans press houses, Nasionale Pers, is now a multi-billion rand, global 
media empire conducting business in several languages (including English) in 
more than 50 countries. Neither the black press, which in fact existed only as an 
indigenous language press, nor the English-language press can be confined 
any longer to the convenient but deeply flawed apartheid era categorisations. 
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In retrospect, it is probably more accurate to say there were only two media 
traditions in South Africa prior to 1994: one that embraced the principles and 
history of the Liberal tradition (most of which come from the group formerly 
known as the 'English-language press'), and one that sought to use the press to 
fulfill specific ideological, political and cultural objectives (Afrikaans press and 
black press). This is not to say that the Liberal press was not subject to non-
Liberal practices, or that the black or Afrikaans press was not capable of 
publishing fine, independent journalism. But if the categories of English-
language, Afrikaans and black press were leaking badly by 1994, in a few short 
years thereafter they were totally overwhelmed by new developments and new 
realities. Commercialism, globalisation, direct foreign investment, black 
ownership and rapid technological change ensured a new press was created for 
a new era. After 1994, and arguably for sometime prior to that, the terms 
English-language, Afrikaans and black press were totally redundant. 
Nonetheless, the scholarship that analyses the South African press has gone 
along with the categorisations and it is difficult to unpick the evolution of 
newspaper development without referring to them. It is certainly true, regardless 
of the nomenclature, that a diversity of histories and values underpins the broad 
corpus that is South African newspaper publishing. It is evidently contested 
terrain. As such, there is no simple linear development unimpinged by 
competing ideologies or imperatives. Nor is there a future untouched by the 
trends and inclinations of the past. This, too, Hallin and Mancini have 
emphasised: "Media institutions evolve over time; at each step of their 
evolution, past events and institutional patterns inherited from earlier periods 
influence the direction they take" (2004, p12). 
Let us delve briefly into the three 'streams of the South African press as 
identified by scholars in the pre-1994 period. We will do this not to concede 
their enduring value but to excavate the two true traditions upon which we will 
base our further analysis and commentary. English-language newspapers 
published in South Africa have largely adhered to a tradition of a press based 
on the principles of Liberal democracy going back hundreds of years. Thomas 
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Pringle and John Fairbairn, the editors of one of the country's first newspapers, 
the South African Commercial Advertiser, fought a prolonged and ultimately 
victorious battle for press freedom against the Cape authorities in the early 19th 
century. The moment of victory followed a visit by Pringle and Fairbairn to the 
English Parliament in 1828 that led to the issue of a royal proclamation 
protecting freedom of speech in the territory (Crwys-Williams, 1989, 16). 
From that time on, mainstream English-language newspapers, owned largely by 
mining houses or wealthy businessmen throughout the period, built and 
cherished the classic liberal Fourth Estate duties and principles. This is not to 
say that many of these principles were not called into question. This was 
particularly the case in the last few decades of apartheid as the wide array of 
anti-press restrictions forced newspapers to publish shallow, biased, misleading 
and often self-censored information that was sold as news. In addition, various 
authors have argued how the ownership of the mainstream English language 
press by the mining houses was reflected in the attitudes, content and agendas 
of the individual titles (Smith, 1945). English language newspaper editors 
seldom, however, aspired to political office in keeping with their liberal 
inclinations. On the other hand, senior members of the craft printing unions that 
serviced the newspapers did take up parliamentary and even ministerial 
positions in various governments and had much to do with the drafting of key 
apartheid labour policies (Hadland, 2004). Overall, therefore, this was a flawed 
adherence to liberal values, but an allegiance nonetheless. 
Newspapers in Afrikaans, by contrast, were first published in the 19th century 
with the very specific ideological task of formalising the language and of 
supporting and building Afrikanerdom's cultural and political values. "The 
explicit aim of ... (Nasionale Pers) was the political and economic upliftment of 
white Afrikaners" (80tma 2006, 3). Newspaper editors from the Afrikaans press 
went on not to just political office, but to the highest office in the land with 
editors such as HF Verwoerd and OF Malan becoming prime ministers in the 
apartheid period. The newspaper Die Burger was the formal mouthpiece of the 
Cape National Party for many years. There was clearly, in this 'section' of the 
South African press, a high degree of party-political parallelism. Any genuine 
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affinity with Liberal press values only developed within the so-called Afrikaans 
press right at the end of the apartheid era. According to Botma, "Since (1994), 
both Naspers and Die Burger has not only turned away from racism and 
Afrikaner nationalism, but has embraced the new South African Constitution of 
1996 and its nation-building programmes" (2006, 3). 
The 'black press' in South Africa has its origins in the missionary presses of the 
18th century. Constrained by apartheid laws on property, location and business 
ownership, under-served by a racially-skewed and politically conservative 
advertising industry and snapped up by an acquisitive concentration of mainly 
white, mining capital, the black press was never allowed to develop to its 
potential. As such, it never really existed. A few newspapers, such as Imvo 
Zabantsundu, Bantu World and, in the 1950s, Drum magazine, started to 
articulate the aspirations and interests of black South Africans but were soon 
banned, bought or shackled. Drum magazine, at its height, contained 
investigative journalism of the highest order. The publications that did emanate 
out of this tradition were, however, largely advocacy driven titles, such as the 
Guardian in the 1950s and the alternative press in the 1980s that reflected the 
imperatives and ideologies of the struggle against apartheid. Often written or 
edited by liberation organisation officials or by struggle sympathisers, they 
commonly and actively sought the end of apartheid. While their views and 
values reflected the beliefs and history of the liberation movement, they also 
produced journalism filled with classic, liberal qualities. But due to their 
suppression by the state, their marginal economic status or their shift toward a 
neutral consumerism, until the end of apartheid, there really was no press that 
was owned and published by black South Africans. 
It can be seen that while the categories are far from adequate, it was true that 
the South African press contained within it at least two fundamentally different 
traditions: the Liberal outlook encapsulated primarily but not exclusively by the 
English-language press; and, the activist traditions both of the Afrikaans press 
and of the so-called black and alternative presses. Each tradition held differing 
perspectives on the rights and duties of newspapers. 
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Certainly, patterns were established that were to continue through into the 
democratic era. After 1994, there was massive, wholesale change (see Chapter 
Seven) in the industry. The state monopoly broadcast sector was liberalised, 
foreign capital bought up key print media organisations, and a black press was 
established with black capital and black editors - these were among many far-
reaching changes and trends. Weighing up the 'answers' to the questions 
posed by Hallin and Mancini's indicators in this chapter and in those that follow, 
requires consideration both of the differing traditions within the South African 
media and of the differing dynamics of the pre- as opposed to the post-
apartheid eras. Frequently, as Hallin and Mancini predict and as critics have 
complained, this demands responses that are both subjective and 
challengeable. 
The extraordinarily high (and increasing) degree of national pride exhibited by 
all race groups in the post-1994 period would appear to support this contention 
of a broad, national political consensus underpinned by a sympathetic media. In 
2003, just under a decade into the new democratic dispensation, 94.4% of 
South Africans (taken from a nationally representative sample), agreed with the 
phrase 'It makes me proud to be called South African', with almost 60% 
agreeing strongly (Pillay, 2003). South African newspaper content, in other 
words, certainly reflects the political orientation of individual titles and host 
companies, just as it contributes to a political, national consensus. This 
supports the view that political parallelism is evident within this particular media 
and political system. 
What are the roles, orientations, voice and writing styles of journalistic 
practice and culture? 
The fourth and fifth indicators of political parallelism are closely related and 
concern the role, orientations and voice of journalistic practice. Hallin and 
Mancini contend that systems in which there is a high degree of political 
parallelism will have journalists who tend toward influencing public opinion 
rather than being the providers of neutral information or entertainment (2004, 
28-29). Two trends and a strong tradition of advocacy indicate a growing 
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inclination of the South African media to be proactive about influencing public 
opinion. We have talked already about the advocacy tradition according to 
which sections of the South African have media set out very specifically to 
pursue political, cultural and ideological objectives. This lives on in the post-
apartheid era in a number of ways. With the political agenda already decided by 
the implicit consensual contract the mainstream media has entered into with the 
dominant party, this leaves the form of advocacy as the terrain of contest. 
For several years, journalists have been debating within their community but 
also with (at times very senior) members of government whether their work 
should be guided by the public interest or by the national interest. This is the 
first trend. The public interest is a Liberal notion according to which citizens' 
right to know is paramount, even if it means damaging powerful, even 
legitimate, interests. The 'national interest' suggests that news agendas should 
be framed in a way that promotes democracy and the progress of the nation as 
a whole, even if this compromises the media's perception of its duties. As 
Government Communication and Information System head Joel Netshitenzhe 
describes it: "Media hold enormous economic, social and political power, so 
there must be accountability. National interest in the aggregate of things that 
guarantee the survival and flourishing of a nation-state and nation - and should 
not be subsumed by public mood swings ... we need consensus on some issues 
so we can forge ahead as one - and not become unwitting tools of other 
countries' national interests or prey to the rumours they start" (Barratt 2006, 48-
49). 
A further dimension to the debate is the belief, largely on government's side, 
that the commercialisation of the media is both reinforcing the historic 
disparities in the media inherited from apartheid and leading inevitably to the 
marginalisation of the interests of the poor in South Africa. This view has been 
aired by many senior figures, not least by the minister of arts and culture Pallo 
Jordan, in a key ANC discussion document presented to the party's 51 sl 
national conference and even by President Mbeki (Duncan 2003, 3). 
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This attitude has its roots in the decades-old debate over 'development 
journalism' (sometimes referred to as 'sunshine' journalism) that played out in 
the 1980s. Proponents argued that for Third World countries to have time to 
develop economically, journalists should refrain from critical reporting (Barratt, 
2006, 49). In practical terms the current debate hinges around the extent to 
which the media is 'supportive' and/or 'critical' of the state. 
It is a debate that continues to have great resonance on the African continent. 
Tettey notes that African governments (along with state-owned media) 
frequently resort to appeals to ethnic or partisan sentiments among individual 
journalists in a bid to subordinate their professional journalistic ethics and 
standards (2001, 18). 
In response to the arrest of The Post's staff in March 1999, the state-
owned The Times of Zambia ran an editorial in which it condemned 
the arrested journalists for their acts of irresponsibility and subterfuge. 
It reminded The Post that 'when national pride, posterity and heritage 
are at stake, newsmen and women stand by the government of the 
day for sake of the nation ... nobody should sympathise with 
newsmen and women who themselves do not care about 
endangering their own country' (Tettey 2001, 18). 
Just as is the case in Zambia, there are supporters of both views within South 
African journalism. 
The second trend is the emergence of tabloid newspapers in South Africa. It is 
a sector of the mass media market that is unstintingly advocatory and for whom 
the stimulation of public opinion is a prime objective. Together, the history of 
advocacy, the political nature of journalism as demonstrated by current debates 
and the emergence of a fiercely public opinion-oriented mass media suggests a 
high degree of political parallelism. 
A 'counter-tendency', in Hallin and Mancini's terms, might be the strong impact 
of commercialisation on the South African media. In many cases, this trend has 
apparently de-politicised publications, particularly magazines, by focusing them 
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more strongly on non-political, advertising-friendly subjects and themes. It is 
also true, however, that by using its financial muscle in the form of 
advertisements and paid-for content, government has intervened in this section 
of the market too. 
A good example of state intervention in the market through advertisements was 
a furore that developed in late 2006 over the payment of hundreds of thousands 
of rands for the placement of a cover story about a government minister in what 
was once a reputable magazine (Leadership). Indeed, by 2004, government 
was spending almost R50-million a year on advertising. This outlay made it the 
sixth biggest advertiser in daily newspapers in that year after major retailers 
Shoprite/Checkers, Pick n Pay and Spar and communications companies e.tv 
and MTN (Nielsen Media Research cited in Milne & Taylor, 2006). 
Commercialisation, in other words, has not necessarily diminished the 
connection between the media and political structures. It has just changed it. A 
variation of this trend has been evident in other countries of the subcontinent 
where "many state-owned media in Southern Africa are also becoming 
increasingly commercialized without gaining any autonomy from government 
(Berger 2002, 37). It is indeed quite possible that commercialisation has 
strengthened the bonds between the two. This conclusion militates against 
Hallin and Mancini's notion of differentiation and will be discussed below. 
On the question of writing style and journalistic culture, political commentary is 
generally not built into 'ordinary' news articles. A form of separation is 
maintained. News reports tend to be done in an informational style, and overt 
commentary saved for the columns, Op Ed page and for the editorial. However, 
commentary and reportage are often written by the same people while the 
tabloids have again blurred the lines somewhat with their unique style of 
presentation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has tackled the first dimension of Hallin and Mancini's paradigm, 
the notion of political parallelism. It has been discovered that South Africa's 
media and political matrix indicates a high degree of political parallelism. This is 
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in spite of the fact that the media industry itself is internally pluralistic. The 
discrepancy is largely attributable to the existence of a dominant single party 
imposing its presence and discourse within a democratic system, a form of 
democracy that is not reflected in any of the other countries populating the 
Hallin and Mancini model. 
While the South African print media is self-consciously 'neutral' and seeks to 
reflect all major political tendencies in the country, it remains nonetheless 
broadly supportive of the social contract imposed by a powerful state. This 
contract is founded on the emotive appeal of overturning the country's apartheid 
legacy and of embracing democracy, human rights and equality. Opposition, 
when it occurs within the media, has more often to do with the errors of 
individuals within government - such as corrupt members of parliament or 
errant members of the executive - than with the state, the party, policy or even 
the system as a whole. There is, therefore, a consensual position determined 
by the state and embraced by the media that reflects a poor adherence to 
internal pluralistic ambitions. What might seem, or is projected as, neutrality and 
balance is, more often than not, tacit agreement with a status quo determined 
by the state and the ANC. 
On the other hand, the delineation and application of Hallin and Mancini's five 
indicators to the South African case study compel the view that political 
parallelism is a strong feature. Newspaper content does reflect the political 
inclination of newspapers, their editors and holding companies, whether they 
admit to it or not. While the data on election coverage is compelling in this 
respect, it is true that this partisanship is accentuated by the dominant one party 
nature of the South African political system. However, media personnel are 
active in political life and their political inclinations do often playa role in their 
career paths. Media audiences are partisan. And journalistic styles and 
practices do reflect the history and imperatives of a political, advocacy-oriented 
approach to the conveying of news and information. 
The traditional, but demonstrably artificial division of the pre-1994 South African 
media into black, Afrikaans and English-speaking streams does little service to 
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the identification of the values that underpin the sector's history and 
development. Instead, an alternative and perhaps more useful approach is 
offered in which the South African media is reassembled into two media 
traditions, one that embraced the principles and history of the Liberal tradition 
(most of which come from the group formerly known as the 'English-language 
press'), and one that sought to use the press to fulfill specific ideological, 
political and cultural objectives ('Afrikaans' press and 'black' press). This is 
something of a departure from the standard manner in which the South African 
press has been conceptualised in the past. 
Collectively the 'answers' posed to the questions implicit in the indicators 
confirm the ubiquity and depth of the connection between the media and 
political system in South Africa. In addition, the trends identified in the post-
1994 period indicate a deepening of this political parallelism. This would 
suggest that the South African media system is anything but a classic, Liberal 
model example. There are too many aspects that are more appropriate in the 
Polarised Pluralist model where the interchangeability of media and political 
elites, the partisan nature of media audiences, the high levels of external 
pluralism and the low degree of internal pluralism are all common features. 
Evidently, the term "polarised pluralist" falls far short of capturing a media 
system characterised by single party dominance. This is especially the case in 
an essentially "post-revolutionary" moment when the pressures are strong for a 
media that is expected to aid in the process of social transformation. The 
discrepancy highlights a conceptual shortcoming in the Hallin and Mancini 
model: its lack of preparedness for democratic hegemony particularly as it 
appears in post-liberation or emerging states. 
Hallin and Mancini place the dual processes of secularisation and differentiation 
at the core of their paradigm, and this chapter begins to grapple with these 
notions. The initial signs support the validity of both processes in the South 
African context. South African experience supports both the decline of political 
parties and the growing role of the mass media. Though this support is not 
without qualification. Hallin and Mancini suggest commercialism reduces the 
role and influence of political actors in the media. There is evidence here that 
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commercialism in some ways tightens the bond. This will be discussed in more 
detail below (see Chapter Four) together with further consideration of the 
applicability and validity of the secularisation and differentiation processes. 
This chapter has spelled out the concept of political parallelism as well as its 
theoretical and historical roots. It has attempted to ascertain how South Africa's 
political and media system matches up to Hallin and Mancini's benchmarks. It 
has concluded, initially at least, that the South African media system has strong 
Liberal elements but that, on balance and in spite of the mismatched label, it 
probably lies nearer to the Polarised Pluralist cluster. This judgment is 
enhanced by the perceived movement of the system away from the Liberal pole 
and toward the Polarised Pluralist one, on the back of developments since 
1994. It will be the task of the following chapters to test this initial assessment 
together with the theoretical frameworks that underpin it. 
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Chapter Four 
'DANCING WITH DEMOCRACY': STATE INTERVENTION AND THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN PRINT MEDIA 
My theory is that the more democratic a country becomes, the more 
television, radio and media will emanate out of that country. I call this 
the dance with democracy - Primedia CEO Willie KirshB 
Introduction 
The regime change experienced by South Africa in 1994 was more like a 
revolution than a simple victory at the polls. It was not merely the policies or just 
the personnel of state that were overhauled, but the very ethos and political 
culture of a nation. Four hundred years of cultural and racial domination were 
exchanged for one of the most liberal, constitution-based democracies in the 
world. Racial oligarchy was replaced by universal franchise. The media system 
too underwent a period of dramatic transformation (see Chapter Six). Inevitably, 
this sea change left behind it a whole new terrain of state-media relations. And 
while the terrain looks alien compared to what existed before it, there is no 
shortage of complexity nor of contest. 
The degree to which the state intervenes in the media is one of Hallin and 
Mancini's four major dimensions. They use it to categorise countries and their 
media systems into one of the three models of media and politics: Liberal, 
Polarised Pluralist or Democratic Corporatist. The notion of intervention is far 
broader than the establishment of a regulatory or legal framework. The state 
naturally plays a significant role in shaping any society's media system, argue 
Hallin and Mancini, "but there are considerable differences in the extent of state 
intervention as well as in the forms it takes" (2004, 41). These forms include the 
development of media policy, the provision of subsidies and funding to the 
media, the extent of libel and hate speech laws, the ease of access to and 
provision of information, the regulation of media concentration and secrecy 
laws. In addition, the role of social groups, the balance of power within political 
S From an intclTicw with Kirsh. 2006. 
80 
systems, the development of rational-legal authority and the degree of political 
clientelism are all elements of what is broadly termed intervention. 
Hallin and Mancini contend that the greater the degree of intervention by the 
state, the further away the media system is from the Liberal model. This is 
because high levels of intervention generally signal a lack of autonomy in public 
administration and the judicial system, a patron-based distribution system for 
social resources and a highly divided and contested political terrain served by 
an equally divided and partisan media. All of these occur less commonly in 
Liberal state-media systems than they do in either Polarised Pluralist or 
Democratic Corporatist models. 
This chapter will spell out more precisely the concept of state intervention, as 
described by Hallin and Mancini. It will then try to ascertain how South Africa's 
political and media system matches up to it. The chapter will examine the 
development of South African media policy and chart the state's relationship 
with the print media. It will look at different forms of state intervention and the 
reasons for and implications of these interventions. It will assess the extent of 
social group representation, the balance of power within the political system, 
the extent of political clientelism and the development and current state of 
rational-legal authority. In concluding, the chapter will indicate, with regard to 
the degree and forms of state intervention, where South Africa might fit in Hallin 
and Mancini's comparative media system matrix. 
State intervention: different forms 
A frequent distinction between a Liberal media system and one that is either 
Polarised Pluralist or Democratic Corporatist concerns the degree of 
intervention by the state, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 44). 
Characterised by their highly developed social welfare programmes, 
Democratic Corporatist states such as Sweden, Holland and Denmark, have 
long traditions of active involvement of the state in a range of activities. This 
extends to the media sector where subsidies to ensure diversity are commonly 
used as an instrument of media policy. These subsidies are generally 
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distributed according to clearly established criteria while the media itself is 
subject to a significant level of regulation (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 163). There 
are often strong hate-speech laws in Democratic Corporatist systems as while 
the state may be interventionist, it also provides significant, often constitutional, 
protection for a range of press freedoms. There are, in other words, strong and 
longstanding limits on state power. There is also a common understanding, 
within Democratic Corporatist societies, that the media is more than simply a 
private business. It is, instead, a social institution providing a vital outlet for 
organised social groupings to articulate their needs and aspirations. These 
groupings, such as trade unions and interest groups, hold an important, even 
central role, in the polity. At the same time, and in spite of the highly partisan 
audiences and readerships, Democratic Corporatist countries tend to foster 
highly professionalised, autonomous journalists regulated by strong press 
councils. 
The state has also played an historically important role in the Polarised Pluralist 
model populated by countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. Here, 
though, the role of the state is more complex, reflecting these countries' 
histories both of authoritarian regimes and of the more recent introduction of 
social welfare policies (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 119). But unlike with the 
Democratic Corporatist countries, "the state's grasp often exceeds its reach" in 
Polarised Pluralist systems, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 119). 
The capacity of (a Polarised Pluralist) state to intervene effectively is 
limited by a lack of resources, a lack of political consensus and by 
clientelist relations that diminish its capacity for unified action (2004, 
119). 
In these states, legal actions against journalists are relatively common and 
political alliances with media owners are usual. Powerful political officials 
frequently hold significant stakes in media companies. There is, therefore, an 
"intertwining of media and political elites", supported by a media subsidy system 
and supported by right of reply laws (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 122). The 
influential role of the Polarised Pluralist state in the development and 
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functioning of the media, according to Hallin and Mancini, "has limited the 
tendency of the media to play the 'watchdog' role so widely valued in the 
prevailing liberal theory" (2004, 122). 
In countries making up the Liberal model, such as the United States, Britain and 
Canada, the role of the state is largely circumscribed by history and by law. 
State subsidies are minimal or non-existent as the market predominates. 
Regulation, by the state or even by industry bodies, is generally weak. The 
state seldom owns media shares but does often support a public broadcaster. 
An adversarial attitude between state and media is common while highly 
professionalised journalists are standard. As we will see below, South Africa 
has elements of each of these systems. 
There are a number of indicators that serve to signal the likelihood of state 
interventionism, according to Hallin and Mancini. A high concentration of capital 
in media markets is one (2004, 48). Such an environment often suggests an 
intimate relationship between media owners and the state, "either through 
subsidy and regulation, or in the form of clientelist ties and partisan alliances 
and also ... a tendency for media to be influenced by outside business 
interests" (2004, 48). See Chapter Five for a more detailed discussion of this 
issue. 
A relatively recent shift from authoritarianism to democracy is a second 
indicator. This was true of most of the countries in the Polarised Pluralist cluster 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal). The recent transition tends to mean a blending of 
the paternalistic, authoritarian inclinations of an active state with more recent 
notions of participatory and pluralist elements, argue Hallin and Mancini (2004, 
50). 
Hallin and Mancini cite Lijphart's distinction between consensus and 
majoritarian democracy as a useful tool in understanding the relationships 
between media and political systems. The type of democracy is the third 
indicator. Majoritarian democracies tend to be associated with the development 
of catchall political parties with a catchall media reflecting this alignment. 
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Journalists are often considered neutral servants of the public and the media is 
characterised by internal pluralism. A breakdown of formal journalistic 
organisation is common (see Chapter Six) in keeping with the press's more 
limited role. Humphreys argues that a dominant political tendency is more likely 
to exert its power to intervene in the media sector, most particularly when it 
comes to publicly owned media (cited in Hallin & Mancini 2004, 52). 
The basic feature of consensus democracies is power sharing, according to 
Lijphart (cited in Hallin & Mancini 2004, 51). These systems have multiparty 
political set-ups and therefore tend to encourage a media environment that is 
externally pluralist and diverse. This is a hallmark of political parallelism (see 
Chapter Three). Consensus systems are likely to make special concessions for 
the formal representation either of organised social groups ("organised 
pluralism") or of special interests ("individualised pluralism"). The former, also 
called corporatism, is a characteristic of the Democratic Corporatist cluster 
(Hallin & Mancini 2004, 53). 
The fourth indicator is the pattern of social organisation seemingly arrayed 
along a spectrum. The two poles of the spectrum are: at one end, a rule-based 
adherence to formal, universal rules of procedure (what Weber termed rational-
legal authority) and, at the other end, the distribution of resources as between 
patrons and clients in which deference, personal connections and the common 
good are the currency. This is the political clientelism defined and expanded 
upon by Mouzelis, Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos and others. Naturally, clientelism suggests a more 
interventionist state. Media owners will use their media properties as a vehicle 
for negotiations with other elites and for intervention in the political world (Hallin 
& Mancini 2004, 58). Where clientelism abounds, political parallelism is high 
and the development of rational-legal authority (such as the judiciary and 
journalistic professionalism) is weak. 
The final indicator concerns the degree of pluralism in a society. Polarised 
Pluralist societies are characterised by sharp political conflicts often involving 
sudden changes of regime (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 61). The media are 
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frequently used as instruments of struggle in these conflicts, sometimes by 
dictatorships and by movements struggling against them, but also by 
contemporary parties in periods of democratic politics (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 
61). Polarised Pluralist countries also, however, are host to "significant anti-
system" political parties. This typifies a system with a wide spectrum of 
divergent, at times conflictual, ideologies (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 60). 
In moderate pluralism, the media sector is subject both to commercialisation 
and professionalisation (which I understand as the process by which 
professionalism is attained). Hallin and Mancini argue this is indicative of a 
lower level of political parallelism (2004, 61). The historical roots of moderate 
pluralism states are likely to include an early triumph over feudalism, while 
Polarised Pluralist systems tend to have experienced conflict deep into the 20th 
Century. In the latter case, political factions continue to contend for power in a 
system marked by a high degree of political parallelism (2004, 63). 
While Hallin and Mancini's indicators are meant to predict the likelihood of 
intervention per se, Comparing Media Systems does not devote much time to 
analysing different forms of intervention, particularly of the coercive type in 
young democracies. This is not surprising, perhaps, as governments in 
Denmark or Great Britain are unlikely to send paramilitary police in to 
newsrooms to sort out the editor. Sadly, as we will see below, this is a more 
common phenomenon in newer democracies, most particularly in Africa. 
Tettey (2001) lists a number of different forms of coercive intervention often in 
blatant contravention of an African country's own legal or even Constitutional 
provisions. Thus in Burkina Faso, despite constitutional provisions of freedom of 
speech and the press, Moustapha Thiombiano, the president general of the 
country's first independent radio station, Horizon-FM, 
was attacked by four supporters of the ruling Congress for 
Democracy and Progress (COP) party ... The attack followed the 
airing ... of 'sharp' commentary on the station's call-in programmes, 
'Sondage Oemocratique', where listeners are invited to call in and 
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voice their opinions on democracy in Burkina Faso (cited in Tettey 
2001, 19). 
Other unorthodox modes of intervention noted by Tettey include "various acts 
of silent or overt reciprocity" among African governments aimed at stifling the 
media, corporal punishment (as occurred recently on one editor in Ivory Coast), 
the use of state-owned media to discredit media critics, the passage of laws 
making insulting the president or members of parliament punishable offences, 
the withdrawal of government advertising (see below), and a number of "very 
indirect ways of hurting the media, by using the citizenry or their supporters as 
agents of intimidation and violence" (2001, 17-20). 
We find in South Africa too a disconnection between Constitutional rights and 
actual state practice. Once South Africa had finalised a liberal democratic 
Constitution in 1996, it was commonly assumed the country had embarked on a 
new and more virtuous path. Freedom of the press, freedom of association, 
freedom of access to information and freedom of speech were all enshrined 
within the Constitution's Bill of Rights fortifying the media's classic liberal 
democratic Fourth Estate function. No longer would the media be curtailed and 
circumscribed by an authoritarian regime. No longer would draconian laws 
determine what could be printed in the nation's newspapers and what could not. 
That, at least, was the intention of the Constitution's authors. In addition, key 
High Court judgments on press freedom, such as the Bogoshi ruling9, eased 
once onerous libel and defamation laws. It seemed as if South Africa now had a 
framework in place that would make a cast-iron Liberal model for its media 
system inevitable. 
Indeed, a great diversity of publications has arisen within the country with a 
significant degree of accessibility, rapid growth and an established mass 
appeal. At present, there are about 600 print media titles in South Africa 
compared to 20 that existed in 1910 (Hadland 1991, 8). But the reality is far less 
comfortable than the figures might suggest. Former Sunday Times editor Ken 
Owen recalls that South Africa's constitution-makers "baulked at entrenching 
9 The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the defence of·'reasonable publication··. also known as the 
Bogoshi defence. in 1998. Bogoshi was the plaintiff (Louw 20(5). 
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free speech or giving it anything like the weight which it enjoys under the First 
Amendment of the American Constitution" (1998, 177). He adds, furthermore, 
that the constitution makers "did not trust either the newspapers or the idea of 
free speech, so they brushed aside the modest request of the Conference of 
Editors for full entrenchment of free speech, and instead assigned to that right a 
lesser status and a lesser protection than they gave to other rights. In effect, 
they put into the hands of legislators and judges the power to decide how much 
freedom would be 'reasonable' in the new democracy ... This reluctance to 
relinquish control of discourse was, given the centrality of free speech to both 
democracy and to the wider search for truth, revealingly ominous" (ibid). 
Within the deeply sympathetic framework of constitutional rights, many 
loopholes exist and countertendencies have apparently emerged. Old apartheid 
era legislation - such as the 1968 Armaments Development and Production Act 
and the 1982 Protection of Information Act - containing deeply anti-press 
restrictions have been used by the state repeatedly in the new democratic era 
(see Tomaselli 1997, 8). At times these archaic laws are used to demand the 
revelation of sources' identities, at others to prevent newspapers from 
publishing articles. This practice has sparked the ire of South African editors 
and a series of meetings have been held with the highest branches of the state, 
including the Presidency, in the as yet unsuccessful bid to resolve the issue 
(see Barratt 2006). 
In 1998, the Western Cape Attorney General invoked an apartheid era law, 
section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, to force photographers to 
testify as state witnesses in a case about the mass killing of a gang leader, 
Rashaad Staggie. Section 205 had previously been used by the apartheid 
government to subpoena journalists to reveal the identities of confidential 
sources - in those days often linked to banned liberation groups (Barratt 2006, 
22). A delegation from the South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) met 
Justice Minister Dullah Omar and Safety and Security Minister Sydney 
Mufamadi in 1998 about the "old laws" problem and an interim proposal was 
drawn up. However, just days after the meeting three Cape Town editors were 
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issued with subpoenas in the Staggie case. They publicly refused to cooperate 
(Barratt 2006, 22). 
On February 19, 1999 a Record of Understanding was signed between Sanef, 
Omar, Mufamadi and the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani 
Ngcuka. The understanding noted a need to continue to negotiate on Section 
205. Despite the agreement, signed on Media Freedom Day 2000, various 
newspapers were raided without warning by the authorities looking for 
information on the Staggie case. Forty editors protested outside the Cape High 
Court in June 2001 when the editor of Die Burger, Arrie Rossouw, appeared 
with regard to his application for the withdrawal of a search warrant. "Sanef 
repeatedly argued that journalists should not be put in the role of police 
informers nor do police work, because this damaged their ability to gather 
information in the public interest" (Barratt 2006, 23). 
In April 1999, Sanef contracted the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the 
University of the Witwatersrand to compile a list of anti-media statutes still on 
the books. The work was completed by May 2000 and the justice ministry 
referred the document to the Law Commission to come up with proposals. By 
early 2007, no progress had been reported. In the meantime, Section 205 has 
been invoked several more times and various other old laws, such as the 
National Key Points Act, have been used to block journalists' access to 
information (Barratt 2006, 24). 
Between 2000 and 2006, Sanef has made representations to Parliament or 
issued statements expressing criticism of various pieces of legislation 
containing anti-press measures. These have included: the Broadcast 
Amendment Bill, the Anti-Terrorism Bill, the Convergence Bill, the Interception 
of Electronic Communications Bill and the Film and Publications Amendment 
Bill. 
Constitutional planners had never intended for the country's founding document 
to be immutable. They wanted a living Constitution that would breathe and 
change (Sachs 2007). They designed a Constitution that would provide 
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principles and codes rather than specific practices. They also anticipated new 
debates and new areas of consensus and expected that the Constitution would 
be adjusted to reflect these. But new practices do not necessarily follow formal 
Constitutional amendments, and indeed more often than not precede them. 
Thus while the freedom of access to information is enshrined within the 
Constitution, the reality is often different. In January 2007, for instance, the 
major provincial government of Gauteng announced that reporters had been 
barred from contacting local police stations directly and would henceforth deal 
only with the police service's head office spokesmen. "This .... shows how fast 
the government is creating an information-starved state," according to Raymond 
Louw, a renowned advocate for freedom of expression and the deputy 
chairman of the South African branch of the Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(Cape Times, Thursday January 182007, page 3). Clearly this is a far cry from 
the kind of access to information envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution. It 
is fair to say, however, that the limitations on press freedom haven't been about 
political party partisanship or banning an opposition point of view. They have 
rather been classical liberal dilemmas about the trade-off, for instance, between 
national security and access to information. 
The horns of the dilemma, at least from government's perspective, were put 
succinctly by Joel Netshitenzhe, a key person in state media policy and head of 
the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) at a speech 
delivered during a conference on "Transformation of the Media in a Society in 
Transition", in Johannesburg in late 2005: 
Access to information is the lifeblood of democracy ... [but] you can't 
have media freedom in a vibrant democracy if there is a situation of 
conglomeration and homogenisation of news. You can't have media 
freedom where there is no diversity of ownership. This means the 
poor are not just consumers but producers of news. You can't have 
media freedom if commercial pressures limit editors' use of content or 
where editors are held on a leash to satisfy the dictates of 
advertisers ... Freedom is not an amorphous concept without 
values ... Is it possible where the media is an opium to dull the senses 
89 
and connives in the destruction of the very values that make media 
freedom possible? Media freedom should add value to the national 
endeavour, not support conspicuous consumption, greed and impel 
the people to live above their means (Netshitenzhe 2005). 
Clearly, while the indicators are useful in identifying scenarios in which state 
intervention in the media is likely, they fall short of portraying the full range of 
interventions that even a democratic state is capable of utilising to enforce its 
political will. 
With Hallin and Mancini's five indicators in mind, however, let us consider the 
South African case study. First, I will set out the development of two phases of 
South African media policy and will allude to relevant legislation. I will then 
discuss various elements of tension between the media and the state to signal 
the level of intervention. Finally I will locate the trends and dynamics of the 
South African state and media within the Three Models paradigm. 
"There is a long history in South African of the combination of market forces and 
political interference wreaking havoc with our media and with the practice and 
quality of journalism," according to former editor and media professor Anton 
Harber (2002). We look now at how the latter developed by playing close 
attention to the evolution of media policy. 
There were two periods of significant policy development in South Africa: from 
1990 to 1994, as preparations were made for the commencement of the new, 
democratic dispensation; and, from 1994 to the present as these policies were 
implemented and refined. In the interests of keeping policy and regulation 
development digestible, and also on the basis that much of the information 
collected has been interview-based (owing to a lack of formal records, 
documentation or much scholarship), I have chosen to present this two-part 
section in a descriptive narrative. 
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The development of South African media policy, 1990 - 19941 
In April 1990, some two months after the historic release from prison of Nelson 
Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), a small 
team of ANC strategists arrived in South Africa. Returned from many years in 
exile, they had to begin the planning and preparation ahead of the formal 
negotiations soon to commence between the South African government and the 
liberation movement. Among the advance party group were two ANC officials, 
Gill Marcus and Joel Netshitenzhe, who had been assigned the specific task of 
engaging with the South African media establishment. The engagement was 
intended to be two-fold: to establish a channel of communication through which 
the ANC could disseminate its views, and to discuss the transformation of the 
media itself (Marcus 2006). 
Marcus had been out of the country for 21 years. But, from the early 1970s, she 
had put together regular weekly briefing documents of press cuttings for the 
ANC's leadership and had developed a familiarity with the personalities and 
structure of the local media industry. Netshitenzhe went into exile following the 
Soweto Uprising in 1976 and went on to become director of the ANC's Lusaka-
based radio station, Radio Freedom, but was also a highly regarded intellectual 
and confidant of the party's highest leadership. Netshitenzhe and Marcus began 
with virtually no infrastructure at all. They opened a small office in 
Johannesburg's Sauer Street, just down the road from the imposing edifice of 
the city's then biggest daily newspaper, The Star. Initially they had one 
telephone line and no computer. Netshitenzhe had been briefed to deal with the 
print media and Marcus was meant to be the party's media liaison contact point 
and was tasked with training and resource gathering. They were soon 
overwhelmed by demands from the local and international media for 
information, comment and analysis (Marcus 2005). Their office, named the 
I The narratives on South African media policy are based on interviews conducted specially for this 
thesis. but also make use of original work already published by the author. including: Hadland. A & 
Thorne. K (200·n 171e People's r 'oice: the development and current state of the small media sector in 
South .1frica. Cape Town: HSRC Press: and. Hadland. A.. Aldridge. M. & Ogada. J (2006). Revisioning 
Television: Policy, strategy and lIIodelsJur the sustainable developlllent of cOllllllunity television in South 
. (frica. Cape Town: HSRC Press. See also Horwitz (200 I) and Louw (1993) for important accounts of 
the policy process. 
91 
ANC's Department of Information and Publicity, expanded rapidly to include 
additional officials such Carl Niehaus, later ambassador to the Netherlands, and 
Saki Macozoma, currently a media and banking magnate. 
Discussions around what to do about the South African media had taken place 
for several years in the ANC's principal exile offices in London and in Lusaka. 
Banned and exiled for four decades, the ANC had no formal media channels 
inside South Africa and its contact in particular with the mainstream print media 
had been minimal. Indeed, for three decades (1960s-1980s), no South African 
newspaper was allowed to quote banned or listed people, which included the 
entire ANC hierarchy. Discussion in exile centred on how the ANC would be 
able to put its views and opinions into the public domain when the media was 
largely controlled by forces not necessarily sympathetic to the party's wishes. 
In 1992, recently released Nelson Mandela - by then president of the ANC but 
not yet of the country - said the party valued "a free, independent and 
outspoken press", but he made a number of criticisms that cut deep in South 
African media circles (Barratt 2006, 6). He said the lack of diversity in control 
and staffing of the print media led to one-dimensional journalism. He 
complained that many white journalists continued to be pessimistic about the 
country's future, in spite of indications to the contrary. He bemoaned the lack of 
excellence in South African journalism. And he strongly criticised black 
reporters, suggesting their allegiances lay with their white bosses rather than 
with the imperatives of the liberation struggle (Barratt 2006, 6). "These 
criticisms put pressure on all editors. White editors felt they were being told it 
was time to leave. For black journalists, being attacked like this was an added 
pressure. Even editors sympathetic to the ANC found that their journalistic 
independence was under question" (ibid). 
This problem of getting its message across was especially acute when it came 
to broadcasting as the ANC soon pondered the prospects of contesting the 
country's first democratic election without the support of the national 
broadcasting monopoly, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). 
The drive to sever the apartheid government's grip on the national broadcaster 
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was to dominate media policy formulation between 1990 and the election in 
1994. It is highly debatable whether this process has secured the impartiality of 
the public broadcaster. Indeed, repeated incidents of interference by the state in 
programming selection and content, the appointment of senior staff and 
management, the choice of commentators and in the restructuring of the SABC 
itself, strongly suggest that the public broadcaster remains very much at the 
whim of government and the majority party (see Green 2006). This has, though, 
fallen short of the government succeeding in securing mandatory broadcast 
time on the public broadcaster (see Horwitz 2001). This focus on broadcasting 
in the early 1990s, together with a general reluctance to interfere with the 
freedom of the press, left the mainstream print media largely untouched by 
specific regulatory constraints. 
The ANC was, however, very keen to establish a foothold in the South African 
print media sector. One option mooted was to launch a party newspaper. 
Another was to acquire a local paper and convert it into a party organ. This 
debate was to absorb considerable energy within ANC structures during the 
early 1990s. At first, the debates were largely theoretical: "When we were in 
London, it was all very abstract. We had a particular focus on radio, and on 
radio training specially. Pallo [Jordan] was head of that. Our big focus was radio 
and print. But it was a big jump to owning a newspaper" (Marcus 2005). 
Gradually, the debate took on a more material form. An ANC working group 
was established to look into the issue of starting a party political newspaper and 
to start costing models. Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of current South African 
President Thabo Mbeki, was commissioned to undertake a feasibility study. 
"It was intended to be a daily newspaper, but it never materialised," said 
Marcus. Just as the idea of an ANC daily paper was abandoned, so too were 
plans to acquire an already existing newspaper. Perhaps the strongest 
contender was the New Nation. Edited by the son of senior party leader Walter 
Sisulu, Zwelakhe, the New Nation was an alternative weekly newspaper that 
had served as an important conduit for ANC information during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. But plans to take New Nation formally under the ANC's wing 
never came to pass either. 
93 
Reasons cited for the ANC's reluctance formally to enter the newspaper 
business are both financial and political. Financially, newspapers are 
enormously expensive to launch and sustain from scratch and without benefit of 
a distribution, printing or infrastructural capacity. Even acquiring already existing 
titles was an expensive endeavour. Politically, key party leaders harboured 
serious doubts about the wisdom of having a formal party mouthpiece at all. 
According to Macozoma: "I didn't believe political parties should own 
newspapers. You have journals for your own members. A party political 
newspaper doesn't make sense: who is going to believe it? I am fatalistic about 
a political party's ability to influence the media. In the end, the ANC is a big, 
important organisation with members allover the place. If the issue really is 
hegemony, this is established by being everywhere and not by having an ANC 
masthead" (Macozoma 2005). There was no question, however, that some 
powerful members of the party retained a keen interest in the newspaper 
option. 
As Horwitz points out, with the prospects of an ANC newspaper closed off and 
the collapse of an initiative to secure mandatory time for the party on the SABC, 
the reform of the South African Communication Service (SACS) became one of 
the ANC leadership's few potential tools to influence press coverage (2001, 
294). This was a process that began in earnest in 1995 with the Conference on 
Government Communications, which led, in turn, to the Communications Task 
Group (Comtask) being established in 1996 and the birth of the Government 
Communication and Information System (GCIS) soon after. 
But the ANC also had a history of supporting a free press that militated against 
direct intervention. As far back as 1943, the ANC annual conference 
unanimously adopted the "Africans' Claims in South Africa" document. This 
document included a Bill of Rights that called for the "right of Freedom of the 
Press". This constitutes the genesis of ANC media policy. It was drawn up 
initially as a response to the 1941 Atlantic Charter which expressed the wish of 
its signatories, US President Franklin D Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
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Winston Churchill, "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to 
those who have been forcibly deprived of them". 
Over the years, the ANC would develop much more specific views, and 
expectations, surrounding the development and role of the media in South 
Africa. These are to be found in party policy documents but are also framed in 
international law as well as being enshrined in South Africa's 1996 Constitution, 
Acts of Parliament, government policy directives, regulatory authority directives, 
licence conditions, self-regulatory structures and in corporate regulations. Some 
of the more noteworthy documents will be considered below. 
The formation of media policy in South Africa began in earnest in 1990 and 
corresponded with the setting up of the ANC's Department of Information and 
Publicity (DIP) unit by Marcus and Netshitenzhe. It was from this time that a 
series of conferences, debates and even protest actions gave significant 
impetus to policy matters and focused attention on the importance of the media 
sector and its role in the transition to democracy, and beyond. Of course there 
were many laws and even policy to do with the media in South Africa prior to 
1990, not least the 120 laws that the apartheid government put in place over 
decades to restrict the media and limit freedom of expression and association 
(Berger 1999). There were also moments in the period pre-1990 when media 
issues reached the public domain, such as former President PW Botha's 
infamous late night telephone calls to the national broadcaster with instructions 
to recast the news in a more favourable light. 
This chapter will, however, not dwell on apartheid media restrictions nor on the 
policy that articulated these attitudes other than in passing. Instead, it will focus 
on the development of progressive media policy as this is relevant to the period 
under discussion in this thesis. 
Not long after the African Claims document was adopted and in the wake of 
World War Two, one of the most important multinational pronouncements of 
human history was made with the United Nations' Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was unveiled on December 10, 1949. Article 19 has 
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become a landmark of media policy. The article reads as follows: "Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." The article 
has been a lodestone for media activists ever since and continues to influence 
constitutional law and media policy both in South Africa and across the world. 
The sentiments of Article 19 were adopted and expanded upon a few years 
later when South Africans came together to launch the Freedom Charter at 
Kliptown in 1955. The charter did not mention the media specifically but did 
declare that South Africa would one day be governed by a law that would 
"guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish, to 
preach, to worship and to educate their children". It also called for the "free 
exchange of books and ideas", the right of all people to use their own 
languages and to develop their own folk culture and customs. These are all 
rights and guarantees that clearly set the tone for future media policy. 
Though the years between the launching of the Freedom Charter in the mid-
1950s and the late 1980s were important years for the development of the 
struggle against apartheid, media policy during this time in South Africa was 
principally about the imposition of censorship and repression. For almost three 
decades, little media policy of note or value emerged. By the end of the 1980s, 
however, things had begun to change. In 1989, the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions set up a national consultative process concerning media policy 
that "crystallised a rudimentary network of left-wingers interested in media 
policy work" (Louw 1993, 9). Sadly, the initiative floundered in the face of more 
pressing national priorities, but a seed had been planted. The increasing 
impetus of political negotiations at home reflected the rapid advances media 
policy was making abroad. Central to this was the growing belief that being able 
to communicate and the receiving and transmitting of information (rather than 
just the right to information) was as important to democracy and development 
as other more traditional human rights. 
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On August 25th 1990, two thousand people marched on the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) offices in Auckland Park, Johannesburg. The 
demonstration was a watershed moment in the evolution of media policy. It 
marked the galvanisation of progressive media workers to resist the top-down 
reform of broadcasting anticipated by a National Party government in its dying 
days. The march was principally a protest against the appointment of the 
Viljoen Task Group, a body headed by Christo Viljoen then chairman of the 
SABC, intended to investigate the future of broadcasting in South and southern 
Africa. The protest was led by the Campaign for Open Media (COM) that was 
established jointly by the Film and Allied Workers Organisation (FAWO) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions' (Cosatu) anti-privatisation committee. 
As it turned out, even the ANC was to concede that the Viljoen task group made 
some useful recommendations, including the establishment of an independent 
regulatory body, the framing of a new broadcasting Act, the devolution of 
political control from the public broadcaster and the improvement of the 
accessibility of the broadcast medium. 
A series of influential conferences in the early 1990s brought in international 
experience and gave substance to early outlines of progressive media policy. 
Most important were the Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves conference of 
August 1991 in Amsterdam and the University of Boputhatswana media policy 
workshop of September 1991. Also important was the Patriotic Front 
Conference in Durban in October 1991 and the ANC department of information 
and publicity seminar in November 1991, at which the ANC circulated its draft 
Media Charter. The document drew heavily on earlier conference debates and 
highlighted issues like the equitable distribution of media resources, diversity, 
access, skills, ownership and affirmative action. The charter, described as a 
"crucial turning point within the ANC's approach to the media" (Louw 1993, 228) 
was adopted by the party's top decision-making body, the National Executive 
Committee, on January 13, 1992. 
The ANC Media Charter, which was a "deliberately Utopian, statement of 
intent", included a clause stating: "All communities shall have access to the 
skills required to receive and disseminate information" (Teer-Tomaselli 1993, 
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231). The draft charter called for the democratisation of the South African media 
and stated that "the forms and methods of the media shall take account of the 
diversity of communities in respect of geography, language and interests" 
(Louw 1993, 330). The charter said diversity of ownership of media production 
and distribution facilities would be ensured while affirmative action would be 
implemented (Louw 1993, 331). But while the main pre-occupation of the 
seminar was what to do with the SABC and how to minimise its pro-NP impact 
in the looming first democratic election, it also focused its attention on the print 
media. 
Three resolutions were adopted by the seminar with specific reference to the 
print media. These concerned, interestingly, the establishment of a national 
newspaper for the democratic movement, the monitoring and regulation of the 
print media and the implementation of a media development programme of 
action. The seminar was an important indicator of the broad democratic 
movement's attitude to the print media, though only the third resolution was 
ever to come to fruition. 
On setting up an ANC national daily newspaper, the seminar called for more 
haste, urging the party to "finalise" its investigations "taking account of the 
political implications, the financial viability, the need for national availability and 
the question of language" (Louw 1993, 338). As we have indicated above, 
nothing was to come of this. The seminar called for the establishment of 
independent monitoring structure supported by the international community to 
assess the impact of the print media during the country's political transition and 
report its findings regularly. While this occurred with the broadcasting sector, it 
was done only temporarily with the print media sector. Indeed the very idea of it 
was vehemently rejected by several key figures in the print media sector 
including the Chairman of the Argus Group, Murray Hofmeyr, the Editor in Chief 
of The Star, Richard Steyn and Argus Director and former Editor of The Star 
Harvey Tyson, who jointly issued a statement in 1992 declaring: "We believe 
that the monitoring of the print media during the interim period period or after 
the election of the new government is an unacceptable principle which conflicts 
fundamentally with freedom of expression" (cited in Louw 1993,327). Nor was 
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an "accord of journalistic practice" established, as called for by the ANC 
seminar, to ensure what it called a minimum of bias in the print media and to 
prevent distortions in the information process. 
Finally, the seminar called for a media programme of action to be drawn up and 
implemented that would tackle issues like skills' shortages, illiteracy and that 
would seek to diversify the use of language. In the establishment of the Media 
Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) more than ten years later, perhaps 
the most concrete outcome of the 1991 seminar can be discerned. The MDDA 
was the progeny of pre-1994 policy, as I have illustrated, but gained real 
impetus with the appointment of the Task Group on Government 
Communication (Comtask) in 1996. Among Comtask's recommendations was 
the very specific call for the establishment of a structure that would support 
diversity in the media industry. A number of policy predecessors for the 
establishment of the agency were referred to, including the National Action Plan 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which was published in 
1998 and which emphasised freedom of expression and media diversity, as well 
as the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 
The Media Development and Diversity Agency Act was eventually passed in 
2002. It established an independent, statutory body funded by government, the 
media industry and by donors with the purpose of assisting the development of 
community media and promoting media diversity. The agency was assigned 
four main objectives and four methods of intervention. The main objectives 
were to: 
• encourage ownership and control of, and access to, media by 
historically disadvantaged indigenous language and cultural groups; 
• encourage the channeling of resources to community and small 
commercial media; 
• encourage human resource development and capacity building in 
the media industry, especially among historically disadvantaged 
groups; and, 
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• encourage research regarding media development and diversitio. 
However, by the end of the period under discussion in this thesis (2004), the 
MDDA had only just commenced its work on a limited budget and had as yet 
made no significant impact. It is true the print media sector had collectively 
agreed to contribute several millions of rands toward supporting the work of the 
MDDA and had committed in principle to supporting it. But even now in early 
2007, no one can honestly claim the MDDA has made a deep impression on 
the mainstream print media in South Africa. In its latest annual report, the 
MDDA says it disbursed close to R20-million by the end of March 2006. It 
concedes, however, that "it is too soon to judge the broader impact of the 
MDDA on media development and diversity. It would be simplistic to measure 
this by the number of grants allocated or the fact that grant funds are all 
committed. The real measure will be whether media projects supported by the 
Agency continue to thrive years after support has been concluded ... " (MDDA, 
2005/6, 9). It is therefore fair to argue that this policy initiative too, in the period 
under discussion, failed to generate a substantive response from the industry. 
Discussions in the early 1990s in South Africa were certainly informed by 
happenings not only elsewhere in the world but elsewhere in Africa. In 1991, a 
statement of principles was drawn up by African journalists calling for a free, 
independent and pluralistic media on the continent and throughout the world. 
The Windhoek Declaration was to become a benchmark for the United Nations 
and for all organisations in the media field. In its preamble, the declaration 
noted that its lineage included Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 59(1) of 1946 (which declared 
that freedom of information is a fundamental human right) as well as 
UNESCO's Resolution on the free flow of ideas of 1989. 
The Windhoek Declaration, which focused specifically on print media, included 
these important policy statements: 
III Media Development and Diversity Act of 2002. 
100 
• The establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, 
pluralistic and free press is essential to the development and 
maintenance of democracy in a nation and for economic 
development; 
• An Independent press means independence from governments, 
politicians, economic control or from the control of materials or 
infrastructure essential for the dissemination of newspapers, 
magazines and periodicals; 
• A Pluralistic Press means the end of monopolies of any kind and 
the existence of the greatest possible number of outlets reflecting the 
widest possible range of opinion; 
• Direct funding is a priority to ensure the development and 
establishment of non-government publications that reflect society as 
a whole; and, 
• All funding should aim to encourage pluralism as well as 
independence. 
But it was the Free, Fair and Open Media Conference in Cape Town in early 
1992 that tied many of the loose threads of progressive media policy 
discussions together. A formal proposal was drawn up which was presented 
and tabled at the multiparty political negotiations, known as Codesa 
(Convention for a Democratic South Africa) at Kempton Park. 
The Codesa proposal argued for three actions: 
• The establishment of an interim independent communications 
authority to regulate the airwaves during the transition period; 
• A new, more diverse SABC board; and, 
• The appointment of a task force to examine obstacles to diversity of 
opinion in the print media. 
The conference resolutions were to have a major impact on policy and, in 
September 1993, the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) - which was 
effectively ruling South Africa at the time - approved in prinCiple the creation of 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority. The IBA was formally established on 
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30 March 1994 by an Act of Parliament. It was within the IBA Act that much of 
the preceding media policy debate was encapsulated and that definitions and 
roles were spelled out in law for the first time. Print media, naturally enough, 
were excluded from legislation directed at broadcasting. But other initiatives 
proposed during the development of progressive media policy, such as the task 
force on diversity, failed to materialise. 
The development of media policy in South Africa, 1994-2004. 
By 1994, a network of policies, laws and regulations relating to the South 
African media were either in place or were imminent. This included well over 
100 statutory provisions left over from the apartheid era that remained largely 
intact together with a raft of new labour relations, freedom of information and 
monopoly laws that would all have some impact on the media industry at large. 
But perhaps the four most important components of this policy network were the 
ANC's Democratic Information Programme published in 1994, the South African 
Constitution which was finalised in 1996, the work of the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa) which was established in 
2000 and the IBA Act which underpinned it, and the creation in 2002 and 
proposed ambit of the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA). 
These four aspects represented the bedrock of South African media policy and 
its implementation during the period. They also form the measure by which the 
balance of power between the media and the state can be ascertained. 
The Democratic Information Programme formed part of the heavily influential 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) "Base Document" that 
was published in 1994. The RDP was the policy clarion call of South Africa's 
first democratic government and gained rapid public acceptance with the 
frequently fulsome support of the national media. President Nelson Mandela 
created a full cabinet post for oversight of the RDP and assigned the 
charismatic and widely respected unionist Jay Naidoo to do the job. The Base 
Document was the RDP's policy platform. It spelt out in some detail the new 
government's attitude and expectations with regards to the South African 
media. Heavily informed by the draft media charter and the advocacy that 
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preceded it, the Democratic Information Programme considered open debate 
and transparency to be crucial elements in reconstruction and development. It 
called for the active exchange of information and opinion among all members of 
society, within and among communities and also between government and 
society11. 
The programme supported affirmative action in the media sector and called for 
resources to be set aside "to set up broadcasting and print enterprises at a 
range of levels" as well as training and education to ensure communities 
recognise and exercise their media rights. The programme proposed "strict 
limitations on cross media ownership to limit monopolies", the setting aside of 
funds for the "training of journalists and community-based media" and 
encouraged media institutions to do the same. It served notice that freedom of 
information legislation would be broadened and called for the restructuring of 
the government's information arm, the South African Communications Service. 
The mainstream print media was largely unaffected by any of this policy. Calls 
for open debate and the exchange of opinion and information were easily 
enough accounted for in newspapers' usual modus operandi. The imperative to 
diversify the media was matched by the rapid expansion of the mainstream 
media's community newspaper divisions (see Chapter One). Affirmative action 
and equity in the workplace were more efficiently enforced by laws imposed in 
the mid- to late-1990s, such as the Labour Relations Act (1995), the 
Employment Equity Act (1998), the Skills Development Act (1998) and the 
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003). But these applied to 
all economic sectors and were implemented unevenly within the sector, at best. 
Motileng, Wagner and Cassimjee report that the success of affirmative action in 
the South African media industry, even from the point of view of black middle 
managers, has been "equivocal" with stress and demotivation common 
consequences (2006, 11). 
11 see various media policy documents, including the Democratic Information Programme, in 
appendices to Louw 1993. 
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The next key pillar of ANC media policy was the 1996 Constitution itself. But 
this vital document actually conferred more rights on the print media than it 
imposed responsibilities. Importantly, the Constitution enshrined freedom of 
expression, a vital right for the media. According to American Founding Father 
James Madison, freedom of expression is the only effectual guardian of every 
other right and, "without it, tyranny can advance in silence" (Sparks 2003). 
Freedom of expression is enshrined in section 16(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
which states as follows: 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes 
a) freedom of the press and other media 
b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas 
c) freedom of artistic creativity 
d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.,,12 
The 1996 Constitution also guarantees the right to equality, the equality of all 
languages, the multi-cultural nature of South Africa and the right to promote 
cultures, choice and diversity. Jane Duncan notes that there were significant 
differences between the way that freedom of expression was spelled out in the 
interim Constitution of 1993 and its final delineation in the 1996 Constitution 
(Duncan 2003). One of the key differences concerns the treatment of hate 
speech. While unpopular and even offensive speech is protected by the 1996 
Constitution, hate speech is not. This does not mean, however, that hate 
speech is banned, merely that it is not protected by the Constitution. This allows 
for a "harms test" to be conducted to determine limitations on hate speech 
rather than a "morality test" which would have been apposite to the Interim 
Constitution. This, argues Duncan, limits the potential for the abuse of a hate 
speech ban by people in power (Duncan 2003, 3). 
The notions of equality and human dignity are also emphasised in the 1996 
Constitution and both have relevance to media policy. A useful illustration of this 
was provided by the South African Human Rights Commission's investigation 
12 Section 16(1) of the Constitution. Act 108 of 1996. 
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into racism in the media in 1999. The commission received a complaint from the 
Black Lawyers Association and the Association of Black Accountants of South 
Africa that two newspapers (the Sunday Times and the Mail & Guardian) were 
racist in the way they reported on what was happening in South Africa, 
particularly where black people were the subjects of stories. The commission 
decided to expand its approach to examine racism in the media more broadly. 
Hearings were held in March 2000. In its submission to the commission, the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA, now Icasa) argued that the 
Constitutional clauses on hate speech were "sufficient protection against racism 
or sexism in all media". The IBA reminded the commission that independent 
regulatory bodies, including itself, existed to field any complaints in this regard. 
It is certainly true to say that the South African media was cognisant of the 1996 
Constitution and its passage into law. Indeed few other institutions devoted as 
much energy or as many resources into covering, analysing, describing and 
popularising the Constitutional process. This is a further indication of the role 
the media played in consensus building, an issue dealt with in the previous 
chapter. 
I have mentioned above that the print media was largely unaffected by the work 
of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa) 1. But just 
like its predecessor, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), Icasa deals 
almost exclusively with the broadcast media. It is in only one area, cross-media 
ownership that Icasa has made its presence felt in the strategic universe of 
South Africa's print media corporations. The converging of technologies has 
meant that several of the country's ostensibly print media establishments have 
embraced or wished to embrace new media, broadcast and other forms of 
information technology. As will be seen from the examples below, Icasa's 
limitations and rulings on cross-media ownership have had a profound impact 
on the print media landscape in South Africa. In several key cases, those 
I The Icasa Act of 2000 dissol"cd thc Indcpcndcnt Broadcasting Authority and the South African 
Telecommunications Rcgulatory Authority but absorbcd substantiye parts of the Telccommunications 
Act of 1996. the IBA Act of 1993 and the Broadcasting Act of 1999. The Icasa Act combincd thc 
functions of the IBA and SATRA into one. independent. regulatory authority. Icasa. 
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involved consider the intervention to have been severely detrimental to the 
diversity, growth and development of the country's media as a whole and to 
their own organisations in particular. Of course, the intention for idealistic policy 
makers and stakeholders had been rather different: to avoid the worst features 
of the Liberal market model such as over-concentration and monopoly (see 
Horwitz 2001 ). 
Perhaps the starkest example concerns New Africa Investments Limited (Nail), 
the first major black-controlled company to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. In 2001, Nail - which owned a controlling stake in the major black 
daily newspaper, the Sowetan - made a bid to buy black-owned broadcasting 
group Kagiso Media. The deal was initially approved by the Competition 
Commission but then, in January 2002, was rejected by Icasa. The merger had 
a price tag of R337 -million and required Icasa to exempt Nail from regulations 
prohibiting a company from owning more than two FM radio licenses. Nail at 
that point held KFM radio station and Jacaranda FM among its assets while 
Kagiso Media housed Durban-based East Coast Radio. 
Astonishingly, the principal reason cited for lcasa's decision not to grant Nail an 
exemption from the two FM license regulation was on the basis of Nail's 
insufficient black empowerment credentials (Berger 2004,60). It was deemed 
by Icasa that the proportion of historically disadvantaged groups holding 
ownership of the company was too low. According to a newspaper report at the 
time: "Although Nail is widely regarded as the symbol of black economic 
empowerment, Icasa has expressed concerns about the group's ownership. In 
a letter to Nail summarising the reasons for blocking the merger, the regulator 
points out that historically disadvantaged groups own less than 5% of the 
company. It further argued that the merger would dilute Kagiso's empowerment 
credentials and lead to a 'reduction in the stake held by empowerment entities' 
in the industry" (Msomi 2002, 5). 
Saki Macozoma, then CEO of Nail, remains bitter at the decision that eventually 
led to the collapse of his company. "Nail's media interests were killed by Icasa. 
When Nail bought Kagiso (our best acquisition) we were strengthened 
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completely on the radio side ... If we'd been allowed to cross-subsidise, we 
would've been on a new platform. The Icasa decision killed it" (Macozoma 
2005). Indeed Macozoma still alleges that it was precisely at the interface 
between government and the media that his bid to create a major, black-owned 
media conglomerate was stymied: "My own interpretation is that there was a 
political decision behind the Icasa ruling. If I hadn't been personally involved, it 
wouldn't have been stopped. There were elements of government involved and 
the question was asked: if he (Macozoma) pulls this media conglomerate 
together, what is he going to do with it? It's not just a question of who you are 
going to support, but who you are not" (Macozoma 2005). Nail sold its media 
interests in 2004, leaving Johnnic Communications as the only JSE-listed black-
controlled media group in the country. The demise of Nail as a media player 
precipitated a measure of consolidation in the newspaper industry, 
concentrating ownership in the hands of four major groups, Johnnic 
Communications (which acquired Sowetan and Sowetan Sunday World), 
Caxtons, Naspers and Independent Newspapers. 
It remains Macozoma's contention, even though he was personally involved in 
establishing the law and regulations governing the post-1994 media 
environment, that they had failed to foresee convergence nor did they allow for 
the cross-subsidisation necessary to safeguard the economic viability of most 
global media organisations in the 21 sl Century. "Radio makes a lot of money. It 
has such a low cost structure. Those who combine electronic and print have the 
best opportunity to survive" (Macozoma 2005). 
Instead, the assets ended up largely at Primedia, still headed by CEO Willie 
Kirsh in 2007. He too bemoans the pervasive influence of the regulator on the 
media sector: "The most important factor in the commercial radio environment 
is Icasa. Our ability to grow is regulated by Icasa. Up to now, it's been very 
restrictive: two FM and two AM stations, though this is in the process of being 
changed to not more than 35% of the total" (Kirsh 2005). 
By contrast, the Guardian of London, the majority shareholder in the Mail & 
Guardian - previously the Weekly Mail- might bemoan their reluctance to take 
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up an interest in the profitable South African radio sector. According to Kagiso 
Media board member and Caxton Professor of Journalism at Wits University 
Anton Harber: "It was clear the privatisation of the SABC offered enormous 
opportunities. I came from the Weekly Mail and was looking for opportunities to 
find media investments to subsidise the paper. We had secured 20% of the 
radio investment for the Weekly Mail, which totalled R44-million for East Coast 
Radio and R11-million for Radio Oranje. They were already worth R200-million. 
But the Guardian had its own cash and financial issues and wouldn't take part. 
It was a great opportunity for the Weekly Mail to stabilise itself' (Harber 2005). 
The opportunity to seize a share of a radio gold mine was instead lost, and the 
Weekly Mail was soon sold to Zimbabwean interests (Harber 2005). Clearly, 
when it comes to matters of cross-ownership regulation and constraints, 
strategic errors are not always the result simply of Icasa interference. The 
example is a reminder, too, that while I refer to broacast a more comprehensive 
examination of the sector's development is necessary before a complete picture 
of South Africa's place within the Three Models paradigm can be ascertained. 
That, however, is a self-acknowledged limitation of the current work and an 
opportunity for future investigation. 
The MDDA, the fourth dimension of the regulatory environment, has been 
discussed above. Beyond the four pillars of the regulatory environment, a 
number of other laws and features are worth highlighting in brief before moving 
to the analysis section of this chapter. The Competition Commission, for 
instance, has been mentioned. This commission derives its existence from the 
passage of the Competition Act of 1998. The Act makes provisions concerning 
monopolistic behaviour, price collusion and access to general services. The 
commission is intended to ensure the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements 
and/or abuse of a dominant position. It also considers applications for the 
approval of mergers, as was the case with the proposed merger cited above of 
Nail and Kagiso Media. In South Africa, as in many other countries of the world, 
there are specific regulations intended to limit the ability of one private company 
or constituency to monopolise channels to public opinion. Some of the South 
African regulations restricting cross-media ownership (with particular reference 
to newspapers and broadcasting) are currently under review. 
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Other notable features of the regulatory environment include the Lotteries Act 
of 1997, which governs the holding of competitions and sets a number of 
regulations in this regard, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(2000) which gives effect to the enshrined access to information clause in the 
Constitution (section 32(1 )). The latter piece of legislation allows access to 
information held by public bodies or other persons or bodies which is required 
for the exercise or protection of rights. The rules are different, depending on 
whether a media organisation requires information from a public or a private 
body. If it is public, procedural requirements need to be fulfilled. Applications for 
information that are in the public interest override grounds for refusal of both 
private and public bodies. The overall intention of the Act is to provide for "a 
more open and trusting society". According to Calland, "despite a certain 
amount of predictable bureaucratic inertia, the law continues to be useful to 
organisations and citizens who wish to extract accountability from those in 
power" (Calland 2006, 32). 
Media-state inter-relations 
A range of controversies from the mid-1990s threw the relationship between the 
media and the state into stark relief. In 1995, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu examined the role of 
media under apartheid. It concluded that most of the media - with some 
important exceptions - had either deliberately promoted apartheid, or had 
implicitly complied with it. In both ways, media institutions had contributed to a 
climate of gross human rights violations (Barratt 2006,4). Some newspapers 
and journalists chose to appear at the TRC hearings and several publicly 
apologised on behalf of their companies. This caused some tension among the 
journalistic fraternity. Former editors grumbled. On September 26, 127 
journalists from Naspers, the Afrikaans publishing group, defied their employers 
by apologising for their actions and role during apartheid (Barratt 2006, 16). 
I have also mentioned, in the previous chapter, some of the antagonism that 
has developed between the media and government concerning the use of 
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apartheid era legislation. This has been high on the agenda of several 
important discussions between editors and high state officials including 
President Thabo Mbeki. No resolution has been forthcoming and the state 
continues to use these laws to limit access of the media and prevent the 
publication of sensitive content. 
In spite of a number of meetings between government officials and media 
editors and managers, "from about five years into the new South Africa, 
tensions increasingly plagued media-national government interaction, with 
mutual antagonism rising and a possible breakdown in communication 
looming," wrote Barratt (2006, 32-33). In March 2001, the Sanef executive met 
President Mbeki to discuss "this sense of disengagement" and a joint workshop 
was proposed. On June 29 and 30,2001, a top-level meeting between the 
President, cabinet ministers and Sanef editors was held northwest of 
Johannesburg at Sun City. Its title was: "The role of the media in a changing 
society". 
At the meeting, Sanef chair Mathatha Tsedu said the "present level of mistrust 
and animosity has gone beyond a tolerable and acceptable point". He added: 
"We concede there's too much shallowness, superficiality and 
unprofessionalism in the South African media. But on the other side, 
government was communicating inadequately, not properly articulating policies 
and resorting too easily to media bashing when failures were reported" (Barratt 
2006, 35). Various activities were put in place following the meeting and a 
general easing of tensions was reported. One of these was the establishment of 
the Presidential Press Corps (PPC), in 2003, aimed at improving 
communications between the media and the presidency. Mired in a lack of will 
on both sides, the PPC never operated and, by mid-2006, Sanef noted it had 
probably died (ibid, 35). 
Further examples of what Johnston calls "points of conflict" between state and 
media include the Human Rights Commission's issuing of subpoenas to editors 
to answer questions on racism in the media (2000), the bitter ANC reaction to 
press speculation about the Aids-related death of presidential spokesman Parks 
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Mankahlana (2000), a court action for defamation brought against the Mail & 
Guardian by cabinet minister Jeff Radebe (2001), and defensiveness from the 
ANC over criticism of President Thabo Mbeki's leadership and character in the 
course of coverage especially surrounding HIV-Aids and Zimbabwe (Johnston 
2005, 13). 
Taken together these flash points amount to "systematic hostility", argues 
Johnston, and the state's lack of effort to deal with it through improved 
professionalised communications has been noteworthy (Johnston 2005, 13). He 
argues that at the core of the clash is a dilemma over the form of democracy 
that is to be consolidated: 
The ANC prefers the political sphere to remain distinct and privileged, 
reported on by a media from the sidelines and, at the same time, to 
claim an authentic, unmediated relationship with what it variously 
calls the people, the masses, or the majority. The media are seen as 
unnecessary to this relationship and are unwelcome to it" (Johnston 
2005, 19). 
Overall, and in spite of the data on the level of support for it from virtually all 
branches of the media, government has consistently expressed its exasperation 
and frustration with the mainstream media and its role in the post-apartheid, 
democratic order. 
It was little surprise when, in mid-2005, government launched Vuk'uzenze/e, a 
regular bi-monthly magazine with a circulation of 1, 1-million (going to up 2-
million for the special President's State of the Nation Address in February) and 
an annual budget of R20-million (Milne & Taylor 2005, 53). The publication is 
perhaps the eventual realisation of the ANC's hopes in the early 1990s for a 
newspaper of its own. In a special message in the first edition, President Thabo 
Mbeki said: "One of the critical elements of the programme of change is to 
expand the platforms of government communication, so we can provide the 
majority of citizens with information they need to improve their lives" (Business 
Day, 30 September 2005, p19). 
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The launch of the magazine was testimony to ten years of frustration with the 
media industry and the failure of government policy to create a media 
environment that, in its view, matched the advances of the new, democratic 
dispensation. Specific problem areas have been identified as slow or 
inadequate transformation within media companies, sluggish linguistic or 
cultural diversification, poor penetration of rural and/or marginalised 
communities, concentrated ownership and a seemingly perpetually antagonistic 
attitude toward government and the ANC. 
Writing in the ANC's online mouthpiece, ANC Today, Smuts Ngonyama, Head 
of the Presidency at ANC Headquarters, commented on the tricky relationship 
that is the subject of this chapter: "One aspect of the media's role which has 
proven difficult to effectively debate, not surprisingly given the country's history, 
is the relationship between the media and the government and the ruling party. 
Some people view this as a simple choice for the media: either be a watchdog 
keeping a beady eye on the ruling party or a lapdog which happily swallows 
anything the ANC might dish up. Neither dog is particularly desirable. What 
South Africa needs is a truly critical media. A truly critical media is not one 
which opposes the government at every turn ... a 'critical media' is a media 
which thinks" (ANC Today 1 (15), May 2001). 
This frustration is reiterated by dozens of government and ANC statements 
during the period, some of which are mentioned here for illustrative purposes: 
• "Mere declarations of media freedoms on their own are not enough. 
These freedoms must be underpinned by an equitable distribution of 
media resources, development programmes and a deliberate effort to 
engender a culture of open debate .... ownership of media resources, 
production facilities and distribution outlets shall be subject to anti-
monopoly, anti-trust and merger legislation" - Ready to Govern, ANC 
policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa adopted at the 
National Conference, 28-31 May 1992 . 
• "We believe that mass media institutions are lagging behind other 
sectors in transforming themselves to suit the new South African 
environment ... it is precisely because we need a diversity of ideas 
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that we need diversity of ownership. And that principle extends both 
to the number of institutions which are able to publish and broadcast, 
and to the ownership structure of those individual institutions" -
Tokyo Sexwale, former Gauteng Premier, in an opinion article entitled 
"SA needs a diversity of media ownership" Mayibuye 6(6), Journal of 
the ANC, October 1995. 
• "To some extent, the media has been transformed. The public 
broadcaster, for example, is now free of government control. Major 
changes in ownership have taken place, and the media industry is 
starting to deal seriously with shortcomings in the field of skills 
development and black advancement. There is still a long way to go, 
however. Huge strides need to be made to talk about equality in the 
South African media, and in building the diversity and depth which a 
developing society such as ours so desperately needs". - From The 
Role of the Media Under Apartheid, ANC submission on Media to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, September 1997,14. 
• "Nor can any of us remain content while press freedom in its fullest 
sense remains in practice something enjoyed mainly by an elite-
urban rather than rural, rich rather than poor, industrialised rather 
than developing" - President Thabo Mbeki, speech on World Press 
Freedom Day, 2001. 
• "We need to ensure however that the media becomes more diverse 
in ownership terms, and that it does not remain the preserve of big 
business, black or white" - Smuts Ngonyama, Head of the 
Presidency at ANC Headquarters, in ANC Today 15(1), May 2001. 
• "The political economy of the media places the interest of 
advertisers, and well-off South Africans above the interests of other 
citizens. Patronage by the advertisers skews the media landscape 
and consequently distorts the democratic process and debate" - ANC 
magazine Umrabulo 16, article on "Media in a Democratic South 
Africa", August 2002, 7. 
• "There is therefore a need to continually engage with the media 
around their attitude towards the democratic movement and 
government, difficult though this may be. As we challenge the media 
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on its relationship with the progressive movement, care should be 
exercised that criticism of the media and its particular behaviour 
should not lead to a situation in which the ANC is perceived as 
opposed to the freedom of the media in general ... The ANC must put 
media reform on the political agenda. This should be aimed at dealing 
with anti-democratic tendencies within the media system" (ANC 
magazine Umrabulo 16, article on "Media in a Democratic South 
Africa", August 2002, 7). 
It is evident from the narrative above that the South African state in the post-
apartheid era has expressed a particular interest in a range of possible 
interventions in the country's print media. That these interventions have often 
been frustrated does not signal the end of, nor even any particular strain on, the 
consensual relationship between the media and the state. Indeed, the state's 
antagonism is grounded in its demand for a media that is more efficient at 
delivering on the state's agenda. The pressure it exerts is understandable as it 
is dealing for the most part with a print media that believes it retains an 
oppositional role. 
The urgency stems in part, too, from the gradual concentration of power within 
the state executive and its consequent anxiety to direct the polity. This 
phenomenon has been widely noted by academics and authors in recent years. 
Gumede refers to it as "democratic centralism", or "vanguardism" (2005, 305). 
According to Butler, "power has drifted from society to state, from provincial to 
national level, from the legislature to the executive, and within the national 
executive from Cabinet to presidency" (2006, 44). 
In his work Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power? Richard Calland 
unhesitatingly zeroes in on the presidency as its key locus (2005). "The 
presidency ... is a centrifugal centre of influence in the new anatomy of the new 
South Africa", Calland writes (2006, 41). He adds that following the 1998 
recommendations of the Maphai Commission, which was established to reform 
the public service, and having quashed internal dissent from within his party 
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and its allies, South African President Thabo Mbeki moved swiftly to centralise 
his authority: 
His hold on political power is complete in the sense that he has 
painstakingly sidelined all serious internal opposition within the ANC, 
whether individual or collective ... (he) has defeated the left and, 
having taken control of the centre ground of South African politics, is 
busy imposing his own version of modern social democracy on 
government. Armed with an increasingly competent advisory team 
and the cabinet of men and women that he wants, he is the dominant 
pivot in government (2006, 40). 
According to Gumede, "Mbeki's presidency and cabinet have been based on 
the three C's: control, coordination and centralisation" (2005, 129). This 
approach has seen the establishment of a "super-cabinet", a coordination unit 
and a stronger secretariat to facilitate the more efficient, and more centralised, 
administration of the country (Gumede 2005, 130). 
A consequence of the greater degree of centralisation has been a diminishment 
in the rank-and-file's importance in determining policy. "According to SACP 
stalwart Jeremy Cronin, policies are now made mostly in government, meaning 
the ANC mass membership's ability to impact on policy-making has been 
severely curtailed" (Gumede 2005, 131). To reinforce this separation, the ANC 
conference adopted an Mbeki-inspired proposal to lengthen the period between 
party conferences from three to five years, in line with government's term of 
office. The Mbeki-ites argued that this would streamline policy-making. 
However, the implications are massive. Once policy has been decided on at the 
five yearly conference, it is all but impossible to change it. Lengthening the 
period between national conferences from three to five years removed a key 
mechanism for ordinary members to change or throw out policies they were 
unhappy with" (Gumede 2005,131). 
Furthermore, Gumede argues, even the legislative arm of government, 
Parliament, has had its hands tied in policy terms. "The ANC in Parliament is a 
virtual case study of how democratic institutions can increasingly be excluded 
from policy-making "(2005, 136). 
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With the exception of Mbeki's cheerleaders, MPs have been 
marginalised or cowed by the executive, and democracy is the victim 
(Gumede 2005, 141). 
He adds that even party "leaders critical of central government pOlicies ... have 
been systematically neutralised, and since the ANC does not have a policy of 
competitive election of leaders, internal democracy has effectively been snuffed 
out ... The climate of fear instilled by the party bosses, and the self-censorship 
it breeds, spills into broader society, because the ANC is such a dominant 
party. Thus is the quality of democracy undermined" (Gumede 2005, 143). This 
is a concern that other scholars have expressed with regard to democracy in 
Africa as a whole: "The continent, far from consolidating an African 
Renaissance, is in danger of backsliding democratically" (Berger 2002,36). 
At this point, you will recall that the matter of how power is dealt with in the 
Three Models paradigm was a self-perceived weakness, according to Hallin 
and Mancini. They do argue, however, that differentiation theory suggests 
"that power should be most diffused and least concentrated - therefore least 
significant - in the highly differentiated Liberal system" (2004, 82). In South 
Africa's experience, power is not diffusing, as one might expect in a democratic 
state, but as Butler and others suggest, it is concentrating. This, in turn, is 
enabling the state to become more interventionist in its attitude and also more 
resistant, for instance, to the urgent demands of editors and newspaper owners 
to rescind offensive legislation. 
The concentration of power is inevitable in the South African political system in 
part because consensus decision-making (and therefore the post-decision 
suppression of minority opinion and disunity) was a hallmark of indigenous 
governing structures and, in part, because the country's political system has 
been set up in a way that accountability, the natural counterbalance to the 
concentration of power, is noticeably under strength in the country's new 
political architecture. As Gumede observes, "undemocratic tendencies in the 
ANC endanger the consolidation of South Africa's democracy and will leave 
footprints on the country's infant political system as a whole" (2005, 304). 
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South Africa has a proportional representation-based majoritarian system that 
emphasises other aspects of democratic rule often at the expense of 
accountability. An Electoral Task Team (ETT) appointed in 2002 to revisit the 
South African electoral system and make recommendations on its reform found 
accountability to be one of the thorniest yet most important issues. As ETT 
chair, Van Zyl Siabbert commented at the time: "no other principle has 
exercised the minds of the members of the task team more than the principle of 
accountability" (Slabbert 2002, 5). 
It is true that there is a considerable degree of accountability already built-in to 
the South African polity and to its electoral system. Regular elections every five 
years or so, as demanded by the Constitution, provide the ultimate sanction. 
Cabinet ministers are individually and collectively accountable to the President, 
as well as to their party, while the executive as a whole is intended to be 
accountable to Parliament (Venter 1998, 88). The effectiveness of the latter 
arrangement, Cabinet's accountability to Parliament, remains moot (James & 
Hadland 2003). 
But for many, this is not enough. As scholar Tom Lodge has pointed out, "South 
Africa's simple list system of proportional representation is chiefly criticised 
because it reduces the personal accountability of parliamentary representatives 
as well as encouraging the executive to adopt an authoritarian predisposition in 
its relations with the legislature" (Lodge 2002,4). According to Ben Reilly: "A 
lack of accountability of elected members to voters ... [can] undermine the 
legitimacy of the electoral system." (Reilly 2002, 37) While the ANC, along with 
a few other parties, has assigned constituencies on a voluntary basis, this has 
been functioning unevenly at best (Murray & Nijzink 2002). There is a widely 
held view too that party managers hold too much power under the closed list 
system. Ordinary MPs, even those belonging to a party holding an 
overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, simply have "little incentive to 
rebel" according to some (Venter 1994, 71). According to Jorgen Elklit, "Many 
of us feel that it should be possible to hold individual political personalities 
accountable for their actions. One should at least aim at a closer connection 
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than is now the case between geographical localities and representatives" 
(Elklit 2002, 28). 
The En made a range of recommendations, including the creation of a number 
of constituency-based wards in the country's national parliament to bolster 
accountability. As things stand, ordinary members of the national parliament are 
highly constrained by party discipline and, collectively, are overawed by the 
power of the executive. This has been exacerbated by the redeployment of 
large numbers of senior ANC parliamentarians, a process that has led since 
around 1997 to a period of parliamentary degradation (Calland 2006,94). 
Diversity of opinion within the majority party is limited by the decision and 
decree of the party caucus, a throwback to the consensual politics treasured not 
only by the liberation movement but also by its forbears in indigenous South 
African pre-colonial communities. Mandela himself nostalgically recalls his first 
brushes with indigenous consensual democracy in his famous autobiography, 
Long Walk to Freedom: 
" ... soon the Great Place became alive with important visitors and 
travellers from all over Thembuland. The guests would gather in the 
courtyard in front of the regent's house and he would open the 
meeting by thanking everyone for coming and explaining why he had 
summoned them. From that point on, he would not utter another word 
until the meeting was nearing its end. Everyone who wanted to speak 
did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a 
hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was 
heard: chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and 
farmer, landowner and labourer. People spoke without interruption 
and the meetings lasted for many hours. The foundation of self-
government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and 
were equal in their value as citizens ... The meetings would continue 
until some kind of consensus was reached. They ended in unanimity 
or not at all." (Mandel a 1994, 20). 
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More recently, Gumede has written of how the ANC's past and its etiquette 
militate against open government: "In political organisations bonded by 
affection, friendship and solidarity, such as the ANC, members are often 
unwilling to be critical for fear that this will prove disruptive and violate the 
organisation's internal norms ... Freedom of speech is a meaningless right if 
group pressure demands conformity" (2005, 306). 
Collective decision-making is embedded in South Africa's past. Allister Sparks 
recalls that at the height of the turbulent 1980s, the United Democratic Front (a 
South African home-based anti-apartheid organisation) issued a policy 
statement concerning the country's constitutional future: "Drawing on the 
experience of its own modus operandi at the time, it advocated ... collective 
decision making and a high degree of consultation with the community. The 
notion was so 'highly democratic' it was almost Grecian but it evolved, naturally 
enough, from the political culture of the townships" (Sparks 1990, 389). 
The discussion above serves to highlight two points. The first point is that 
emerging democracies may be more vulnerable to the concentration of power 
and therefore to a higher level of state intervention. This may be exacerbated if 
a national political culture contains elements, either from its traditional 
indigenous past or from its authoritarian one, that support this process. The 
second point is that if the evident diffusion of political power is an indicator of 
the Liberal model, according to that criterion alone, South Africa is arguably not 
in this camp. On the whole, though, efforts at intervention in the South African 
context have been resisted, causing tension, frustration and counter-initiatives 
aimed at circumventing the power of the media. 
Applying the Three Models paradigm 
We have charted in considerable detail the development of media policy in 
South Africa and have characterised the current status and evolution of media-
state inter-relations in the post-1994 period. But do the forms of this relationship 
measure up to a high or a low level of interventionism? We refer back now to 
Hallin and Mancini's indicators. The first of these indicators was the degree of 
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concentration of capital within the South African media. This is dealt with in 
detail in the next chapter, Chapter Five. In essence, though, South Africa's 
media industry is characterised by a high degree of concentration in which only 
a few media companies predominate. This has been the case historically for 
more than a century and while the form and ownership of the media companies 
may have changed, the market continues to be dominated by a handful of 
powerful media organisations. 
We have seen from earlier discussion around the findings of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and from the argument presented in the 
previous chapter on political parallelism, that dominant media companies do 
tend to support the social and political status quo. Examples of intimate 
relations between senior politicians and media barons are relatively 
commonplace. Few better examples exist than in the personal arrangement 
between Irish press baron Tony O'Reilly and Nelson Mandela. 
In 1993, Mandela was having a hard time, in particular over Winnie 
(his wife). O'Reilly called and said: "you're working too hard, I'm 
sending my plane to fetch you. You need a holiday." O'Reilly's G5 
plane picks up Mandela and whips him off to the billionaire's exquisite 
holiday home in the Bahamas. There, in Lyford Cay, Mandela spent a 
week alone. [Soon] after that, there was a meeting in Switzerland. 
Mandela, accompanied by Pallo Jordan, meets O'Reilly in his hotel 
suite. There he asks them businessman questions. His most 
important one is this: If I put hundreds of millions of pounds into your 
country, will my bid meet with your favour? Are you okay with me 
buying in?". There were no guarantees given ... [But] there was a tacit 
understanding, following the meeting, that Mandela knew about 
O'Reilly's intention to bid for the Argus Company and approved of it. 
He then got into negotiations with Anglo [Michael Spicer] and, in 
1993, he buys a controlling stake [31 %] in the company. The myth 
about the friendship is this: O'Reilly woos Mandela and says that if he 
approves the Argus purchase, he will make sure the group is pro-
ANC for ever (Independent Newspapers senior executive who wished 
to remain anonymous 2005) 
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Myth or not, Mandela was hardly likely to support the O'Reilly bid if he 
suspected deep and perpetual animosity was on the cards. Moeletsi Mbeki, 
media consultant and brother of South Africa's current president, claims the 
arrangement between O'Reilly and Mandela had been endorsed by the ANC 
"on the understanding that some black shareholding would be facilitated. This 
did not occur" (cited in Tomaselli 1997, 37). 
There remain strong doubts in some circles about the wisdom of allowing 
O'Reilly into the South African market. Says Macozoma: "Moeletsi (Mbeki) and 
Pallo (Jordan) were involved in the O'Reilly deal. Overall, that was a bad deal 
for South Africa. I wouldn't have done it, even at that time. There was no reason 
to court O'Reilly. There were sufficient resources inside South Africa. O'Reilly 
has extracted value" (2005). Macozoma, by his last remark, was repeating the 
oft-made charge that the Irish parent company had embarked on an asset-
stripping strategy according to which excess profits were repatriated to Ireland 
(also see Ambekar's statement on page 161). 
One might argue that the arrival of O'Reilly into South Africa would contribute to 
Liberal drift by importing practices, content and even staff from Ireland (one of 
the four countries populating Hallin and Mancini's Liberal model). Indeed, there 
is some truth to this. A couple of senior managers were brought over to South 
Africa to assist with Independent Newspapers' absorption into the company's 
global profile. But the company also made some terrible and costly 
misjudgements about the South African market by applying inappropriate 
strategies. One of these was the conceptualisation of the Cape Town 
readership market as being best represented by a pyramid: wealthy readers at 
the top and a sea of less affluent potential readers at the bottom. 
With the pyramid in mind, the decision was then taken to pitch the Cape Times 
at the top end of the pyramid for the sophisticated reader and to dumb down the 
Cape Argus to feed readers at the bottom. It was realised eventually, as the 
readership figures for both the Cape Times and the Cape Argus deteriorated 
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rapidly, that perhaps this was not the case. The market was, in fact, shaped 
more like a diamond. Instead of allowing both titles to occupy the thick, middle 
band of reasonably wealthy, reasonably educated readers, the company 
pushed the Cape Times up into a space which it did not have the capacity or 
quality to exploit and the Cape Argus down into a heavily populated, but largely 
illiterate group who couldn't afford newspapers anyway. On the whole, the 
O'Reilly head office did not interfere much in the day-to-day running of their 
South African holdings. He himself spent a week a year thinking about South 
Africa, and that was when he was in the country for his annual visit, according 
to one senior staffer. There is similarly no evidence that a Zimbabwean's 
ownership of the Mail & Guardian has translated into any difference in the way 
that newspaper has related to the state. Foreign ownership, in other words, 
does not necessarily prove Liberal drift. 
This all amounts to a strong affirmative response to Hallin and Mancini's first 
indicator. There is a high degree of concentration of capital in media markets in 
South Africa and this has created an environment in which cosy relationships 
have developed between senior political and media players. 
Furthermore, South Africa has made a recent shift from authoritarianism to 
democracy - the second indicator - and this has indeed resulted in a blending 
of the system's paternalistic, authoritarian (and traditional) inclinations together 
with more pluralist elements. These elements exist in a state of tension. At root 
are a concentration of power and a diminishment of accountability that may 
exacerbate emerging democracies' vulnerability to heightened state intervention 
in the media. 
In an environment of single-party dominance within a majoritarian system - the 
third indicator - with a weak level of accountability, this could lead (as it has in 
South Africa) to repeated bids by an active state to roll-back media power and 
autonomy. This does not mean that democracy itself is in jeopardy. It may 
mean, however, that the expansion of media freedom is less likely in a 
democracy that is dominated for long periods by a single political party. 
122 
South Africa has certainly experienced a breakdown in formal journalistic 
organisation, particularly at a relatively junior level (see Chapter Six). In a 
sense, though, it does have a consensus-based system in that key organised 
social groups (the biggest trade union federation in the country, for instance) 
are formally included in government. This corporatism and the lack of access 
afforded to individual, special interests might well have mingled with a penchant 
for a social welfare state to locate South Africa firmly in the Democratic 
Corporatist cluster. Unfortunately, as a developing country with massive 
inequity and high levels of poverty and unemployment, South Africa does not 
have the resources to provide an adequate social welfare system. This recalls 
Hallin and Mancini's observation cited earlier in the chapter that in Polarised 
Pluralist systems, "the state's grasp often exceeds its reach" due to lack of 
resources, political consensus and by clientelist relations that diminish its 
capacity for unified action (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 119). 
If rational legal authority and clientelism occupy either end of a continuum, 
South Africa is probably placed halfway between the two. There are rule-based 
norms and procedures and a code (the Constitution) that is universally 
applicable. However, the country's apartheid legacy - in which non-compliance 
and ungovernability were hallmarks of the struggle - together with the state's 
lack of capacity and the challenges it faces even to provide basic services to 
the majority of its people, undermine the currency of rational legal authority. 
Clientelism, of the kind exposed by various corruption scandals (such as the 
arms deal scandal that saw the ANC's former Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni, 
imprisoned in 2006) continues to impact on the distribution of some social 
resources. Certainly deference is expected from the media in its relations with 
the state. Personal connections are important in generating news and 
uncovering inside information (see reference to journalist Ranjeni Munusamy in 
Chapter Six). And the common good is frequently cited by the state as a 
moderator of the press's liberal inclinations (see Netshitenzhe's remarks above, 
page 89). 
The final indicator set out by Hallin and Mancini is the degree of pluralism in a 
society. They contend that "Polarised Pluralist societies are characterised by 
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sharp political conflicts often involving changes of regime" (2004, 61) and in 
which the media are often used as instruments of struggle. Both of these would 
certainly be true of South Africa, where sharp political conflict and regime 
change have been recent hallmarks. What South African doesn't really have, 
according to the Comparing Media Systems ledger, are "significant anti-system" 
political parties. In addition, it has degrees of commercialisation and 
professionalisation that might suggest a more moderate form of pluralism. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have fleshed out Hallin and Mancini's understanding of state 
intervention in the media and isolated the indicators that help to categorise 
media systems. The chapter has presented an account of the development of 
South African media policy, much of which is new material gleaned from the 
interviews conducted for this thesis. There is no other published account of the 
establishment of the ANC's Department of Information and Publicity, nor any 
other detailed discussion of the party's plans to launch a daily newspaper, nor 
even an account of how the deal between Mandela and O'Reilly was struck. 
We have again found that emerging democracies may present a different 
category of democracy in which inherent or traditional values militate against 
the kind of Liberal drift described by Hallin and Mancini. In South Africa's case, 
this stems from the lack of accountability within South African's political 
architecture together with its consensual decision-making style rooted in ancient 
indigenous practice. The consequence is an increasing concentration of power 
that is by no means typical of the differentiated media and political systems 
populating the Liberal model. This lends credence, furthermore, to critics' 
concerns (as well as to Hallin and Mancini's own anxiety) that the dynamics of 
power is an under-represented concept within the Three Models paradigm. 
It is clear from the narrative above and from South Africa's placement vis-a-vis 
Hallin and Mancini's indicators that in the terrain of state intervention the 
country constitutes a Polarised Pluralist media-state system. This is in spite of 
the vestiges of Liberal model values and inclinations. Certainly, the balance of 
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forces suggests an increasingly powerful, if democratic, majoritarian state. The 
media is under great pressure to resist a series of anti-press measures 
contained in proposed legislation, as well as a raft of old laws still resiliently 
inscribed in law and occasionally called upon by the authorities. The media has 
entered into a number of controversies and debates that have served to 
heighten tensions with the state, including over the role of the press in a 
developing democracy. The majority party itself appears ambivalent about this, 
in spite of its inclusion in party policy and its enshrinement in the Constitution, 
and is inclined to more forcibly harness its envied social, political and economic 
power. The media has, in any case, and perhaps unwittingly in many cases, 
bought into the ANC political contract. 
With each of the indicators, South Africa's system corresponds largely to a 
Polarised Pluralist model with some notable Liberal and corporatist elements. 
Such contradictions are a common feature of all individual countries populating 
the Three Models, as Hallin and Mancini have conceded. The roots for South 
Africa's placement in the Polarised Pluralist cluster derive not only from the 
structures and dynamics of the new political dispensation but reach back 
through the apartheid, colonial and pre-colonial eras to long-standing patterns 
of social and political organisation. 
It seems true that not only is South Africa located in the Polarised Pluralist 
cluster, but that it appears to be moving deeper into it. The vestiges of 
liberalism and democratic corporatism are being gradually but systematically 
reduced. This supports Hallin and Mancini's scepticism concerning Liberal drift 
and the argument that all systems must converge toward the Liberal model, at 
least in the middle- to long-term. It also begins to suggest a new model of 
media and politics in which Liberal elements are held in retreat and perhaps 
even in permanent abeyance by the power of a mass-based ruling political 
party in an environment of emerging, loosely-accountable majoritarian 
democracy. 
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Chapter Five 
'TRIGGERS OF CHANGE': THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA MARKET, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF A MASS PRESS 
Introduction 
Unlike any of the 18 countries used to populate Hallin and Mancini's Three 
Models paradigm, South Africa has experienced recent, dramatic change both 
in its political system and in its media sector. Indeed, if there is one defining 
characteristic of the South African media market over the 13 years since the 
advent of democracy, change is probably it. Certainly, there are trends in place 
that were around before the 1994 election, indeed for decades prior to that. The 
country's media sector is still dominated by four or five companies and their 
products, just as it was a century ago. But in many key areas such as patterns 
of ownership, diversity, products, audience and even roles and functions, the 
South African media now is virtually unrecognisable compared to the early 
1990s. 
The extent, rapidity and contemporaneity of the transformation experienced in 
the South African media sector offers a very particular and rigorous challenge to 
the Three Models paradigm: how does it cope with change? After all, several 
other critical methodologies, such as political economy, do devote considerable 
attention to this aspect (see below). The short answer is that Hallin and 
Mancini's paradigm does not cope very well. Comparative Media Systems does 
offer an account of the process of media system change, and it does set out an 
understanding for the direction of that change, based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the paradigm as a whole. The first part of this chapter will be 
devoted to elucidating this understanding of both the process and direction of 
media system change. But there are a number of key weaknesses within Hallin 
and Mancini's paradigm both in how change is defined and in understanding 
how and why change takes place. 
Change in an emerging democracy may, for instance, be quite different from 
the shifts and transformations that older, more stable systems undergo. This 
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naturally has an impact on the degree and pace of change within corresponding 
media systems. Many post-colonial, democratic states in Africa, for example, 
are effectively one-party systems with many of the networks, structures and 
values of their authoritarian and even pre-colonial pasts still very much in 
evidence. This is a different kind of democracy to the versions that exist 
elsewhere, most particularly compared to the developed, western states that 
populate the Three Models paradigm. 
Even though mature systems go through a process of constant change 
themselves, as Hallin and Mancini discern, they are likely to cope with the 
potential triggers of change more comfortably. They are unlikely, for example, to 
have to manage a dramatic swing in the value of their national currency or a 
massive sudden outflow of foreign investment. New market entrants with global 
connections are unlikely to shift the whole shape of the sector. Newer, smaller 
systems are more vulnerable. They are buffeted and transformed by 
phenomena that would cause only marginal shifts over the long-term in larger, 
more stable systems. And, with the legacy of pre-democratic values, alliances 
and systems pressing for adoption and even formalisation, change may also not 
be in the direction of Liberal drift. 
This thesis is not the first work to consider the causes and consequences of 
change within the South African media system. The fullest body of work on the 
subject is to be found in political economy scholarship, the predominant critical 
method in South African media studies over the last two decades. Indeed, I 
believe a political economy approach does shed some interesting light on 
aspects of change - in particular concerning ownership structures, economic 
forces and in considering business strategy in the sector - and therefore 
constitutes a useful theoretical partner to the Three Models paradigm. Hallin 
and Mancini make repeated reference in Comparing Media Systems to the 
importance of the economic context of media and political systems, a 
fundamental concern of political economy. It is important, however, to 
acknowledge prior work and to sketch some of the perspectives emanating out 
of political economy scholarship as a means of understanding change in the 
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South African context. This will be done later in the chapter and as a prelude to 
a discussion on what I call the "triggers" of change. 
This chapter will identify seven triggers that individually and collectively have 
had a significant impact on the South African media system. Some emanate 
from within the media sector, such as technological change or the framing of 
business strategy. The others stem from factors external to the sector, for 
instance from the global environment, from the state, from commercialisation or 
from the local economy. The notion of triggers of change introduces a much-
needed modification to Hallin and Mancini's paradigm. It enables a clearer 
understanding of the dynamics and patterns of change and also introduces a 
useful tool for comparative purposes. 
We will look at specific examples for each of the triggers of change and 
compare the evidence offered by the specific case study of South Africa with 
the broad principles and understandings identified by Hallin and Mancini from 
their study of 18 mature democracies. Some significant conceptual departures 
are offered from the Three Models approach that draw on the South African 
experience. It is hoped that by contrasting the development of South Africa's 
media market with the 18 markets populating the paradigm, new light will be 
thrown on to Hallin and Mancini's conceptualisation of media system change. 
While various differences and weaknesses will be aired in relation to the 
paradigm offered in Comparing Media Systems, this thesis does still find the 
Three Models a useful, indeed important, tool of comparative analysis. The final 
task of this chapter will be to pick up once more on the three models of media 
and politics proffered by Hallin and Mancini. This will be done in an attempt to 
clarify still further whether South Africa might fit best into the Polarised Pluralist, 
Democratic Corporatist or Liberal model when it comes to the development of 
its media market and the existence of a mass press. A number of indicators 
have been identified and these will be measured against the South African 
experience. It will be demonstrated, once again, while South Africa has several 
characteristics of both the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist systems, that the 
Polarised Pluralist cluster is probably its most appropriate cluster. 
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Change in the Three Models paradigm 
For Hallin and Mancini, change in media systems is frequently - though not 
exclusively - about a gradual shift toward a universalised media that is 
increasingly autonomous (differentiated from other social institutions), 
professionalised and self-assured. Modernisation theory suggests this results in 
an ultimate zone, if not point, of convergence in which all media systems 
become essentially Liberal by nature. This homogenisation, or liberal drift, 
occurs through the dual processes of secularisation and commercialisation. 
Secularisation, according to Hallin and Mancini, has spawned key media 
system changes including the shift to catch-all media, the development of 
journalistic professionalism and a move toward media-oriented forms of political 
communication. These changes reflect the deterioration of mass political parties 
and group solidarity that secularisation implies. 
Commercialisation, on the other hand, contributes to the widening of the 
media's function in society by blurring the traditional separation of current 
affairs, advertising and entertainment. The result is a media that performs a 
variety of functions in keeping with the catch-all media predicted by 
secularisation. Commercialisation, Hallin and Mancini argue, "has in general 
weakened the ties between the media and the world of organised political 
actors" (2004, 282). This thesis will challenge this particular assertion and will 
argue that far from weaken the ties between the media and the political system, 
commercialisation - in the South African case - has in several ways 
strengthened them. 
Hallin and Mancini make certain concessions and acknowledge a number of 
weaknesses in their outlook. They concede, for instance, that there are "real 
problems" with differentiation theory and agree that modernisation theory is not 
convincing when it comes to "understanding media system change" (2004, 
288). They also accept it is possible that while the media are becoming more 
differentiated from the political system, they may be becoming less 
differentiated from the economic system. This is an argument that has been 
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posited by Bourdieu with his notion of de-differentiation (cited in Hallin and 
Mancini 2004, 80-82). Indeed, Giddens casts doubt that differentiation is a 
plausible theory at all, arguing that it "does not satisfactorily address the issue 
of time-space distanciation", one of they key elements of Giddens's own theory 
of modernisation (1990, 21). 
The Three Models paradigm also struggles to account for social and political 
power, a problem "endemic to the structural-functionalist perspective from 
which the notion of differentiation is taken" (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 253). We will 
grapple with each of these dimensions below. 
Critiquing change in South Africa's media system 
The 1990s witnessed significant shifts in the South African print media market. 
Newspaper companies underwent substantial changes in ownership, the racial 
re-composition of newsrooms and management, the competition of global 
media interests, a range of interventions by the state and the emergence of 
both mass-readership tabloid newspapers and of a new generation of local 
community newspapers. Steenveld, using a culturalist critical method, has 
pointed out the distinction, in the South African context, between change and 
transformation (2004). She argues that change, even significant change, does 
not necessarily amount to the fundamental shift represented by the notion of 
transformation (2004, 102). The pOint is perceptive. Indeed, Berger has argued 
that the question, "transformation from what, to what?" prompted by Steenveld's 
critical argument is essential for "anyone wanting to analyse the South Africa 
media and society using the term 'transformation'" (2000, 1). 
As perceptive as the point is, the disjuncture between change and 
transformation is perhaps a peculiarly South African conundrum steeped, as it 
is, in broader, ongoing national debates around the efficacy of various agencies 
or forces to bring about change and/or transformation. As Teer-Tomaselli puts 
it, "in the post-apartheid parlance of South Africa, 'transformation 'has come to 
mean the adaptation and reformation of institutions, both in the public and 
private sectors, to accommodate the change in political culture and ethos 
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following the first universal franchise election of 1994" (2004, 7). In the end, 
trying to assess the manner and extent of change is very much the purpose of 
this thesis without wanting necessarily to get bogged down in the nomenclature, 
particularly when it is so specific to the context. Indeed the distinction may 
make comparative studies more difficult. 
Whether one calls it change or transformation, much of the critical response to 
these shifts has in any case come from the political economy school that, 
naturally, has understood the change in its own terms (Tomaselli and Dunn, 
2001: 2). The two main protagonists have been media theorists Keyan 
Tomaselli (1989, 1997) and Guy Berger (1999, 2000, 2004) though a range of 
others, including Switzer & Switzer (1979), Louw (2001), Boloka (2004), Krabill 
(2001), Grove (1996), Teer-Tomaselli (2004), Mabote (1996), Memela (2004), 
Duncan (2003), Dunn (2001) and Jacobs (2004) have all taken part and made 
contributions of one kind or another. 
One author, Sonja Laden (now Narunsky-Laden), has stated, "the dynamics of 
South Africa's media industry in general, and its print media in particular, have 
typically been analysed in terms of political economy frameworks that tend to 
focus largely on the economic role of the South African state and its institutions, 
the creation of state corporations and their joint ventures with private capital, 
and the ways in which these have set about monitoring and controlling the black 
press and other media" (Laden 2001, 181). Indeed, in arguing for a move away 
from "standard politico-economic factors" and toward a new focus on socio-
cultural determinants, Laden notes the "scholarly preoccupation with the formal 
constraints imposed by and through South Africa's political economy, and their 
role in shaping the country's socio-political history" (ibid). 
We have discussed in some detail the development of various critical 
methodologies for analysing the media and its role in society (see Chapters 
One and Two). But it has only really been since the 1960s, when it emerged as 
a serious modern discipline, that political economy developed into a broad but 
popular critical framework. A short narrative on the roots of political economy is 
appropriate as we develop its compatibility with comparative media systems 
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theory. There are aspects of political economy theory with which I am 
uncomfortable and elements that I believe are useful. I will allude to both. 
Development of the Political Economy critical method 
According to Vincent Mosco, classical political economy was founded on two of 
the pillars of the Enlightenment: Cartesian rationality and Baconian empiricism. 
In general it sought to extend the 1 th Century revolution in the physical 
sciences by applying the principles of Galilean and Newtonian mechanics to the 
world of 18th and 19th Century capitalism (Mosco 1996, 39). It began, in 
essence, as a study of the science of wealth and even before a radical Marxian 
critique developed, political economy concerned itself - through the writings of 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and JS Mill - with understanding social change and 
historical transformation (Mosco 1996). 
While Karl Marx failed to engage with communications and the media as 
vigorously as he did with many other aspects of the shift from agrarian to 
industrial economy, he did provide a toolbox with which to get to grips with 
these phenomena. These tools, which include class analysis, the identification 
of patterns and cycles in capitalist development, social relations and their link to 
the production of goods and services and an interest in the locus and 
perpetuation of power, form the foundation of neo-Marxian political economy 
analysis. One can already see how, in the roots of political economy as a critical 
method, key similarities exist with comparative media systems analysis: the 
focus on patterns and cycles (differentiation and de-differentiation, for instance) 
and the emphasis on social relations as a determinant of production. 
The political economy approach gained new impetus in the 1930s and 1940s 
with the focus of the Frankfurt School on the cultural industries' role in 
sustaining totalitarianism. Adorno, for instance, insisted that the process of 
cultural domination had its roots in the economic dynamics of the "culture 
industry" (Mosco 1996, 102). Murdock and Golding argue "a critical reading of 
the Frankfurt School's analysis of the cultural industries provides one of the 
132 
primary links between the Marxian legacy and their application of it to 
communication studies" (ibid). 
Since the 1960s and 1970s when American commentators Dallas Smythe and 
Herbert I Schiller were the "trailblazers" of a modern political economy 
approach, the discipline has developed in a number of ways. It now resembles 
a broad school rather than a narrow critical method and encapsulates a 
diversity of interests, concepts and methodologies. According to Smythe, "in its 
broadest sense, political economy is concerned with how mankind arranges to 
allocate ... scarce resources" (Smythe 1960, 564). But many other components 
live comfortably within political economy. Mattelart (1979), another key 
contributor, contends "the manner in which the communications apparatus 
functions, which determines the elaboration and exchange of messages, 
corresponds to the general mechanisms of production and exchange 
conditioning all human activity in capitalist society" (cited in Mosco 1996, 104). 
By the 1980s, the leadership of the political economy approach had shifted 
across the Atlantic to various British schools. James Curran, Nicholas 
Garnham, Graham Murdock and Peter Golding "established a sophisticated 
political economy approach to media and cultural questions that remains 
unrivalled" (McChesney 2000, 113). More recently, political economy has grown 
in the developing world, in particular in work from Latin America and from 
Africa. While Frantz Fanon and Paulo Freire were the early pathfinders and 
considered the media and literacy to be tools of revolutionary activity, more 
contemporary developing world scholars (Baran, Emmanuel, Amin) have 
explored aspects of dependency theory, the transnationalisation of 
consumption, the homogenisation of demand and transnational culture from a 
political economy perspective (Mosco 1996, 119-125). Oliveira, for instance, 
argues that national media systems are controlled by national elites with close 
ties to western capital who depend on them for technology, support them 
through programming and promote consumerist values (Mosco 1996, 128). 
South African critic Eric Louw contends that the political economy method 
"focuses on how meaning is made by people within a productive process. This 
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involves exploring the social positions people occupy, the relations between 
them and struggles over meaning-production within organisations" (2001, 2). 
But definitions and foci abound. McChesney argues that political economy is 
about how media reinforces, challenges or influences existing class and social 
relations (2000, 110). Saunders suggests that "inherent in capitalism and the 
institutional structures that develop to support it, are 'rules' that restrict equitable 
access to the productive potential of market economies" (2000, 3-4). Political 
economy, then, is about understanding those rules. 
There is no single, correct approach that by itself constitutes a definitive political 
economy of communication, argues Vincent Mosco: It is "a starting point, a 
gateway" (1996, 3). But as varied and as textured as political economy is as a 
field, it has as its basis an understanding of the connections between the 
political and the economic. In essence, political economy treats the media as a 
business with the content and impact a product of the industrial, political and 
structural dynamics in which it is anchored. The method embraces a neo-
Marxian perspective on social relations and encourages the examination of 
issues such as the distribution of power (a weakness of the Hallin and Mancini 
paradigm), the structure and operation of capital, the labour process, 
globalisation and the development of modern (South African) capitalism. 
Vincent Mosco, arguably the doyen of current political economy, has identified 
four cornerstones of the discipline: social change, social totality, moral 
philosophy and praxis (1996,27). The question of social change is one with 
which several of political economy's "founders" have concerned themselves, 
including the classical economists Smith, Ricardo and Mill but also Marx who 
looked for patterns that signalled fundamental change. Social totality is 
important, according to Mosco, as it implies an understanding of the 
connections between the political and the economic. The moral philosophy 
dimension of political economy provides a means of engaging with social values 
such as justice, equity and the public good (Mosco 1996, 36). Praxis, finally, 
roots the paradigm in the real world. Praxis is about "human activity and 
specifically the free and creative activity by which people produce and change 
the world and themselves" (ibid). 
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''The Marxian tradition continues to inspire a wide variety of positions in political 
economy," writes Mosco. "In spite of their numerous differences, they are 
generally alike in their commitment to history, the social totality, moral 
philosophy and praxis" (1996, 59). 
But political economy is far from uncontroversial. It has been called 
mechanistic, deterministic and even outmoded by critics. During the 1990s, 
purveyors of political economy and supporters of the culturalist approach traded 
fierce ideological and methodological blows that dominated discourse in the 
field throughout the decade. Arguably, the result was a draw with both sides 
having taken the opportunity to develop and strengthen their critical tools. 
However, a number of key "charges" have been made about the weakness of 
the political economy approach that require consideration. These include that 
the tradition is "overly concerned with structure of production rather than with 
content, meaning and the symbolic" (Steenveld 2004,93). Garnham, too, has 
bemoaned the lack of a consideration of the symbolic in political economy: "No 
study of the media can bypass the complex and difficult questions posed by 
their content, by the symbolic forms they create and circulate" (Garnham 2000, 
138). 
Also, according to Mouffe (1988), political economy "implies a conception of the 
economy as a world of objects and relations that exist prior to any ideological 
and political conditions of existence. This view assumes that the economy is 
able to function on its own and follow its own logic, a logic absolutely 
independent of the relations it would allegedly determine" (cited in Steenveld 
2004,93). 
In addition, the paradigm is accused of being "too mechanistic" and of 
"obscuring a series of complex relationships which have yet to be explained" 
(Curran and Seaton 1991,274). The base/superstructure dichotomy is 
unrealistic and ahistoric and fails to take account of the audience, according to 
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Smythe: "no audience, no message, no medium, no advertiser: mass 
communications theory begins and ends with audiences" (1981, xiv). 
For advocates of political economy, charges of being mechanistic and 
deterministic ring hollow. They are "caricatures" of a paradigm that fail to 
appreciate the complexity and inter-relatedness of the approach, argues Mosco. 
Political economy is "not mechanistic but foregrounds social change: No social 
actor, social relation or social institution is essential. Each is involved in 
manifold, ubiquitous and multiply-determined processes of mutual constitution" 
(Mosco 1996, 10). 
Louw maintains that "a great strength of the political economy method is that it 
stresses the need to analyse communications contextually ... meanings need to 
be seen as inextricably bound to the (physical/temporal) sites in which they are 
made/used (Louw 2001, 3-4). McChesney jibes that "to approach 
communication without political economy is similar to playing the piano with 
mittens" (McChesney 2000, 115). "If scholars are to move beyond description to 
explanation, political economy must be at the centre of the enterprise" (ibid). 
Robin Mansell noted in 2004 that the current revitalisation of political economy 
in media and communications followed a renewed "interest in the analysiS of 
the specific historical circumstances under which (new) media and 
communications products and services are produced under capitalism, and with 
the influence of these circumstances over their consumption" (Mansell 2004, 
98). 
It is certainly true, as Mosco points out, that political economy "covers a wide 
intellectual expanse including diverse standpoints, emphases and interests 
which belie charges of essentialism that, in the extreme, dismiss the approach 
as economistic" (Mosco 1996, 20). 
My belief is that the media is a tremendously complex phenomenon that can be 
viewed and critiqued from a wide variety of perspectives, each legitimate and 
useful to a certain extent. I don't deny that the symbolism carried by texts within 
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the media can be important and even influential. I also appreciate that the 
media does have a cultural role that can be unpicked by deconstructing texts 
and by unearthing coding systems. However, I feel that an overemphasis on the 
texts and the isolation of the media as a cultural phenomenon, fails to get to 
grips with the vital symbiotic relationship between the media and its political and 
social context. Luthuli has indeed described the "wave of discontent" that has 
affected textual analysis over the past few decades and cites Stuart Hall as 
writing: "Textuality is never enough. Textual analysis alone fails to provide a 
sufficiently balanced account of the phenomena that it is used to analyse" 
(Luthuli 2004, 50). 
I am uncomfortable, too, with the emphasis on class analysis within critical 
political economy. I am not convinced that political economy's class-based 
approach to the analysis of media systems is the most useful approach. Indeed 
the question of which exerts more influence, class or race, has characterised 
much South African historical and sociological scholarship since the 1980S13. 
Class analysis can certainly be useful. Hallin has acknowledged its potential 
even within comparative media systems theory (2005). He specifically cites its 
relevance when considering the various impacts of commercialisation: the "link 
between media and social class that is central to the political economy 
perspective may become increasingly important" (2005, 237-8). 
My concern is that class analysis fails to take into account the complex and 
varied racial, identity-oriented, linguistic, regional, technological and historical 
aspects of modern life. Neither does it get to grips with the dynamics within 
classes, or even within subclasses (such as the black middle class, for 
instance) that turn out to have such an impact on the media system in South 
Africa. Political economy also struggles to address changes within capital, in 
particular with the 'unbundling' of historically white (either mining-based or 
Afrikaner) capital and the introduction of black capital together with the dynamic 
between them. These are all important dimensions of the South African media 
13 Thc field is c:-..1ensiYe but major texts incluc E. Webstcr (1985). S. Marks (1987). H. Wolpe (1988). B. 
Bozzoli (1996). 1. Simons & R. Simons (198]). C. Saunders (1988). 0. Crankshaw (1997) and J. 
Seekings & N. Nattrass (2005). 
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system. I believe, however, that the compatibility of political economy with 
comparative media systems analysis offers the opportunity to extract its more 
useful elements but in a context of a more realistic and comparative paradigm. 
In my view, the much more fundamental question is the one posed initially by 
Siebert et al and reiterated by Hallin and Mancini: why is the press as it is? And, 
following on from that, what implications does this have for the future both of the 
media and of the political system in which it resides. 
While political economy has its shortcomings, it does have value in gaining a 
realistic understanding of the functioning, role and importance of the print 
media. Political economy is about much more than ownership. It acknowledges 
the question of capital's decision-making processes - which I refer to below as 
business strategy - around, for instance, product targeting and the dynamics 
and developments that take place (or don't take place) within a media 
organisation. 
Consider Independent Newspapers chairman Tony O'Reilly's observation that 
the "central question is not whether there are gaps in the market, but whether 
there are viable markets in the gaps" (cited in Steenveld 2004, 93). This says a 
great deal about the positioning of titles in the South African print media sector, 
about which this thesis will concern itself. O'Reilly's words are of no value to 
textual analysis as they don't appear in newsprint. But, in reality, and coming as 
it does from one of the most powerful media magnates in South Africa, it is a 
perspective that is critical to understanding the strategic positioning and 
direction of the industry. Political economy encourages acknowledgement of 
this strategic thinking and comparative media systems theory would be weaker 
without it. 
Based on the interviews with media executives and on my understanding of 
developments within the media sector, it seems evident to me that the South 
African print media sector is happy to accept a consensual status quo with the 
new democratic state (see Chapter Four). This enables it to focus its energies 
on profitability issues such as return on investment, cost cutting and the 
importing of new technologies. The catch is that the South African state, 
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perhaps like other emerging democratic, one party states, is intent on redefining 
the role of the media. It is busy picking at the edges of the media's legal, 
Constitutional and ethical framework. In the media's conciliatory and submissive 
mode, this will contribute not to liberal drift, but to the unravelling of the media's 
liberal functions and duties and their realignment with the state's social agenda. 
This may be exacerbated by various forces including deteriorating 
professionalism (see Chapter Six), the undermining of editors' roles relative to 
corporate management and also by the ethics-shredding and controversy-
averse impact of commercialisation. 
This thesis takes a long hard look behind the scenes of the South African print 
media sector to determine the forces at play within the context of a new and 
emerging democracy, ever mindful of the philosophical and moral question of 
the role of the media in undermining or building a new social and political order. 
This is a question with which many authors have grappled over the years and 
which has generated different answers. 
A number of published works emanating from retired or former editors tend to 
support the view that the mainstream (non-Afrikaans) newspaper industry in 
South Africa was a consistent thorn in the apartheid state's side. H. Lindsay 
Smith's publication, Behind the Press in South Africa (1945), argues that the 
press declines to abuse its power and therefore remains a responsible, free 
agent capable of opposing the state. Elaine Potter classified the English-
language press during apartheid as an external opposition that "uniformly 
opposes the government, its ideology and its supporters" (1975, 7). This stance 
is taken up by a number of other writers, including Hepple (1960), Neame 
(1956) and Richard Pollak: 
Newspapers serve as the lone megaphone of dissent. Without the 
still moderately free press to promulgate news and un-popular ideas, 
the country's political lopsidedness would be near complete ... More 
than any powerful force in the country, these newspapers stand 
almost alone between the Afrikaans government and totalitarian 
darkness (1981,2). 
139 
A growing group of critics take the opposite view. Chimutengwende, for 
instance, argues that newspapers "represent the forces of status quo ... none of 
the media can publish or broadcast material undermining the principles of their 
owners or the elements upon which they depend financially" (1978, 48). For 
Hachten and Giffard, the South African press "essentially serve the narrow 
class interests of the dominant whites" (1984, 97), while the Tomasellis state 
that "all sectors of the established (South African) media support one or more 
factions of the hegemonic alliance" (1989, 33). In one of the most recent works, 
Jacobs argues that the "media played a more pivotal and complicated role in 
South Africa's democratic transition than the democratisation literature would 
lead us to expect" (2004, 4). The debate continues. It is apparent, however, that 
Comparing Media Systems throws new light on this question, as we will 
discover during the course of this thesis. 
A large portion of contemporary South African critical analysis that claims for 
itself the label of political economy, focuses on the notion of change, or 
transformation. At root is an interest in the ways, means and effectiveness with 
which the South African media has changed to reflect more closely the 
demography as well as the political and social values that underpin the new, 
post-apartheid society. 
Some authors are sceptical about not so much the appearance of change as 
they are about its meaning. Keyan Tomaselli's main contention in his work on 
political economy is that a change in the colour of ownership of the South 
African media has not made a difference to the media's role as it pertains to the 
development of capitalism and the inevitable inequities and contradictions 
therein (Steenveld 2004, 102). While Tomaselli concedes that the working class 
has been included to some extent as investors in media ownership post-1994, 
he argues that this has not precipitated a new social order or even fundamental 
change in the sector (Steenveld 2004, 103). 
Berger on the other hand, again according to Steenveld's useful comparative 
essay, argues that the colour of ownership does indeed have a symbolic social 
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impact and provides possible space for change in media management, staffing 
and thus content (Steenveld 2004, 103). Duncan, by contrast, challenges 
Tomaselli and Berger: "Both arguments miss the point that labour itself is being 
restructured and stratified; so workers inside the productive economy probably 
will be able to ... make the media serve their interests more faithfully ... 
Changes will probably trickle down to management and editorial levels. 
However the structural barriers that frustrate greater media access may well 
remain" (ibid). 
In his own words, Tomaselli offers "an historical materialist analysis of shifts in 
ownership" and focuses in particular on the notion of corporate control (1997, 
21). Using Murdock's model, he argues that two types of questions about 
corporate control need to be asked in order to produce an effective analysis of 
political economy. I summarise them as follows: 
• Action/power questions: these concern the identification of 'key 
allocative controllers' who exercise the power to define the overall 
goals and scope of the corporation and determine the general way it 
deploys productive resources; 
• Structure/determination questions: these identify the economic 
and political determinants constraining both allocative and operational 
controllers (1997, 28). 
"A full analysis of control therefore needs to examine the complex interplay 
between international action and structural constraint," Tomaselli argues (1997, 
28). As an illustration, he cites the media interests of "allocative controllers" 
Anglo-American and JCI, two of South Africa's premier mining houses: "These 
companies were redeploying capital in response to structurally determined local 
political and global economic changes ... The result was a redeployment in 
allocative control as a means of shaping structural processes" (1997, 29). 
For Berger, "there were limits to democratisation and socio-economic 
transformation in post-1994 South Africa as a negotiated polity with a capitalist 
economy located in a global network of relations after the Cold War. But within 
these parameters, many meaningful alternatives were possible. Thus while 
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media in such a society was unlikely to really provide the access or appropriate 
information resources for grassroots participation in governance, it could playa 
range of democratic functions" (Berger 1999, 6). 
Boloka and Krabill raise questions around whether any substantive 
transformation has taken place at all within the South African print media in the 
ten years since democracy: "Successful transformation of the South African 
media (will have been) achieved when it reflects in ownership, staffing and the 
product, the society within which it operates - [we] question to what degree 
media have made substantive transformative changes rather than superficial 
ones aimed at maintaining privilege among an elite (Boloka and Krabill 2000, 
cited in Steenveld 2004, 103). 
Despite mergers and acquisitions that took place in the first ten years of 
democracy, "consolidation has continued to elude the industry", argues Boloka 
(2004, 31). "Those companies which emerged under the rubric of black 
economic empowerment are companies which are subsidiaries of vertically or 
multi-sectorally integrated conglomerates. As a result, apart from lacking focus, 
media assets are not their major revenue-generating streams. It means that 
conglomerates are willing to dispose of their media assets at any time they want 
to raise capital (e.g. Kagiso Trust Investments' unsuccessful attempts to sell its 
media assets to NAIL, the reverse move by Johnnic Holdings to sell Johnnic 
Communications and the ultimate sale of Nail's media assets" (Boloka 2004, 
31 ). 
Boloka also argues that while black economic empowerment has shaped post-
apartheid media and continues to influence policy, transformation has not 
always been in the interests of a diverse media (Boloka 2004, 31): "The 
globalisation-shaped transformation process in the South African media 
industry has helped in terms of creating and enhancing a competitive media 
environment, access and diversity, [but] it has shed many non-performers and 
annihilated small media corporations, creating an environment in which only 
conglomerates thrive" (Boloka 2004, 31). 
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While Grove (1996) and Mabote (1996) limit themselves to describing the rapid 
changes in ownership and control of the South African media in the mid- to late-
1990s, Sandi Ie Memela sees not only unsubstantial change but also lasting 
damage: "The media are still largely in white hands. Young, gifted and black 
professionals, who pay allegiance to capitalism, are promoted and sponsored in 
and through the media to serve their interests ... Ten years into freedom and 
democracy, the twin forces of racism and capitalism not only dish out high 
profile positions to inexperienced but articulate 30-somethings indiscriminately 
and as quickly as possible, but they are unleashing them to the so-called black 
market to destroy everything that stands for black pride" (2004, 10). 
Jacobs also falls back on the use of political economy as his chosen paradigm, 
if reluctantly: "while none (of the other interpretative approaches) offers a 
completely satisfactory account, analyses of the transition from a political 
economy perspective provide a basis for interrogating media's role" (2004, 4). 
This then is a sketch of the current state of South African work on political 
economy. It is an environment in which unpacking the notion of change (or 
transformation) is central and in which the key elements of analysis are: 
ownership, corporate control, staffing, access, content, competition and 
audiences. In addition, the economic role of the South African state and its 
institutions, the creation of state corporations and their joint ventures with 
private capital are also characteristic of contemporary critiques. 
From this list of elements, all of which grapple with change of one kind or 
another, it is possible to isolate a list of key change agents, or triggers, that 
have forced or necessitated significant shifts in the media market. They are 
drawn from a paradigm (political economy) that has a particular interest in 
change in spite of its core understanding that the media always functions in 
support of capitalism. They also locate the discussion on the unusual, at times 
unique, idiosyncrasies of the South African context. Furthermore, political 
economy has a direct interest in the notion of power, its source and application 
- an acknowledged weakness in comparative media systems theory. The 
injection of a political economy perspective, particularly in relation to an analysis 
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of the media market, gives Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm greater 
depth and a better understanding of media system change in general. We will 
now consider the triggers of change more closely. 
Triggers of change 
With the debate over the extent of change in the South African media market 
having been aired in some detail in recent work, it is necessary to set out my 
own perspective. The evidence clearly indicates to me that there has been 
profound change since the democratic election in 1994. The features of this 
change include: 
• The emergence of a mass press (tabloids) reaching mainly a new 
audience of first time newspaper buyers; 
• The disappearance of two of the four largest media conglomerates 
in the country, Perskor and Times Media Limited. The former is 
realigned with a black publishing house, Kagiso Trust Investments, 
but print media interests are sold off. TML is broken up, part bought 
by Johnnic Communications (Johncom) and part by Pearsons, 
owners of the Financial Times of London; 
• Significant entrance of black capital (for instance through the 
National Empowerment Consortium, New Africa Investments Limited 
and, more recently, Media24) into the sector including trade union 
investment vehicles such as that belonging to the Paper, Printing, 
Wood and Allied Workers' Union; 
• The purchase of the country's biggest newspaper group, the Argus 
Company by the Irish Independent Newspaper group; 
• Foreign investment in several South African print enterprises 
including Business Day, the Financial Mail, the Mail & Guardian and 
Thisoay; 
• The growth of Naspers from a unilingual newspaper business into a 
multinational, multilingual, multi-billion rand business, now by far the 
biggest player in the South African media market; 
• The rise of local newspapers, now accounting for 30% of the 
country's newsprint; 
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• The racial transformation of newspaper company editors and 
management; 
• The deregulation and liberalisation of the country's broadcast 
system, with implications for cross-ownership and synergies with print 
media titles and companies; and, 
• Growing state support for diversification and subsidisation of 
community newspapers (up to R20-million by end March 
2005)(MDDA, 2006). 
From these examples alone, it is clear that change has been substantial and 
far-reaching. Even Tomaselli, who supports the contention there has been little 
material change in the sector, agrees that "the post-apartheid restructuring of 
the Argus company ... the later acquisitions by black-dominated capital of TML, 
and the share offerings to black investors by M-Net and Nasionale Pers in 
1996, emerge as a significant departure from the pattern of concentration of 
ownership that historically characterised the South African print media" (1996, 
49). 
In the context of the Hallin and Mancini paradigm, however, it is necessary to 
consider not only the hallmarks or end-point of change but the process. In this 
regard, I have identified what I call triggers of change. In discussing these 
triggers, and in giving examples of their operation, I hope to expand further 
Hallin and Mancini's conceptualisation of change, and its causes, in 
comparative media system theory. 
Perhaps the closest precursor to the notion of triggers can be found in Blumler 
and Gurevitch (1995), who talk about the "motors" of political communications 
development (204). These motors are changes in technology, changes in the 
surrounding social and political system, the relationship between journalists and 
politicians and the nature and interests of the would-be audience (1995, 204-5). 
While I would certainly agree, and indeed have included, changes in technology 
as a trigger, "changes in the surrounding social and political system" is much 
too broad to be a useful analytical tool. The interpersonal relationship between 
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journalists and politicians (on which Blumler and Gurevitch focus their 
attention), on the contrary, is too narrow without the debates and forces that 
inhabit its context. Limiting the interface to journalists, for instance, excludes the 
vital dimension of owners and also of media managers, both of whom -
certainly in the South African case - have made important interventions in the 
space between state and press. I have divided the sharper notions of triggers 
into factors that emanate out of newspaper organisations themselves and those 
that are the consequence of external, audience- or environment-driven factors. I 
suggest that in order to more clearly understand the causes and forces of 
change, rather than just the direction and end-result, one needs to isolate the 
specific zones in which change arises. These zones contain the potential, as 
they have already demonstrated, to trigger change in media institutions and 
quite possibly in society at large. Let us look at my proposed triggers of change. 
These triggers are consistent with the position I set out above which argued that 
the media system is the dependent variable in relation to the political system. 
The change generated by each trigger may either enhance or diminish the 
degree of dependence. This bears a conceptual resemblance to the agents 
within Bourdieu's fields wrestling for dominance. The difference, perhaps, is that 
these triggers cross "fields" and that change in one field triggers change in 
another. In the process of discussing each of these triggers, I will discuss how 
they help to define to this relationship. 
1. The state 
While Hallin and Mancini agree on more than one occasion in Comparing Media 
Systems that the state has "always played a large role" in media systems, 
particularly those in southern Europe (2004, 119), they do not consign adequate 
agency to the state in terms of its power to initiate and shape media system 
change. They certainly do not contend that change with a political system 
largely determines change within its media system. Hallin and Mancini argue 
that as a country modernises, the process of differentiation sees the media 
system and organised political groups and social institutions diverge: 
"Differentiation means ... that the media system increasingly operates according 
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to a distinctive logic of its own, displacing to a significant extent the logic of 
party politics and bargaining among organised social interests, to which it was 
once connected" (2004, 253). As this differentiation becomes more advanced, 
the structure of the political system affects the media system less and less 
deeply, because the mass media have become differentiated from it (2004, 
283). The more advanced a media system is, in other words, the less the 
political system will influence it. Conversely, the less advanced a media system 
is, the higher degree of political parallelism, the more impact the state will 
possibly have. It is this aspect that Hallin and Mancini have de-emphasised. 
The South African experience - and perhaps that of other emerging 
democracies - is that the political system, including the parties and actors 
within it, continues to impact in a profound way on the structure of the media 
system. In the apartheid era, it was the state that determined who could publish, 
what could be published and for whom. More than a hundred laws underpinned 
this process including deeply restrictive regulations which applied, for instance 
during states of emergency. 
Developments in the political system sparked equally dramatic change in the 
media sector. The advent of democracy itself created an ideological confusion 
of purpose within the alternative media sector but also dried up funding from 
sympathetic, anti-apartheid sources (Opatrny 2007). The end of South Africa's 
political and economic isolation, accomplished largely within the domain of the 
political system, also exposed the entire media sector, after decades of glorious 
and uncompetitive isolation, to the forces and interests of the global media 
marketplace. 
In the post-apartheid era, state intervention continues to shape the industry in a 
direct way. As Teer-Tomaselli has argued, "the nation-state, far from becoming 
irrelevant, has become a key player in driving the project of neo-liberalism, 
reform and restructuring" (2004, 7). Many of the apartheid era press laws 
remain on the statutes, in spite of repeated requests to the contrary. New, post-
1994 laws on employment practice, racial transformation, cross-media 
ownership, black economic empowerment and foreign exchange controls 
147 
continue to regulate newspaper company development. This is symptomatic, as 
I have argued, of a state that has been persistently interested in harnessing the 
power of the mass media to consolidate its own. Even though this may 
ostensibly be for the furthering of democratic objectives, such as greater social 
equity and the consolidation of the political system, it nonetheless signals not 
greater differentiation between the media and the state, but indeed the 
opposite. 
It is worth mentioning, in passing, that the nature of the state has shifted 
somewhat even in the years since 1994. Initially, the government consisted of 
three political parties, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the New National Party and 
the African National Congress. This alliance was called the Government of 
National Unity and, naturally, emphaSised the compact it required ill! citizens, 
including the media, to join. Within a couple of years, the GNU collapsed once 
the New National Party realised it had no real say in the determination of policy. 
While the IFP still remains within the government coalition, the departure of the 
NNP ushered in a new phase of ANC-dominance. It is likely, however, that the 
GNU period made the broad co-option of the media easier (as demonstrated by 
the media's immediate embrace of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme). It was an arrangement that soon tested boundaries and brought 
into question the role of the media in the new democratic dispensation. 
In July 1997, South African arms parastatal Denel was granted a High Court 
interdict preventing newspapers from naming Saudi Arabia's involvement in a 
major arms deal. Apartheid-era legislation was used to persuade the High Court 
to grant the interdict, but a number of editors went ahead and published the 
information anyway (Barratt 2006, 16). On August 29, 1997, Thami Mazwai, the 
chair of the South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef), undoubtedly the 
most powerful association of senior journalists in South Africa during the period, 
publicly denounced the editors who had flaunted the interdict suggesting they 
were being unpatriotic and unsupportive of the new, democratic state. 
148 
The incident serves to indicate how even the most senior editors are unable or 
unwilling to differentiate the interests of the state from the traditional Liberal 
functions and responsibilities of the press. If anything, and contrary to what 
Hallin and Mancini argue, the state is attempting to impose its own distinctive 
logic on the media rather than allowing the media to develop one for itself. 
South African journalists have become collectively less assertive with state 
elites - a Three Models indicator of shrinking media autonomy - though there 
are individual and occasionally high-profile examples where the contrary has 
been the case. 
A range of further policy interventions by the state also have the potential to 
impact on the media market and possibly to tighten the links between them, 
including the establishment of the Media Development and Diversity Agency 
(MDDA), charged with funding and promoting diversification in the media. 
Recent research indicates a relationship of growing depth and complexity 
between various levels of government and the community media sector 
(Hadland & Thorne 2004). In addition, a raft of legislation attempting to 
empower government to intervene in electronic communications, the internet, 
convergence-related processes and in connection with mobile-cellular 
telephony is currently in the pipeline or has already been passed into law. 
While the political system has seen the establishment of a constitutional and 
legal framework that includes fundamental protection for a free press, as we 
have seen above a powerful democratic state is also more than capable of 
stalling, if not reversing, the process of differentiation to ensure its own narrative 
is the one that predominates in the mass media. In this way, it continues to act 
as a key catalyst for change in the media marketplace. It also seeks continually 
to intervene in and shape the media system and to deepen its dependence on 
the political system. 
2. Sentiment 
Between the lead-up to Mandela's release from prison in Feburary 1990 and 
the swearing-in of the first democratic cabinet in May of 1994, there was a thirst 
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for news perhaps unrivalled in South Africa. Comparatively only the Boer War at 
the turn of the Twentieth Century and the two World Wars that followed elicited 
the kind of sustained interest in newspapers that was evoked in the halcyon 
days of the early 1990s. While readers in South Africa soaked up newspapers 
during the Second World War, a newsprint (paper) famine meant these were 
kept short, some titles were closed and full opportunity could not be taken by 
news producers (Hadland 2004). 
By 1994, there was such a desire for information in and about South Africa, and 
such ubiquitous fear of political instability in the country, that newspapers simply 
couldn't print enough copies. The Star held a big party in Johannesburg in 1994 
and printed special t-shirts with the number '275,000' on them. Circulation was 
higher than it had ever been and people were in a mood to celebrate. 
Newspaper managers and staffs believed they were riding the crest of a wave 
that would keep on growing and gathering momentum. They were mistaken. 
After the election, there was a collective sigh of relief - and people stopped 
buying newspapers. "We were producing the best papers ever, but still the 
numbers fell, "according to one Independent Newspapers editor. "I wanted to 
give the people politics but all they wanted was a normal life" (Johnson 2006). 
Certainly media executives agree that transition fatigue, or reader exhaustion 
with the political process and with the messengers who described its 
rollercoaster ride, was a key component of plunging sales (Williams 2005, 
Robertson 2005). According to the chief executive of Media24's newspaper 
division, Jan Malherbe: "The main reason the circulations dropped in 1994-95 
was that people's interest in politics waned. People grew tired" (2005). 
Indeed all things heavy, such as politics, crime and judicial system reportage, 
were toned down in the post-1994 period in an endeavour to keep exhausted 
South Africans buying newspapers. Entertainment and positive lifestyle stories 
were emphasised. Headlines were quietened, brought down in size, made less 
bold and a more discreet feel was sought in the design and content of most 
broadsheet titles. Critics said newspapers were dumbing down. But it was 
reader sentiment that was leading the way. 
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Reader attitudes were picked up from the surveys and questionnaires regularly 
commissioned by newspaper companies - and they indicated that change was 
required in order to sustain loyalty. One research study, for instance, showed 
that 77% of South Africans said they agreed with the statement: It I am more 
interested in development and justice issues than party politics" (Futurefact 
2004). Reader sentiments do often have a key impact on the positioning and 
content balance of titles as well as on the launching of new products and the 
withdrawal of ones that are not working (Robertson 2005). Sentiment clearly 
represents a powerful trigger of change. This sentiment is far more complex 
than readers' responses to media content. It derives from the connection or 
disjuncture between media content and readers' response to their own political 
and social environment. Thus, total overkill of political content (transition 
fatigue) leads directly to falling circulation levels. 
3. The Economic System 
Economic pressures are becoming the primary forces shaping the behaviour of 
American newspaper companies, according to Robert Picard (2004, 1). And 
what appears true in the United States certainly has applicability in South Africa 
(indeed, it is one of Hallin and Mancini's underlying assumptions). What Picard 
alludes to, political economy theory as a whole embraces. Few other critical 
paradigms stress more the importance of the underlying economic system in 
the structuring of the media sector. Neither has the role of the economy been 
lost on senior media executives in South Africa. "The economic environment 
ha(s) a big role," according to Malherbe. "The size of the advertising cake is 
determined by what is happening in the economy" (Malherbe 2005). 
The entire South African economy was distorted during the colonial and 
apartheid eras and this affected every single sector. The massive and growing 
wealth of the mining houses from the turn of the 19th century together with the 
economic isolation enforced during the apartheid era nurtured a process of 
economic cannibalisation in South Africa from 1948 until 1990. In this process, 
mining houses consumed all other sectors on the stock exchange, from 
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insurance and paper production to beer brewing and pharmaceuticals. By the 
late 1980s, the stock of the South African economy was concentrated largely 
into half a dozen mine-based corporations. At its height in the late 1980s, the 
most powerful of these establishments, Anglo-American Corporation, had a 
controlling share of more than half the companies in the economy. This 
included diamond mines, retailers, manufacturers - and the newspaper houses. 
The two companies that monopolised the English language newspaper industry 
until the early 1990s, the Argus Publishing and Printing company and South 
African Associated Newspapers (SAAN) - later Times Media Limited (TML)-
were both owned by Anglo-American. The lack of competition enabled by the 
concentration of capital together with the deep pockets of the media houses' 
mining benefactors allowed gross inefficiencies to creep into the South African 
newspaper market. 
By the time Irish media magnate Tony O'Reilly acquired the Argus company in 
1993, it carried with it a burden of enormous inefficiency. The weak 4% 
operating margin on turnover (compared to the standard global benchmark of 
15-20%) was symptomatic of the structural problems (Wilson 2005). But the 
poor margin was only one indicator of the scale of the wastage. In 1994, the 
Independent Newspapers group had 14 parliamentary correspondents 
representing each of the company's individual titles. Each correspondent was 
paid not only a handsome salary - relative to other journalists at the time - but 
the company was obliged to pay a government-approved tax free parliamentary 
allowance which virtually doubled correspondents' packages. This allowance 
was a relic from the days when the South African government shifted its seat 
during the year from Cape Town to Pretoria and imitated the grant 
parliamentarians received for the upkeep of a home in each city. 
The intention of employing 14 correspondents was that each newspaper in the 
Independent Newspapers group, from the Cape Times and the Cape Argus to 
the Port Elizabeth Herald and the Pretoria News, would be serviced by a 
dedicated reporter ready and willing to shape the news from Parliament to fit 
each title's unique regional interests. The reality was that 14 people were 
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employed at great cost for a job that was effectively done by one person. It was 
a common practice for the group's correspondents to copy each other's stories 
and put their own names on them, a practice reminiscent of cheating 
schoolchildren known as "disking,,14. This practice would entail one 
correspondent writing up an article and then handing-over the material to his 
colleagues. They would change the byline and perhaps a few words in the first 
paragraph and then pass it off as their own. In return for his or her efforts, the 
original writer would receive a similar service next time round. It was evident 
inefficiencies of this kind, identified by the team O'Reilly sent to look over the 
Argus Group's financials and organograms prior to the acquisition in 1993 that 
persuaded the Irish magnate to buy-in in the first place. "The wastage was quite 
staggering," one editor recalls (Williams 2005). 
The rise of the middle class in South Africa since the end of apartheid is 
typically considered one of the key engines of the country's rapid economic 
growth rate. The increase in the numbers of consumers with cash has fuelled a 
retail, housing and travel boom in the post-2000 period, and with it a strong 
surge in adspend, that has created a great deal of profit in the media business. 
Independent Newspapers' flagship daily, The Star, for instance, quadrupled its 
profitability between 1999 and 2005 (Williams 2005). 
Key to the more equitable distribution of adspend was in part the increased 
spending power of the black community, but also the substantial political 
pressure on the advertising industry which, in 2002, was called to account for its 
racial placement practices (Berger 2004, 57). This led to a rapid growth in 
adspend targeting black readers, underpinning further growth in this sector of 
the media (ibid). Indeed, adspend in the South African media sector climbed by 
20% a year between 2002 and 2005, according to media analyst Rajay 
Ambekar (2005). 
"Normally adspend tracks GOP (gross domestic product), but GOP 
has been only 4% so adspend has been very strong. What's caused 
the growth? There have been some cyclical elements but of the 
l~ The practice o[··disking" was ncycr carried out by the candidatc. though I was witness to its 
occurrence. 
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structural elements, the most important has been black economic 
empowerment, employment and equity and the emerging black 
middle class. These are what are driving consumer spending and 
growth in adspend" (Ambekar 2005). 
The survey enterprise Futurefact surmised that "the ANC government's 
commitment to redressing past inequities and ensuring the entry of increasing 
numbers of black South Africans to the skilled workforce has shifted the 
balance of the purchasing power to the black market, led to a growing 'middle 
class' and broadened the market for houses, cars, furniture, appliances, 
clothing" (Futurefact 2004, 32). This has been accompanied by other 
infrastructural improvements, such as the electrification of 3,8-million homes 
between 1994 and 2004 (SouthAfricainfo.com 2004) that has further contributed 
to growing media consumption. 
In addition, recent research commissioned by the Financial Mail shows that 
almost 300,000 black South Africans climbed up the socio-economic ladder to 
join the ranks of the middle class between 2002 and 2004 with another 500,000 
achieving lower middle-income earnings levels in the same period 
(SouthAfrica.com 2004). The categories are drawn according to average 
household income with middle-income group earning between R6,455 and 
R11 ,566 per month. The survey Futurefact shows that the top priority for 
virtually every new member of the middle class is securing a decent education 
for their children (Futurefact 2004). Clearly, a rapidly expanding group of 
potential readers with cash to spend who emphasise education (and with it, 
literacy) is going to make media planners and managers sit up and pay 
attention. 
As Malherbe put it: "In 1997 at a Naspers management conference, a slide was 
put up showing projections of readers. It indicated a huge growth of black 
readers while the others stayed more or less the same. This made an 
impression on us and we thought, so this is where the growth is" (Malherbe 
2005). Indeed it is this new, emerging middle class that now comprises the 
backbone of the country's best-selling daily newspaper (the Oaily Sun), as well 
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as the best-selling weekend newspaper (the Sunday Times). The emergence of 
tabloid newspapers in South Africa was based precisely on the growing 
economic power of the emerging middle classes. 
According to Connie Molusi, the former CEO of Johncom: "The political stability 
and change has led to the growth of the black middle class. There have been 
two aspects to this: redistribution, in which this new sector is buying cars at 
entry level almost as soon as they leave university (for my generation it took us 
3-5 years to afford to buy a car. Currently, even without a subsidy the 
youngsters can afford them); economically - transformation has opened up a 
ray of hope, of access to careers, skills, equality of access and the 
establishment of a meritocratic system which underpins value. At a political 
level, a society that was deeply skewed has started to deracialise. There is 
dignity and pride. But you can't democratise accumulation. You can't put 
ceilings on consumption. We do need the development of a strong, black 
middle class (politically as well as economically). A deracialised economy and 
society provides a platform for equality of access. If you leave intact a race-
skewed process and access, your political settlement will remain fragile" (Molusi 
2005). 
While the growth of the black middle class was a symptom of change within the 
economic sector, it is also true that macro-economic shifts also playa critical 
role in shaping media system change. A recession, for instance, will inevitably 
impact on adspend as well as on circulation, as both advertisers and readers 
tighten their belts. For newspapers, cost cutting, searches for synergy and 
efficiency planning will result. Conversely, economic boom times will also act as 
a catalyst for change. 
It is more than apparent from these general prinCiples as well as from the few 
examples offered that macro- and micro-economic factors, from local interest 
rates and tax policy to the international economic environment, act as vital 
triggers of change in the media market. The economic trigger can either 
enhance or diminish dependency depending on its composition and direction. 
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4. Globalisation 
We have mentioned above how South Africa's doors to the outside world were 
flung open in the early 1990s as international isolation ended and the new 
democratic state resumed its place in the world. That indeed was a powerful 
moment in political and media terms as the country was exposed virtually 
overnight to the converging technologies, powerful interests and the 
professional practices of a global media community. Though Boloka has 
observed that "the appearance of global players completely transformed the 
way South African industry operates" (2004, 30), this is not true without 
reservation. As we have seen above, globalisation did impact on the way in 
which Media24 conducted its business by giving it the springboard to leap into 
the global marketplace. But a global parent did also not make much difference 
to local journalistic practice at the Mail & Guardian. At Independent 
Newspapers, some argue the cost-cutting and asset-stripping that took place in 
the wake of global investment severely damaged not just the company but 
South African journalism in general (see below). 
It is true that the opportunity for making money in the closed but relatively 
mature market that was South Africa raised the interest of major global media 
companies. And when Anglo-American started unbundling its diverse interests 
in the early 1990s, including its newspaper holdings, an assortment of teams 
representing media magnates such as Conrad Black and Rupert Murdoch 
arrived in South Africa to assess the profit potential of the country's largest 
newspaper house, the Argus Company: 
Anglo American put the word out around then that they wanted to 
offload the Argus Company. Conrad Black and Rupert Murdoch were 
sounded out, as well as O'Reilly. Both Black and Murdoch sent out 
emissaries to look over the books. They both decided the South 
African market was too small. They also didn't know what was going 
to happen after the election (Johnson 2005). 
It was Tony O'Reilly, the Irish billionaire businessman, who took the plunge. At 
the time, he told the Mercury newspaper that the Argus company was "one of 
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the most under-cultivated assets in the world of print anywhere" (cited in 
Tomaselli 1997, 33). It was also the first time in a century that mining capital 
had relinquished newspapers it previously regarded as so strategically 
important in ensuring its dominant role in the economy and the security of 
capitalism (Tomaselli 1997,49). Keyan Tomaselli argues convincingly that the 
sale by Anglo-American of its substantial media holdings in South Africa in the 
mid-1990s was intended as a means of protecting the company's diamond 
monopoly (1997, 66). But it may also be true that the mining proprietor was 
acknowledging the diminishing role of capital in the protection of capitalism as 
well as in its stewardship of oppositional politics. 
O'Reilly's influence on the Argus company in particular and on newspapers in 
South Africa (and elsewhere) in general has been marked. Indeed, it is difficult 
to talk of newspapers in the new South Africa without bumping up against the 
formidable presence of O'Reilly. Head now of a global processed food empire, 
HJ Heinz, with annual sales in the region of US$1 O-billion and a newspaper 
empire that reaches from Ireland to India, O'Reilly initially acquired a controlling 
interest (31 %) of Argus newspapers from Anglo and JCI but later expanded his 
interest to full ownership (and the name was changed to Independent 
Newspapers ). 
Even before he arrived on South African shores as a media baron - he first 
came over as a brilliant 19-year old rugby player representing the Irish and 
British Lions in 1955 - O'Reilly was known for his ability to cut costs. Perhaps 
his most famous cut was his idea to remove the little black label on the back of 
HJ Heinz's flagship tomato sauce. The cut, which halved the product's use of 
paper and adhesive, saved the company US$4-million a year (O'Toole 1996). 
O'Reilly prided himself on being able to turn around a company by chopping out 
the inefficiencies and flab. That was exactly what he intended to do in 1994 with 
his newest acquisition, Argus Newspapers. 
Now, just over ten year's later, opinions are very much divided over whether 
this strategy was good either for the company or indeed for journalism in the 
new South Africa. Sympathisers say the company has never been more 
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profitable or efficient as a consequence of those deep cuts and continues to 
grow from strength to strength. Antagonists argue that the diminishment of 
editorial quality in one of the country's most important media companies, the 
maltreatment and loss of experienced staff and the asset stripping carried out 
by the company's foreign owner amount to little more than an exercise in 
pillaging, the dark side of globalisation. 
Ryland Fisher was appointed deputy editor of the Cape Times, an Independent 
Newspapers morning title, on January 1, 1995, only a year after O'Reilly had 
acquired a controlling interest in the group. Eighteen months later, Fisher was 
promoted to the Editor's chair, a position he held for three-and-a-half years. 
Reflecting back over the period, the drive to cut costs was one of the most 
difficult and counter-productive activities imaginable: "Every year we had to cut 
staff, every year. When I started in 1995 we had 75 staff members. Go and 
count how many they have now. I felt incredibly uncomfortable with cutting staff 
every time. We were losing good people" (Fisher 2005). 
At root was an O'Reilly interdict that the company as a whole succeeds in 
achieving a 15% annual return on investment (ROI). This was a common 
benchmark, particularly in the global business and media environment, heavy 
pressure was placed on individual titles and their editors to deliver on the all-
pervasive ratio. At that time, the Argus company as a whole was functioning on 
a 4% margin (Williams 2005). Fisher says the 15% ROI benchmark and the 
ultimate target of 20% across the group has "been the guiding principle at 
Independent (newspapers) since (O'Reilly's arrival). People no longer talked 
about superior journalism, intelligent journalism or even vaguely good 
journalism. They only talked about the 15%". 
The conundrum, as Fisher saw it, was this: With the salary bill the largest cost 
centre in the business; trimming the salary bill was the most efficient means of 
achieving the benchmark. The reduction of labour costs was done in two ways: 
by offering generous retrenchment packages to senior staffers and by replacing 
leaving seniors with juniors. "The people who took [the retrenchment packages] 
up were people who knew they could make it. Useless people stuck to their 
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guns and never took the packages ... this way, we ended up with the dead wood 
and got rid of the good people" (Fisher 2005). 
Few Independent Newspapers staffers who endured this period recall it with 
any nostalgia. "O'Reilly flew out, cut costs and had a condescending attitude to 
the editors," says Rory Wilson, a General Manager of Independent Newspapers 
Cape at the time. '''We managers will make the money, let the editors go off and 
do their thing' was his attitude". There are generally two strategies to improve 
return-on-investment ratios: either push up revenue and hold costs stable, or 
hold revenue and cut costs. "In the O'Reilly era, everything was about the 
ratios" (Wilson 2005). In the post-1994 period, revenue was far from stable. In 
fact, with the rapid decline in circulations, revenue too was falling. The more 
quickly income fell, the more cuts were required. The more cuts were needed to 
meet the margin, the wider and deeper they were felt. "It was fine to cut costs if 
they weren't core, but everything was purely statistical. 'Ten percent of editorial 
must go', they would say. But it was more efficient to ask questions than to 
make cuts" (Wilson 2005). 
Along with the reduction of labour costs, a range of strategies was employed to 
bring the 15% benchmark into reach. Restrictions were placed on internet 
access by reporters, regional libraries were shutdown and centralised, the 
national payroll and some administrative duties were consolidated and 
efficiencies were pursued in the distribution of newspapers by hiving-off that 
section of the business to private contractors. Newsfloor2000, an ambitious 
project to consolidate staff and costs (see below), was launched. 
The culture of Independent Newspapers is very bottom-line driven because this 
is the motivating force at its global parent Heinz. "O'Reilly is a brilliant cost-
cutter. Look how he turned Heinz around. His famous ketchup brand was in the 
doldrums and his cost cutting saved the company $1 OO-million. His maxim is 
that he is a 'low-cost quality operator'." Says the Irish writer Fintan O'Toole: 
"(Tony O'Reilly) is part of an age of capitalism in which the idea of the 
entrepreneur as inventor is long past. As a multinational manager, he does two 
things - he cuts costs and he buys companies" (O'Toole 2001, 65). Looking at 
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O'Reilly's well-documented record, neither should have come as a surprise to 
South African media employees or employers. "Tony O'Reilly brought 
international media practice to South Africa," says one former manager who 
wished to remain anonymous. "We all learned a thing or two when we saw how 
he operated". 
Among the lessons: a 15-20% return-on-investment is a standard benchmark in 
the newspaper industry worldwide; owners are entitled to siphon profits and use 
these, among other things, to re-invest or to leverage capital; inefficiency is the 
bread-and-butter of management teams seeking to improve profitability; and, 
cost-cutting is a painful, legitimate and largely unavoidable corporate strategy. 
For Moegsien Williams, current editor of the major South African daily The Star 
(an Independent Newspapers title), and a first-hand observer and participant in 
the post-1994 management of the Independent Newspapers group, anger and 
finger pointing at O'Reilly's methods have missed three vital points. First, three 
of the Argus group's flagship titles - the Cape Times, Pretoria News and The 
Mercury - had been running at a loss prior to the O'Reilly buy-in and faced the 
very real prospect of bankruptcy and closure. All three of these survived and 
were placed on a firm financial footing as a result of the cost cutting. Second, 
the cost-cutting measures implemented group-wide during the 1994 to 2003 
period served to guarantee the financial stability and profitability not only of the 
South African arm of the Irish-based company but underpinned its expansion 
elsewhere. Third, far from concentrate on siphoning capital out of the business, 
the Independent Newspapers group launched three new titles including the first 
new newspaper in the post-1994 era (the Sunday Independent). 
There's been much bleating about the Independent group. But the 
Sunday Independent was the first new title in the new South Africa 
and it was followed by Business Report and by Isolezwe. Three daily 
titles were also brought back from the brink of bankruptcy. The Cape 
Times, Pretoria News and the Mercury were all brought back to 
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profitability and those papers now making a significant contribution to 
the company's bottom line (Williams 2005). 
On his arrival, O'Reilly vowed never to close any titles, and he has kept to this 
assurance. The Sunday Independent, in fact, remains a loss maker - just as the 
initial projections suggested - but O'Reilly continues to absorb annual losses of 
around R7 -million. This, says Williams, constitutes an "investment in South 
African journalism" and to diversity in the local marketplace (2005). 
Independent Newspapers' synergy and consolidation strategy, in which 
resources were shared - various parts of the newspapers including the 
motoring, travel and Tonight entertainment sections are prepared centrally and 
then distributed to regional titles - was a vital component to the survival of the 
three titles and enabled the company to expand by launching new products. 
"These titles had to be moved from close to bankruptcy without closure or sale 
of titles. Today, the company is profitable, a jewel in the crown of O'Reilly's 
empire. Independent Newspapers itself is also a hugely successful company, 
listed in London" (Williams 2005). 
The company's cost-cutting methods together with the prominence of the high 
ROI margins have not, however, instilled much confidence in the marketplace 
or in the investment community. According to African Harvest media analyst 
Rajay Ambekar, "They are milking it until it's dry, then they will pull out... You 
can see it in the quality of the newspapers. They can't keep doing it forever. In 
the next two or three years, there will be changes in the offing" (Ambekar 2005). 
But it wasn't just the former Argus Company that was the subject of piqued 
interest from the international media community. Times Media Limited was 
broken up with the Financial Times of London buying into the quality daily 
Business Day and the weekly Financial Mail magazine. The last remaining 
alternative newspaper of any significance, the Mail & Guardian, shed its 
London-based backing in exchange for Zimbabwean ownership. Clearly, global 
interests had settled on the South African media market and the change was 
marked. 
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Nigerian interests started a new, quality daily newspaper, Thisoay, in South 
Africa in 2002 that survived for almost two years. One of its biggest obstacles 
was a classic difficulty associated with trade involving the developing world -
the problem of moving cash resources across international borders: "(Publisher 
Nduka Obaigbena) had great schemes but he never listened and he never got 
the money on time. Foreign exchange (Forex) regulations were an issue, but 
from the Nigerian side. As the Central Bank explained, Nigeria has a shortage 
of Forex and therefore it was not a priority to permit money for investing in 
business to leave the country, especially when it was needed to pay for 
necessities in Nigeria" (Matisonn 2005). 
Neither was it just foreign companies arriving in South Africa that were to 
change the complexion of the newspaper and media industry. Media24's 
transformation from a small local enterprise, Naspers, into "an integrated, 
multinational media business" (Media4, 2000) with an annual budget of close to 
R3-billion was achieved largely on the back of its international acquisitions and 
business. By the end of March 2004, 28% of Media24's revenues were 
generated from outside South Africa (Media24 2005, 2). These revenue 
sources included Tencent, a Chinese Internet platform, Irdeto, a new 
technology development company, satellite television service PayTV, Entriq, a 
content protection and subscription management company and magazines in 
Kenya, Angola and Hungary. From an exclusively print-based business in 1994, 
Media24 had developed into a very different company by 2004. Of the 
company's R2, 7 -billion in operating profit for the 2003/4 financial year, R701-
million came from its print division, the rest from its electronic media interests 
(Media24 2005, 2). 
Many other cross-national partnerships have been established in the 13 years 
since South Africa entered the international community of nations. These 
include Johncom's buy-out of the Nigerian newspaper Business Day and 
Zimbabwean businessman Trevor Ncube's purchase of a controlling stake in 
the Mail & Guardian. 
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Hallin and Mancini have written about the exposure of local journalists to the 
international media corps as being a powerful agent promoting convergence to 
a Liberal model (2004, 253-260). The free press agenda of organisations like 
the World Association of Newspapers and the interaction of journalists 
worldwide has led, they argue, to "a diffusion of techniques, practices and 
values" (2004, 258). This is a process that has been assisted by the content 
sharing implicit in many technological advances over the past few decades, a 
further contributor to the creation of "common cultures of practice" (2004, 260). 
Mark Alleyne and Janet Wagner argue that a global information structure has 
come about through the consolidation of news agencies into "the big five": "The 
old notion of news imperialism complained about by the south could be 
expanded to include the notion of a global information structure as these 
countries find that Reuters, AP, UPI, AFP and TASS are not only their sole 
sources of international news but also of financial data and historical 
information coming to them via high-speed telematics from databases in the 
north" (1993,50). 
This intermingling of journalistic practice, techniques and values has certainly 
been the case in South Africa not only in the recent past but also stretching 
back a hundred years and more. A huge international media contingent of 
several hundred senior correspondents was based in South Africa for much of 
the transition period (from the late 1980s through to the mid-1990s), though 
important, influential figures were around earlier and for much longer (such as 
the Independent of London's John Carlin, the New York Times's Joseph 
Lelyveld, the London Guardian's David Beresford and Newsday New York's 
Vivienne Walt). 
The high degree of interaction between South Africa's journalistic community 
and the world's is reminiscent too of the Boer War. During this period at the turn 
of the century, many well-known correspondents also spent time in South 
Africa, including Winston Churchill, Rudyard Kipling, Edgar Wallace and others. 
It is inevitable that a certain degree of "diffusion" took place with particular 
cogency at these times. The connection was bolstered, over the years, by the 
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close links between the South African journalistic community and institutions 
such as the Poynter Institute in Florida, Harvard University (Nieman 
fellowships), Oxford University (Rhodes scholars) and other international 
centres and programmes. It is a further reminder, acknowledged by Hallin and 
Mancini, of the power of global practices and values to impact on the local 
media. It is clear too that the degree and form of global influence will differ from 
system to system, thereby impacting on the speed and direction of the change 
experienced. Evidently globalisation has the power to trigger change in a way 
that impacts on the degree of media-political system dependency. 
5. Technology 
Over the years, indeed over the centuries, the rapid evolution of printing and 
newspaper technology has had direct, often fundamental impacts on the 
structure and functioning of media markets and of the societies in which they 
are located (see the work of Benedict Anderson and Marshall McLuhan). The 
arrival of desktop publishing in South Africa in the mid-1980s was just such a 
moment. Getting rid of hot-lead typesetting and the need for expensive editorial 
systems, desktop publishing was a key element in the birth of South Africa's 
alternative press. "Desktop publishing made it possible to run the newspaper at 
one third of the cost of a normal press operation," wrote Louw (1991, 23). 
Weekly Mail co-editor Irwin Manoim's account of the arrival of desktop 
publishing in 1985 and its consequences for the print media in South Africa and 
beyond is an important (and rarely reported) historic recollection worth recalling 
at some length: 
One lunchtime, I was browsing the stacks at CNA, when I chanced 
upon a magazine cover announcing an amazing new device, a laser 
printer. Inside were sample printouts that looked plausibly as if they'd 
come from a commercial print shop. It dawned on me that if a laser 
printer could produce text that looked 'printed', it might eliminate the 
need for typesetting equipment, darkrooms, chemicals and skilled 
technicians. It might make it possible for people with almost no 
money to produce a newspaper. And that, give or take a few matters 
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of detail, is what happened. The first purchase by the nascent Weekly 
Mail was an Apple Laser Writer. It was flown in especially from 
Holland, arriving ten days before liftoff. I became rather fond of that 
squat little box. It was, in many ways, the reason the Weekly Mail 
became more than just a dream ... the laser printer's legacy went 
beyond the Weekly Mail. It brought newspaper publishing within the 
budgets of communities around the country. Within a few months, an 
'alternative' weekly press had mushroomed, based on the Weekly 
Mail's production techniques (Manoim 2005, 4). 
In South Africa in 199617, an industry-wide shift in technology had massive 
repercussions for the newspaper industry. The arrival of full-page pagination 
and the simultaneous loss of several classes of employees engaged in 
traditional typographical tasks, led to a centralisation of journalistic functions. At 
Independent Newspapers, this centralisation with a particular eye on cutting 
costs, was commonly described as the search for synergy. 
A programme to share production facilities, photographic services and content, 
known in the Cape office as NewsFloor2000, was introduced. Within the 
company, the buzzword was "synergy". But concerns were soon raised about 
the impact of synergy on the quality of the company's products, in particular on 
the quality of the editorial content. 
"In 1998 we discovered a word that has become the curse of South African 
journalism: synergy. The idea was to synergise as much as possible: pay one 
salary instead of 3 or 4. You can already see it now: the international news 
page is the same in the Pretoria News as it is in The Star, the Tonight section of 
The Star is also in the Cape Argus and the Daily News. The only difference is 
the advertising. Some sub-editor up in Johannesburg is designing everybody's 
pages. That's the way they were thinking then already: Squeeze as much as 
possible out of each individual in the company" (Fisher 2005). 
Former management employees claim the consequence of this ratio-driven 
method of cost cutting undermined the company's capacity to provide quality 
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content thereby endangering its long-term viability and credibility. By forcing 
newspapers within the same group, even though they were technically 
competitors, to share news services, photographs and production facilities, 
Newsfloor 2000 had a direct impact, argues Wilson, on the independence of 
editors and therefore on freedom of the press itself: "Editorial independence is 
about an editor being able to scan the environment and choose what is 
important to him or her. Narrowing the environment was very damaging" 
(Wilson 2005). 
More sympathetic voices concede that while cost cutting at Independent 
Newspapers had been fierce during a large part of the period, inefficiencies 
were widespread and the sacrifices made placed the company on a much 
stronger footing come the upturn. At the time the Argus company was acquired, 
management consisted of dozens of grey-shoed white men in what was known 
as mahogany row, explains one former manager. "Even after 1990, the pace of 
change was glaCial. When someone was promoted, the joke was you would ask 
'who died?'. It was an old-fashioned, patriarchal industry. Clearly a seismic shift 
had to happen" (interview with anonymous Independent Newspaper manager, 
2005). 
Elsewhere in the world, the impact of the new generation of global media 
executives were changing things dramatically. The days of the old press lords, 
where proprietors in the mould of Lord Beaverbrook owned and manipulated 
newspapers as an amusing pastime, were gone (Greenslade 2004). Now, 
newspapers were a big, bottom-line, global business. For years South African 
newspapers had been protected. The English-language press had enjoyed a 
cosy relationship with the major mining group Anglo-American while the 
Afrikaans press, principally Naspers and Perskor, had been created as an 
instrument of the volk and had never been intended to be a business. Suddenly, 
in the early 1990s, as the country itself crawled out of apartheid isolation, the 
South African mainstream press entered a new realm. Virtually overnight, it 
became a large, commercial enterprise in which the rapid evolution of 
technology was a common and powerful force. 
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Technological change also played a key role in the advancing fortunes of South 
Africa's biggest media house, Media24. Afrikaans media companies Naspers 
and Perskor, developed intimate ties with the political establishment over the 
years (see above). As apartheid failed and pressures seemed to mount even on 
the future of Afrikaans as a language, decisions had to be made about how best 
to proceed. Should the Afrikaans media keep to itself, eke out a pretty good 
living from mainly white, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and stay out of the 
way of the black political juggernaut? Or should it take the aggressive route, 
expand into new terrain, publish in different languages and grow wherever 
possible? This was the conundrum faced the editors and board of Naspers (and 
Perskor) in the early 1990s (Malherbe 2005). "One of the most important 
conferences in our existence took place at Klein Drakenstein in December 
1993," the company's 1994 annual report told shareholders. "The board 
discussed our future role and mission. Far-reaching proposals for the 
regeneration of our activities were approved" (Naspers 1994). 
The decisions included the listing of Naspers on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in 1994, the racial transformation of the company and of its Board 
and the commencement of a period of major investment in state-of-the-art 
printing technology, presses and equipment. "We invested in the future on an 
unprecedented scale," Naspers chairman Ton Vosloo told investors in the 
company's 1995 annual report. It was announced the company had decided to 
spend R215-million on new presses, "the largest capital project undertaken by 
the group" (Naspers 1995, 12). But this was only the first installment in a 
massive recapitalisation programme that would catapault Naspers into a 
dominant position in the South African print market. 
Between 1998 and 2001, the company invested R 1-billion in its traditional print 
media business, both in renewal of infrastructure and in the acquisition of new 
titles (Naspers 2001, 5). This enabled Naspers to produce not only the best 
quality reproduction in the business (as the endless reproduction awards during 
the period testify), but also created the excess printing capacity it needed to try 
new magazine and newspaper ventures (such as the Oaily Sun). Naspers grew 
from a R 1-billion business (turnover) in 1994 to one that brought in almost R 14-
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billion in group revenue by 2005 (Naspers 2005, 1 )15. From a roughly equal 
contender in the market, it is now three times the size of its nearest rival. 
In 1994, we had old presses, mature products (with limited capacity 
for growth), the internet had arrived and there was uncertainty about 
our political future and about the future of the Afrikaans language. But 
we agreed we believed in the future and decided to invest and 
upgrade our infrastructure and technology. This gave us a platform 
for growth (Malherbe 2005). 
In this case, as in so many, technology was a prime trigger and its acquisition 
had a fundamental impact on the media market. 
The benefits of investing in technology were not entirely missed by the other big 
players in the South African newspaper business. According to Anton Harber, 
Caxton chairman Terry Moolman also "noticed that every time they spent 
money on presses, profits went up" (Harber 2005). Caxton executive Nick 
Holdsworth recalls his boss Terry Moolman "put a lot of money into new 
presses and achieved more efficiency. This trimmed prices. Caxton invested 
steadily in technology, unlike Johnnic and Independent Newspapers who kept 
on using creaky old plants" (Holdsworth 2005). 
Independent Newspapers did not, as Holdsworth suggests, invest vast amounts 
of money into new presses in the wake of 1994. This was because the presses 
the company owned were still in pretty good shape, according to the current 
editor of The Star, Moegsien Williams: "We've remained a newspaper company 
and our presses are set to last for another 13 years. Why throw them out? 
We're a newspaper company. [Naspers and Caxton] are into commercial 
printing, magazines and books - 99,9% of our products are newspapers. We've 
spent hundreds of millions of rands maintaining and refurbishing our presses. 
We even launched the Oaily Voice (45-50,000) in the new South Africa along 
with a number of free sheets and community newspapers" (Williams 2005). 
15 Naspers changed its accounting method in the 1999/2000 fimmcial year from a measurement of 
tunlOyer to reyenue/eamings making a direct contrast impossible. Tumoyer cmd revenue are however 
close enough to giw a good indication of the change. 
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Only Johncom was left ruing its total lack of printing facilities and its reliance on 
the other companies to publish its titles. Johncom CEO Connie Molusi told me: 
"I do regret not having printing presses, though we are constantly evaluating our 
major input costs which are newsprint, printing, production and distribution. Our 
margins are lower than for the industry as a whole because we pay market-
related costs for printing" (Molusi 2005). 
Neither is technological change likely to be something that becomes less 
important in the years ahead. As Irwin Manoim writes: 
"Can technology shape the news? Most journalists affect a 
professional indifference to the grubby technical processes that 
transform their musings into products called 
newspapers ... newspapers didn't exist until moveable type was 
invented, and mass-circulation newspapers required the invention of 
high-speed rotary presses. The cell phone-like news devices of the 
not-too-distant future may prove demanding taskmasters. This is a 
medium that will always need to be first with the news, around the 
clock, 365 days a year. Hollow-eyed journalists will find themselves 
filing at all kinds of strange hours. Those over 35 will, on doctor's 
orders, downscale to less stressful occupations. Electronic journalists 
may have to rediscover some of the skills of yesteryear's Fleet Street 
evening tabloids. They will need to specialize in the rapid delivery of 
short, breaking news stories, no more than three or four paragraphs 
long, and updated frequently. The ink on the page just sits there, but 
the ink on an electronic page can jive from margin to margin and Sing 
in stereo" (Manoim 2005, 233-4). 
6. Commercialisation 
Hallin and Mancini argue that commercialism has led to greater separation of 
the political world from the media one. As small-scale newspapers have been 
transformed into highly capitalised and highly profitable businesses, they gain 
greater autonomy from organised political and social groupings. The 
consequence of this shift, according to traditional interpretations, is that the 
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increased value of newspapers as advertising mediums has allowed them 
gradually to shake off government and/or political party control and to become 
independent voices of public sentiment (Hallin & Mancini 2004,203 citing 
Altick). The revisionist view is that commercialisation undermines democratic 
life by shifting the purpose of the press from the expression of political 
viewpoints to the promotion of rank consumerism (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 215). 
My understanding from my own research conducted into the area is that the 
blurring of advertising and editorial that is the common feature of 
commercialisation does indeed threaten to damage democratic life (Hadland, 
Cowling and Tabe, 2007). It does this by undermining the self-regulation of the 
media (by not adhering to its own codes), by breaking the trust of the public (by 
concealing paid-for content) and by decapacitating the media from the effective 
performance of its Fourth Estate functions. As Ryland Fisher, the former editor 
of the Cape Times pointed out: "I've always said that when people talk about 
political interference that commercial interference is more of a threat" (Fisher 
2005). 
It is certainly true that commercialisation has had a major impact on the South 
African media market. In the post-1994 environment, there were suddenly new 
rules and new ways of doing things. It was no longer acceptable for an editor to 
have no grasp whatever of budgeting or of managing the financials. "Harvey 
(Tyson, a former editor of The Star) always maintained he never had seen or 
done a real budget. This was left to the financial guys," says one former 
colleague. "Even in 1990, if a manager wanted to come on to the newsfloor at 
the Argus company, he had to make an appointment". Obviously, there were 
soon to be increasing tensions between the commercial imperative and the old 
style. This was to prove very stressful within the company, and was at its 
strongest in the period between 1990 and 1994. 
But I would also argue that commercialism does not necessarily, as Hallin and 
Mancini suggest, lead inexorably toward a differentiation of media and politics. 
Evidence from the South African market indicates that commercialism has 
actually served as a trigger for a closer relationship between the media and the 
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state. By allowing the state to pay for content, often without signalling that this 
constitutes advertising, the new climate of commercialisation allows for a new 
opportunity for indirect intervention in the print media. 
The supposition is supported by analyses emanating from other countries and 
regions, including central America and Africa. In his work on Gacetilla -
advertising disguised as news - Jose Luis Benavides describes this form of 
content as a central feature in the finances of contemporary Mexican print news 
media (2000, 85). He also argues that it is a "key ingredient in a system of 
governmental press subsidy, essential in explaining the way in which the 
Mexican press has served as a propaganda tool for both the Mexican 
government and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Benavides 2000, 
85). Benavides concludes in his work that government advertising (particularly 
gacetillas) is an important element of "press control" in Mexico (2000, 86). 
Tettey notes the common occurrence in African democracies of the withdrawal 
of government advertising to starve critical media outlets of income. 
Commercial advertisers are also cajoled into pulling their own advertisements in 
newspapers considered to be at loggerheads with government: 
The advertising revenue of the critical private Ugandan newspaper, 
The Monitor, for example, was slashed by almost half as a result of a 
cabinet order in July 1993 banning state institutions from advertising 
in the paper (2001, 20). 
In late 2006, a story along these lines made front page news in South Africa 
when it transpired that a cabinet minister, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, had paid 
tens of thousands of rands to have herself as the cover story of a hitherto well-
respected financial weekly, Leadership. The magazine had just changed 
ownership and the controversy focused new attention on the frequency and 
consequences of disguised paid-for content, particularly when it was from 
politicians. Subsequently, towards the end of 2006, the South African National 
Editors Forum (Sanef) appOinted a subcommittee to investigate improved self-
regulation of paid-for content. 
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Virtually every newspaper, including free drop titles and community papers, 
carries some form of government advertising. Commercialism, in the South 
African context, has thus lead to a subtle subsidisation of the media by the 
state. This is creating a dependence on advertising revenue from the state for 
many titles but is also contributing to the deterioration of ethical values that 
commercialism and dependence naturally brings with it (see Hadland, Cowling 
& Tabe, 2007). 
Ironically, commercialism has made the connection with political life and with 
political actors stronger as new opportunities arise to use the media 
commercially for the state, without appearing to be exerting influence that is too 
close. As media companies themselves diversify into different media and 
different forms, the ties with regulating agencies, government departments and 
state institutions grows. A good international example is the massive increase in 
election advertising expenditure in recent times both in the United States and in 
Great Britain (see, for instance, Magleby, Corrado & Patterson 2006, or UK 
data at: http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk), and the cosy ties with the 
media establishment that this necessarily creates. It is little wonder no 
American newspaper is calling for an overhaul of the country's political system, 
in spite of the very recent and serious electoral system problems. While this 
countertendency doesn't necessarily disprove differentiation, or even de-
differentiation, it is a reminder nonetheless that as an agent of change, few are 
more powerful than commercialism. 
There is another aspect of commercialism I'd like to highlight which also has an 
impact on the notion of differentiation. This is the fact that it is not only the 
media that is affected by commercialism, but so too is the political world. Indeed 
the South African experience suggests that commercialism is not only 
contributing to the breakdown of political organisation, it is also bringing the 
worlds of politics and of business even closer together. "Commercialism has 
driven a profound change in the nature of the ANC," Paton wrote in a recent in-
depth article on the majority party (2007,27). "Once local ANC meetings were 
all about policies and strategies - the transformation of South Africa's society 
according to the ideals the party championed for decades. Now these 
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gatherings are frequently preoccupied with business opportunities and who 
should have access to them. It's a transformation that wasn't expected. Rather 
than 'transforming the state', as the party describes its goals in official rhetoric, 
the economy has transformed the ANC" (Paton 2007,27). This is a point 
Gumede takes up as he argues that a new intimacy between business and 
government threatens the "soul" of the majority party (2005, 217). 
The point is that differentiation and de-differentiation may well involve the 
separation of politics from the media and the narrowing of the divide between 
the media and business, as Hallin and Mancini argue. But it may also spark an 
increasingly close proximity of politics to business. Certainly in South Africa in 
2007, getting ahead in business is about politics. "It was only when politicians 
moved into the world of business that the competition for commercial 
opportunities began to dominate ANC dynamics ... In parliament, 40% of ANC 
MPs are directors of companies, many owning them outright" (Paton 2007, 27). 
Commercialism, in other words, appears to be a particularly strong agent of 
change affecting, among other things, the very process of convergence of the 
media, business and politics. This is a slightly different, but not disharmonious, 
take on Hallin and Mancini's understanding of convergence. It supports the 
power of the Liberal model, the cluster within which commercial and business 
interests are traditionally most comfortable. 
7. Business Strategy 
The final trigger of media change is another process that is internal to the 
sector: the definition and implementation of business strategies or models. As 
Picard has argued, changes in the business model constitute "a critical factor in 
the environment of the newspaper industry" and few elements are more 
influential either within individual companies or within the sector as a whole 
(2004, 2). The launching or closing of titles, the emphasis on local or 
international products, the targeting of particular audiences and the alignment of 
these products within the market are all vital factors in determining the 
topography and composition of the news media. OccaSionally, this strategy 
encompasses non-media specific dimensions. Tomaselli's argument, for 
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instance, that the sale by Anglo-American of its media holdings was intended as 
to protect its diamond monopoly (see Tomaselli's comments on page 157) is 
not a contention that is easily explained by Liberal drift or by differentiation. 
Indeed, it became politically essential for the over-concentrated South African 
mining houses to initiate a process of fundamental and rapid differentiation of its 
media interests from its resource-based interests. The deliberate and 
systematic separation of the media system from the economic system for 
political reasons is hardly an equation that sits comfortably within modernisation 
theory. 
Mostly, while reflecting historical trends, business strategies look forward 
attempting to make best use of demographic, political and social opportunities. 
Individually, business strategies focus on areas of competition and on the 
products that will perform best. Collectively, they have a very real impact in 
determining not just the local media universe but the global one too. It is for this 
reason that political economy stresses the significance of business strategy in 
evaluating the importance of influencing factors. 
We have seen above how global business strategy - Independent Newspapers' 
attitude to cost cutting - came to playa role in influencing the South African 
media system. Let us look too at a local example. 
The literature from business studies indicates that other than direct competition, 
product for product, companies operating in mature industries - such as South 
Africa's print media sector - have various options to consider in search of 
growth and expansion. These include mergers and acquisitions (locally and 
internationally) as well as responses to export or other international business 
opportunities (Thompson and Strickland 2003). In addition, companies can seek 
out horizontal or vertical integration strategies. The former applies when a firm's 
long-term strategy is based on growth through the acquisition of one or more 
similar firms operating at the same stage of the production-marketing chain 
(thereby eliminating the competition), the latter applies when a firm's strategy is 
to acquire, or closely align with, firms that supply it with inputs (such as raw 
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materials) orlare customers for its outputs (such as warehouses for finished 
products (Pearce & Robinson 1997, 227). 
These were the options facing Johncom in 2003/4 as it contemplated the 
expansion of its newspaper business. An attractive proposition was the 
purchase of the Sowetan, a national daily newspaper in a circulation slump, and 
its sister title, already 50% owned by Johncom, the Sowetan Sunday World. 
The strategy was a typical horizontal integration approach by which Johncom's 
current holdings, most particularly the leading national Sunday newspaper the 
Sunday Times, could be protected from new entrants while exploiting the new 
opportunities and market offered by the daily and by full ownership of the 
Sowetan Sunday World (Emslie et al 2005). 
At the time the Competition Tribunal approved the acquisition, in July 2004, the 
Sowetan was owned by New African Publications Limited. It catered mainly for 
a black readership primarily located in Gauteng, KwaZulu- Natal, the Northern 
Cape, Mpumalanga and Free State. The Sowetan had a strong brand with a 
proud history. It appeared, however, as if the paper's original readers had 
outgrown its content. Much of what was being printed in the paper was of no 
real interest to its target market (LSM 4-7). This was reflected in the steady 
decline of readership and circulation. The Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) 
figures at the time indicated Sowetan's circulation declined from 123 590 (July 
to December 2003) to 118261 (Jan - Jun 2004). The AMPS results also 
showed a dramatic slump in appeal, from a penetration of 6.2% to 5.1 % (Emslie 
et al 2005). 
Johncom management believed the Sowetan was losing out primarily to the 
hugely successful tabloid, the Daily Sun, owned by rivals Naspers. This 
combined with a failed attempt by the Sowetan to appeal to upwardly mobile 
black executives meant the title had become "a paper without a people" (Emslie 
et al 2005). After the acquisition, Johncom management immediately set about 
repositioning the paper to cater for LSM 4 to 7. The strategy proposed: 
• To establish an agreed role and personality for the newspaper; 
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• To clearly define the target readership; 
• To determine the precise needs of the target readership; 
• To optimise the paper through investment in world-class production 
and back-end operations; and, 
• To identify the parts of the newspaper that are not read by the 
target readership group. 
(Emslie et al 2005) 
In acquiring the Sowetan, Johncom realised a number of important cost savings 
that helped their other businesses. They strengthened their negotiating position 
with suppliers of paper and printing services, appointed one cost-effective 
national sales team, provided a full pre-press support services to all of its titles 
without any additional capital cost and with some re-organisation and reduction 
in staff costs. All titles reported to one circulation director, thus reducing cost 
and enabling Johncom to strike a more favourable deal with sub-contractors by 
offering them more newspapers at a lower cost per unit. (Emslie et al 2006). 
The example, as narrowly specific as it is in this instance, serves as a reminder 
that the strategic decision-making of individual media companies can also act 
as a significant trigger for change in the marketplace. It is the kind of change 
that is hard to evaluate from texts alone. This is particularly the case when 
individual corporate strategies cohere into industry changing shifts. An upsurge 
of interest, acquisitions and repositioning of titles to match anticipated growth in 
the middle class black market, for instance, clearly has implications for the 
structure of the media system. It also has consequences for the relationship 
between the media system and the political system, both of which anticipate 
key shifts in their emphases and appeal to co-opt this rapidly growing and 
increasingly powerful group. 
A further example concerns the impact of black economic empowerment on 
corporate media strategy and therefore on the topography of the sector. 
According to former editor and Caxton professor of Journalism Anton Harber: 
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One of the great ironies of BEE is that empowerment owners as 
media owners are more conservative. They tend to owe money (e.g. 
Johnnic), they had to be focused on the bottom line and this made 
them incredibly cautious and risk averse (like Kagiso). New BEE 
owners were also under scrutiny from shareholders. Many of them 
had trade union money behind them, real people's money in other 
words. Deals were proposed to (Kagiso chairman) Eric Molobi three 
times a day. Everyone wanted Kagiso Trust involved. He wanted 
investments that would be safe, including politically. Radio was 
politically safe and had high returns. Newspapers had lower margins 
and were a higher political risk. That's one of the ironies of 
empowerment: It sped up transformation of the media, but actually 
created cautious and conservative management attitudes (Harber 
2005). 
Where does South Africa fit in? 
The South African media market is a mature one. Radio is accessible to 88% of 
the population, principally in the form of the public broadcaster, the SABC - and 
close to 70% of the population have access to television, also overwhelmingly 
provided by the SABC (Duncan 2000, 1, cited in Johnston 2004). This makes 
for extensive coverage: "The SABC controls 19 radio stations, attracting 20 
million listeners daily. Radio news produces 2,000 programmes a week with a 
combined airtime of close to 300 hours. The SABC's television service consists 
of three channels ... attracting a daily audience of about 12 million viewers" 
(World Press Review Online 2001, cited in Johnston 2004). The broadcast 
sector is also now populated by close to 100 community radio stations and the 
arrival of community television is widely anticipated during 2007 (Hadland, 
Aldridge & Ogada, 2006). 
By contrast, the circulation of daily and weekly newspapers is limited. 
Comparatively speaking in the global context, the consumption of print media is 
not high. Calculations based on figures produced by the SA Advertising 
Research Foundation (SAARF) suggest a readership for daily papers in South 
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Africa of just over 8-million. This is 31 % of the population over 20 years of age, 
or 26% of the population aged over 15 years (Johnston 2004, 25). According to 
the World Press Review 2001, only 36% of South Africans use the print media 
as a source of information. But close to 7 million people are not catered for at all 
by the print media while apartheid legacies continue to perpetuate information 
inequality (Johnston 2004, 27). 
For Hallin and Mancini, it is not so much the size of the market as its 
"relationship to its audience and its role in the wider process of social and 
political communication" that locates that market within the comparative 
systems matrix. The media markets of the north European (Liberal and 
Democratic Corporatist) countries do have high circulations, but they also 
address a mass public. They are not necessarily engaged in the political world, 
but rather take part in a vertical process of communication. This entails 
mediating between political elites and the ordinary citizen. The press in these 
models may also have a horizontal communication dimension, though not to the 
same degree as the Polarised Pluralist countries. In these countries, 
newspapers are frequently addressed to a small elite. This elite is mainly urban, 
well educated and politically active and the press is engaged in a process of 
debate and negotiation among elite factions. 
The South African press has a history of appealing to political and social elites. 
This was true of the missionary press right back at its origins in the 1880s when 
various titles (such as Izwi la Bantu) were produced by and aimed at 
missionary-educated black South Africans. Johnson writes that the 
establishment of Bantu World in 1932 "spearheaded the shift from a local to a 
mass black press" (Johnson 1991, 21). But, like other attempts to develop the 
black newspaper market, this too failed. Tim Couzens identifies three reasons 
that consistently led to the constrainment of a mass, black press in South 
Africa: financial difficulties, a fear of political militancy (by the state and by 
advertisers) and the intervention of white entrepreneurs (cited in Johnson 1991, 
20). The combination of these factors, together with the powerful monopoly held 
by the Argus company, Naspers, Perskor and South African Associated 
Newspapers (SAAN, later Times Media Limited) and close state vigilance and 
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intervention, ensured no mass press developed in South Africa until 2002. In a 
few short years, the mass press has sprung up from nothing to a powerful 
dominance of the newspaper market. 
Hallin and Mancini state: "So far as we know, no country that did not develop 
mass circulation newspapers in the late 19th to early 20th century has ever 
subsequently developed them." This is clearly not the case in South Africa 
where a brand new, mass circulation newspaper sector has sprung up within 
the last five years. There now is a clear separation between quality (elite) and a 
mass press. Hallin and Mancini argue this has great significance for the 
development of media as political institutions. This may prove to be the case. 
For Deon du Plessis, publisher of the Daily Sun and the person who thought up 
the idea of launching a tabloid newspaper in South Africa, the tabloid press 
ushered in a whole new way of looking at the newspaper business: "Previously 
newspaper owners never thought of their papers as a brand. We understand 
that both the Daily Sun and Nova16 are not newspapers, they are brands. We 
market them as brands, the Star doesn't. After three years the Daily Sun is one 
of the best-known brands in South Africa (like Coke). You must recognise that 
this is a helluva thing and something we've worked very hard at. That's one of 
the imperatives of the post-94 era. After 1994, there's been an explosion of 
choice, that's what it's meant to me. In 1994, if you lived in the townships, you 
had no choice" (Du Plessis 2005). 
Media24 acknowledged as early as 1996 that its margins were coming under 
pressure in the magazine market due to the growing appreciation internationally 
of the worth of a brand: "Overseas publishers are showing an increased interest 
in the South African market ... The interest is related to the increasing 
realisation amongst large magazine publishers abroad that their trademarks 
have international worth" (Naspers 1996, 13). 
]G .vom. a daily newspaper aimed at wealthy young urban readers. was launched in 2005 by Naspers and 
Deon du Plessis but was subsequently closed down in 2006. 
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It was also true that while branding could make a newspaper a success, 
handled wrongly or inappropriately, it could lead to disaster. According to John 
Matisonn, editorial director of the now-defunct Nigerian-owned daily newspaper 
ThisOay: 
The biggest flaw was thinking about prestige in the way they do in 
Nigeria. We had to have a fancy address. Flashy was what counted. 
This was how we were positioned. I wanted cheap, modest quarters, 
like a building in Newtown or Braamfontein, that we could have 
transformed into something with value. He wanted somewhere across 
from the Stock Exchange in Sandton. This was symptomatic of other 
extravagances. These included pay. Nduka (the publisher, Nduka 
Obaigbena) would double what people asked for ... He spent huge 
amounts on changing the logo. He commissioned two ad agencies to 
come up with books full of logos. I thought the Nigerian one was 
better anyway, but the ad agencies saw him coming. They wasted his 
money and I believe that what they did was basically steal from us. 
They called him on a Saturday and went around me. They came up 
with all these projects and gimmicks that he went for, but which didn't 
help us. I often wouldn't even know about them until they appeared in 
the paper (Matisonn 2005). 
A further benchmark for evaluating a media system's location in the matrix is its 
balance of local, regional and national newspapers. Hallin and Mancini suggest 
that the more significant the national newspaper sector is, the more likely a 
country is to have a politically differentiated press. Once again, until fairly 
recently, South Africa had strong regional newspapers, some national titles and 
a paucity of local papers. However, this balance has changed dramatically. 
According to Malherbe: "Thirty years ago, community newspapers didn't exist, 
but only a few mainstream titles. Now there are many more community 
newspapers than mainstream. In South Africa, about 70% of newsprint is used 
on mainstream titles while the rest is community papers" (Malherbe 2006). 
Perhaps of all the key dimensions considered so far, locating South Africa's 
media market into the Hallin and Mancini paradigm has proven the least 
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comfortable fit. This is because the South African media market has changed 
so radically and so quickly that assumptions that could have been made about it 
five or six years ago are simply no longer valid. Indeed flux has probably been 
the most noteworthy characteristic of the print media sector over the last 
decade and more. What this has demonstrated is that the Three Models 
paradigm is ill-equipped to deal with such wholesale and radical change within 
media systems. It is not that different systems contradict each other while 
occupying the same model, as in the Liberal model of the press. It is that 
change defines South Africa's media market; change in ownership, products, 
audiences and even in functions. And with change such a key element, it 
becomes even more important to note in this and in the other dimensions the 
direction and pace of change as it pertains to the various sets of indicators. 
The key characteristics of the Polarised Pluralist model, say Hallin and Mancini, 
are to be found in the closeness of political actors to the media, in the heavy 
focus of the media on political life and on the relatively elitist nature of 
journalism. All of these would suggest South Africa falls close to, if not in, the 
Polarised Pluralist cluster. Political actors and the media can hardly have been 
closer than during the transition period when political reporters fulfilled, almost 
to the letter, the classic function of a Polarised Pluralist media system to signal 
positions, commitments and the agendas of party elites to one another. The 
heavy focus on political life indeed threatened to undermine the print media 
itself, as we have discussed. And, until the arrival of the tabloids, the South 
African media was very much geared to the country's elite. 
In common with the Democratic Corporatist model, the South African media 
market has a high degree of political parallelism, a strong interventionist state 
with traditional limits on state power and a sophisticated pattern of civic life. 
However, this corporatism does not find its way into the print media in any 
systematic way and neither does a wide variation in political tendencies. 
Horwitz has lauded the deeply democratic and accountable process fuelled by 
civil SOCiety activism by which South Africa framed its communications policy in 
the post-1994 period (2001). And while this has been influential with regard to 
broadcasting and, to some extent, in the community print media field, it has not 
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made a deep impression on the mainstream print media. Indeed, one would be 
hard-pressed to argue that the replacement of South Africa's ministry of 
information (later, the South African Communication Service) by a new 
interactive, participatory agency (the Government Communication and 
Information System, GCIS) had been a successfully achieved process. There is 
much in the new GCIS that is reminiscent of its predecessor. 
South Africa's multiplicity of forums and stakeholder involvement in policy 
processes might also have indicated its leaning toward the Democratic 
Corporatist cluster. But while some of these forums remain important (such as 
the National Economic Development and Labour Council, Nedlac), there is also 
evidence that as the state concentrates power in the presidency, the impact of 
these civil society structures is diminishing just as they slide further out of the 
reach of ordinary citizens: 
Although the executive seems committed to empowering the poor, 
improving participation is hampered by a lack of capacity on the part 
of those whose participation is most necessary. The extreme 
inequalities in South Africa could pose problems to increasing public 
participation. Although public participation is constantly advocated in 
the name of empowerment, it may be that only those already 
empowered are able to take advantage of this principle ... In South 
Africa, two important factors affect the relationship between the public 
and the government. The sheer size of the nation, coupled with socio-
economic realities, make meaningful participation difficult. Secondly, 
the lack of a clear relationship between the electorate and the elected 
due to the pure proportional list system makes contact harder 
(Calland 1999, 65-66). 
This is a process Horwitz also concedes when he acknowledges that in the 
post-1994 period, the political meaning and import of the stakeholder processes 
became more complicated as far as the ANC was concerned: 
The forums had evolved into pluralistic, non-statutory, quasi-
corporatist bodies whose authority to make policy was perceived by 
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some as treading upon, even compromising, the government's policy-
making authority (Horwitz 2001, 280). 
The South African media market also exhibits clientelism, significant shortfalls 
in mass literacy and inadequacies in access to the media together with an 
emphasis on a regional and national press that prevent it from being a 
convincing member of the Democratic Corporatist cluster. 
Similarly, South Africa has the mature commercial element of the market and 
the sharp separation of quality from sensational press that would signal it may 
form part of the Liberal media cluster. But, it also lacks the predominance of 
local titles, the limited state role and the informal regulation that are the 
hallmarks of the liberal press. 
Conclusion 
For all its strengths, the Hallin and Mancini Three Models paradigm does not 
cope very well with media system change. This is mainly because the study 
compares 18 countries that have enjoyed decades - and, in some cases, 
centuries - of relative political and media system stability. When one introduces 
countries that have endured far more rapid, more recent, more comprehensive 
change, the model struggles to cope. It generalises the causes of change, 
assumes that change leads to greater differentiation and calls further into 
question the power of Liberal drift. However, the application of the model 
suggests routes for its modification. In this respect several new aspects have 
been touted. 
We have seen how commercialism does not always lead to greater 
differentiation between state and media, even if it is accompanied by the party-
degrading process of secularisation. Indeed, this chapter argues that far from 
weakening the ties between the media and the political system, 
commercialisation - in the South African case, at least - has in several ways 
strengthened them. This is because commercialisation offers new opportunities 
for the state to influence, subsidise or create dependence in the media. This is 
particularly the case in systems where self-regulation is weak. 
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This also suggests, contrary to Hallin and Mancini's argument, that the state in 
some cases is attempting to impose its own distinctive logic on the media rather 
than allowing the media to develop one for itself. This is symptomatic, as I have 
argued above, of an emerging, democratic state with authoritarian roots that 
has been persistently interested in harnessing the power of the mass media to 
consolidate its own power. Even though this may ostensibly be for the furthering 
of social democratic objectives, such as greater social equity and the 
consolidation of a constitution-based political system, it nonetheless signals not 
greater differentiation between the media and the state, but indeed less. 
While an emerging democracy's political system may have seen the 
establishment of a constitutional and legal framework that includes fundamental 
protection for a free press, a powerful democratic state is also more than 
capable of stalling, if not reversing, the process of differentiation to ensure its 
own narrative is the one that predominates in the mass media. In this way, it 
continues to act as a key catalyst for change in the media marketplace. This 
ongoing capacity of the state to impact (negatively) on the media system, most 
especially in systems where political parallelism is high and where democratic 
institutions are new, is underplayed in Hallin and Mancini's paradigm. 
The chapter has suggested that media system change may be understood 
better and more easily compared with change in other systems when the notion 
of triggers is introduced. Gleanings and insights from the political economy 
paradigm, a useful adjunct especially when it comes to analysis of media 
markets, underpin this consideration of triggers. There are indeed many areas 
of overlap and compatibility between political economy as a critical method and 
comparative media systems analysis. The injection of a political economy 
perspective, particularly in relation to an analysis of the media market, gives 
Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm greater depth and a better 
understanding of media system change in general. This perspective is again a 
new one offered by this chapter. 
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A range of specific examples from the South African case study that is the 
subject of this thesis has illustrated these various trends and characteristics of 
change. There are elements that may be uniquely South African, such as the 
very recent emergence of a mass press. But there is also plenty of reason to 
suspect that these experiences, and the modifications they infer, may well be 
applicable not only to emerging democracies in Africa but elsewhere in the 
world too. Naturally, further comparative research involving other new 
democracies, particularly those emerging from authoritarian pasts, would allow 
the usefulness of the modifications I have suggested to be tested further. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the Three Models of media and politics that Hallin 
and Mancini propose. And while elements of both the Liberal model and the 
Democratic Corporatist model are evident in the South African case, it is clear 
that it largely conforms to the Polarised Pluralist cluster. This supports the 
findings of previous chapters concerned with the other key dimensions of 
comparative media systems theory, political parallelism and the degree of state 
intervention. The final dimension of the theory, journalistic professionalism, 
follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
JOURNALISTIC PROFESSIONALISATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PRINT MEDIA 
Introduction 
South Africa has a long and proud history of journalistic excellence in the print 
media. Examples include the hard-fought winning of press freedom from the 
colonial authorities by Thomas Pringle and John Fairbairn in 1828, Edgar 
Wallace's "scoop of the century" when he broke news of the Boer War 
armistice before the British Parliament had been informed in 1902, the vibrancy 
and talent of the writers of Drum magazine as they articulated black South 
African urban culture for the first time in the 1950s (anticipating in the process 
the techniques of New Journalism) and the government-toppling exposes of 
what became known as the Muldergate scandal in the 1970s. In addition, the 
many South African (and international) journalists who were jailed, shot, 
harassed or who even lost their lives in pursuit of the truth during the dangerous 
transition period from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s - such as photographer 
Ken Oosterbroek - bear testimony to a long legacy of quality, dedication and 
professionalism. 
Since 1994 and the introduction of democracy, the rules and requirements of 
journalistic professionalism in South Africa have, however, changed. With 
apartheid gone, the Fourth Estate no longer had a clear enemy. The 
relationship between the media and the state shifted. The arrival of global 
investors, tabloids, client magazines and accelerated commercialism threw 
traditional practices into question and introduced new forms of journalism. The 
formal organisation of South African journalists collapsed and self-regulating 
codes and structures have been found wanting. The poor handling of racial 
transformation at newspaper companies, the 'juniorisation' of newsrooms, the 
downgrading of training, the undermining of editors' authority and the poaching 
by government and the corporate world of key black staff have all contributed to 
dwindling journalistic standards. By 2003, South African journalism was 
experiencing what one analyst called its "worst year" (Bird 2004, 58). 
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For Hallin and Mancini, journalistic professionalisation is a key indicator 
characterising the relationship between the media and the state. It is also useful 
in assessing the degree of political parallelism and facilitates the location, within 
the comparative systems matrix, of a particular media system (such as South 
Africa's). The state of journalistic professionalism is informative, they argue, 
regarding the maturity of a country's system of rational legal authority and is 
also illustrative of the degree within society to which journalists can be 
persuaded to perform political tasks (instrumentalism). It is, therefore, an 
important indicator of the overall autonomy of the press. 
This chapter sets out Hallin and Mancini's description of the origins and 
definition of the characteristics of journalistic professionalisation. A number of 
indicators, such as degree of autonomy and public service orientation, are 
presented. The chapter then goes on to South Africa and attempts to map 
journalistic professionalisation to Hallin and Mancini's template, as experienced 
by this country's media and as influenced by its state system. Conclusions will 
then be drawn about the current state of South African journalistic 
professionalism, its direction and the consequences of its delineation for the 
country's placement in the comparative systems matrix. 
Journalistic professionalisation: origins and indicators 
For Hallin and Mancini, the process of journalistic professionalisation began 
when newspapers first started hiring reporters on a fulltime basis and paid them 
a salary (2004, 218). At first, wages were low, there was little job security or 
autonomy and journalists were easily tempted into corruption. They occupied, in 
any case, a low status in social terms and could apparently be relied on to do 
unethical things for paltry incentives. Since then a gradual process of 
professionalisation has taken place in which journalists have won growing 
autonomy and independence, have acquired greater levels of job security, have 
set higher standards of ethical behaviour and have, therefore, garnered 
improved social standing. 
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This rising status together with advances in technology have allowed the mass 
media to take on functions and duties, such as information gathering and 
information sharing, that were formerly the responsibility of other social 
institutions, such as political parties, trade unions and churches. This correlates 
with Hallin and Mancini's understanding of secularisation and of the growing 
role of the mass media in modern society. 
There are four dimensions, or indicators, of journalistic professionalism, 
according to Comparing Media Systems: autonomy, the development of distinct 
professional norms, public service orientation and the degree of 
instrumentalism (2004, 36). Autonomy encompasses job security, the extent of 
interference in reporting, the amount of pressure applied by senior managers 
and editors and the role which journalists occupy in decision-making within 
media organisations. The development of professional norms reflects the 
maturity of a media system's ethical framework, the efficiency of journalist 
organisations and the effectiveness and extent of self-regulation. The notion of 
public service orientation has a number of meanings in the South African 
context. It could describe a state-funded initiative to provide information or 
content, as is performed by the state broadcasting body in the classic Liberal 
model sense. Or, it could refer to the notion of a developmental media aimed at 
generating responsible coverage of emerging democratic states. In this thesis, 
particularly as I am not focusing on the broadcast sector, I mean the latter. 
Instrumentalisation attempts to evaluate the extent to which the media can be 
used by various actors as tools to intervene in the political world (2004, 36). 
Together these indicators outline an important dimension of a media system 
that has key consequences for the functioning and development of that system. 
Journalistic professionalisation in South Africa 
Journalists in South Africa have achieved a significant degree of autonomy 
within their news organisations. Their work process is largely collegial, as Hallin 
and Mancini put it, in the sense that authority over journalists is exercised 
primarily by fellow journalists (2004, 35). There is a formal and hierarchical 
structure in most newspaper newsrooms by which almost all material is subject 
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to review and revision by people at several different levels. Unlike in southern 
Europe, it is commonplace for editors or senior editorial journalists to dictate to 
reporters what the general gist of their stories might, for news agendas to be set 
with their approval and for stories to be guided through the gathering and 
production process. It is less usual, but by no means unheard of, for senior 
management (non-editorial) to put pressure on newsrooms to cover particular 
events or stories. Any South African newsroom has anecdotes about this kind 
of intervention. 
At South Africa's national daily Business Day during my tenure there as a 
senior reporter (1987-8; 1991-94), it was implicitly understood that no article 
could be written about the newspaper's parent company, associated companies 
or board without the explicit approval of the editor. As Bagdikian has observed, 
"when their most sensitive economic interests are at stake, the parent 
corporations seldom refrain from using their power over public information" 
(2000, vii). 
Similarly, at Independent Newspapers frequent interventions by management 
were experienced. One senior executive at the company "interfered in editorial 
from the day he arrived. He thought nothing of calling the editor to have some 
story or other changed or redone. Some of the other managers also never knew 
where the line was," according to the former managing director of Independent 
Newspapers Cape Rory Wilson (2005). One example was the order from above 
to the newsroom staff in 2003 to ensure the opening of a new pottery shop was 
given prominent placement in Independent Newspapers Cape's group 
newspapers, the Cape Argus and the Cape Times. The pottery shop, 
Wedgewood, was owned by the wife of Independent Newspaper proprietor 
Tony O'Reilly. The opening of the establishment had no apparent news value 
but still gained prominent placement. There are many, many other examples of 
such interventions, and not only at Independent Newspapers or at Business 
Day. 
Of course, Hallin and Mancini's intention is that a lack of autonomy should apply 
primarily to the political world and that interventions in which the media are 
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made pawns for political purposes are more indicative of the trend than 
commercial interference. My experience, and research, indicates that while it is 
extremely rare for corporate management to dictate the political content of 
South African newspapers on a day-to-day basis, there is more often than not 
an unwritten consensus among senior staff that determines a title's attitude to 
different political players (see Chapter Four). Usually, this consensus consists 
of a broad sympathy with the ruling party and a disregard bordering on subtle 
ridicule of the opposition parties. The findings of the Media Tenor study into pre-
election coverage of political parties in 2004 (see Chapter Three) supports this 
perception. However, it is important to state that there are many examples of 
exceptions to this rule, of newspapers or individual journalists who exhibit 
moments of determined and effective autonomy. These would include the Mail 
& Guardian's popular (among readers, not among ministers) Cabinet score-
card, the satirical cartoons of Zapiro and the Sunday Times's frequent 
identification of important political office bearers as the "mampara of the week". 
It is the case in the post-1994 period that South African journalists have less job 
security than was the case in the apartheid era when entrenched monopolies 
and inefficiency characterised the mainstream press. Post-apartheid job 
uncertainty has come about partly because the racial transformation of 
newsrooms and management - demanded by the state - has been handled 
poorly and often randomly (Fisher interview 2006, Motileng et al 2006). It is also 
because of the high turnover of senior journalists, particularly black ones, due to 
the demand for their services from national, provincial and local government as 
well as from the parastatal and corporate sectors. It was this persistent loss of 
newly-qualified staff that also persuaded Independent Newspapers to close its 
cadet school in the early 1990s. 
Hallin and Mancini support the common-sense dictum that skills levels among 
journalists are indicative of the state of professionalism in the sector. High skills 
are a pre-requisite for journalistic quality. Sadly, both the quality and skills 17 of 
1- It is note"orthy that in recent years scycraJ South African media companies report increasing attention 
on and funding of journalist trdining including Naspers and Johncom. According to the editor of The Star. 
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South African journalists are currently of a poor general standard. Indeed, 
former Sunday Times editor Ken Owen suggests that even by 1994, the level of 
journalism was "quite appalling" (1998, 179): 
For decades, the 'fight against apartheid' had served as a justification 
for every kind of malpractice, including reckless use of 'sources', 
manufactured 'quotes', refusal to hear the other side if that side was 
politically hostile ... and so forth (ibid). 
Things were not to improve. If anything, they deteriorated further18. This is 
clearly demonstrated by the findings of the two skills surveys conducted on 
behalf of the South African National Editors Forum (Sanef). The first survey of 
senior journalists conducted in 2002 found low levels of important skills with 
many journalists demonstrating poor interviewing skills, a weak grasp of 
general knowledge, mediocre reporting skills and an inadequate understanding 
of ethics or the law (De Beer & Steyn, 2002). Little has changed in the 
intervening years, according to former Independent Newspapers executive 
Rory Wilson: "What has happened to editorial quality is very unsatisfying. The 
editors were extremely ill-prepared for political change. Proper leadership would 
have asked: 'What are we going to do?' They would have thought about it. 
Being the critics and writing exposes was no longer appropriate. There were no 
signs we were adequately prepared. Now we are whingers, it is still with us" 
(2005). 
A follow-up study into the skills of first-line journalist managers in news 
organisations, dubbed Skills Audit 2, was conducted on Sanef's behalf in 2004. 
The results again showed substantial management skills weaknesses (Barratt 
2006, 46). This was also evident from the generally weak grasp of ethics held 
by my junior colleagues at the Cape Argus (2000-2002), where as assistant 
editor I held ethics classes in attempt to bolster understanding. This is not to 
say there are no individuals in the sector who have world-class skills. There 
most certainly are. Only that, on average and across the sector, the general 
standard of skills and quality is relatively low and demonstrably worsening. 
Moegsien Williams. Independent Newspapers has also introduced ··a massive training and retention 
exercise" (Williams 20(5). 
18 Without a comparatiw pre-199-l study it is nonetheless difficult to assess accurately or quantitatively 
the decline in skills levels 
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The poor maintenance of skills levels in the sector has been matched by the 
painfully slow progress toward standardising and formalising professional 
journalistic qualifications. The National Qualifications Framework was 
established by the National Skills Act in 1998 and envisages a system of 
sectoral education and training authorities (SETAs) overseeing the appropriate 
implementation of standardised training. All companies in South Africa pay 1 % 
of annual turnover to their relevant SETA and can claim a portion of this back if 
they can demonstrate that it has been spent on approved training. Newspapers 
and magazines fall under the Media, Advertising, Printing, Publishing and 
Packaging (MAPPP) SETA, which itself has been struggling with leadership and 
capacity problems. 
Work on unit standards describing the skills and knowledge that journalists 
need to do their jobs well, and how to assess this capacity, started in 2000. By 
the end of 2001, the first unit standard was written: editing text. By mid-2004, a 
range of standards had been written and the first journalism qualification was 
complete. The national certificate: journalism level 5 (matric plus one year) was 
approved for registration and set as the basis for all future journalism 
qualifications. The "slow work" of drawing up further unit standards was still 
continuing by early 2007 (Barratt 2006,43). 
The lack of participation by ordinary journalists in strategic decision-making at 
newspaper companies also demonstrates a general lack of autonomy in the 
sector. Since the collapse of the South African Union of Journalists (SAUJ) in 
2002, there is some staff representation at most media houses in forums like 
pension fund trustee committees but seldom do they participate at a 
strategically significant level. At Johncom, a staff association took over from the 
SAUJ, which lost its majority at the company some time before it went into 
liquidation (Robertson 2005). Some media companies, such as Independent 
Newspapers, include non-executive journalists in occasional policy-related 
decision-making forums, but these generally consider human resources-
oriented policy, such as absenteeism or sexual harassment, rather than 
strategic issues (Morris 2007). Indeed South African media company labour 
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relations have been characterised over the years by the systematic quashing of 
journalistic demands and aspirations. The last successful industrial action of 
journeymen journalists against editors took place in 1912 and concerned the 
use of bylines (Hadland 1991). 
According to former SAUJ branch organiser Ronnie Morris: "Journalistic 
organisation is practically non-existent in 2007, it's not happening anywhere" 
(2007). Morris says that organising journalists was more difficult in some 
companies than in others. "[The SAUJ] never succeeded in unionising at 
Naspers (Media24). There was an historic hostility to unions in that company" 
(Morris 2007). He recalls that membership of the main journalist union, the 
SAUJ, began to tail off after the new, democratic state came into being in 1994. 
It wasn't long after then that dwindling subscriptions from members fell short of 
the union's day-to-day costs: "The changing of the political order had something 
to do with it. We went from an oppressive system to a democratic, constitutional 
state. The irony is that journalists didn't feel the need to belong to a trade union 
anymore. There was a lot of apathy and membership eventually dried up" 
(Morris, 2007). He adds that some journalists joined other unions, such as 
Mwasa, when the SAUJ collapsed, but estimates overall that 5% or less of 
working journalists are currently un ionised (Morris 2007). 
Journalists working within the Democratic Corporatist model reportedly enjoy 
considerable ownership rights and responsibilities representing a high degree of 
professionalisation. In South Africa, there have been few examples of this trend. 
Perhaps the closest journalists have come to owning a stake in their businesses 
was with the alternative press in the 1980s. The Weekly Mail, for instance, was 
started with pooled retrenchment money and the staff journalists retained a high 
degree of participation and ownership until the mid-1990s. This has since 
changed and the company (now called the Mail & Guardian) is predominantly 
owned by Zimbabwean magnate Trevor Ncube. 
The only other example of journalist ownership that I have come across in 
South Africa was the issuing of phantom shares by Times Media Limited to its 
journalists for a period during the 1990s. This scheme, which was incentive-
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oriented rather than a form of ownership, was also phased out. According to the 
scheme, journalists were assigned pretend (hence phantom) shares for joining 
the company, in lieu of bonuses and once long-service benchmarks were met. 
The journalists could cash in the difference between the share price at which 
the phantom shares were issued (which matched the actual share price at the 
time) and the current ruling price. The idea was that if the business was 
growing, the share price was increasing and this would allow long-serving or 
senior members to share in the benefits. 
Perhaps the only reason why editors are inclined to be less antagonistic toward 
their staff in the post-apartheid era is due more to the declining importance of 
editors in corporate hierarchies and their collective slide into middle 
management than it is due to any gains by the rank and file. This devaluation of 
editors' status is also due to the fact that there are many more of them in media 
organisations these days. Naspers, for instance, had only half a dozen editors 
in its stable pre-1994 all holding high status in the company. Nowadays, there 
are dozens of editors, many of them working on small, one-client magazines 
and reporting to more senior publishers within the company (Malherbe 2005). It 
is inevitable that the collective power of editors has diminished in these 
ci rcumstances. 
It's true in general that editors are less powerful than they used to be. 
The main reason is that there are more and more titles and editors 
are now part of bigger groups. Newspapers aren't freestanding as 
they used to be. We have 50 editors in one company. As a result, in 
the new corporate structure, editors are lower down in the hierarchy 
(Malherbe 2005). 
It is also arguably the case, however, that the fast-track promotion of black 
editors to meet racial transformation quotas and/or to respond to political 
pressure - often before they have served their time and collected the 
appropriate skills - has also undermined the standing of editors within South 
African media companies. In addition, the growing demands of 
commercialisation in the post-1994 period has exacerbated this process with 
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increasing power devolving upwards to corporate management and, with it, a 
growing emphasis on the enhancing the profitability of the industry and its titles. 
Like the mining men who controlled them, the managers of the 
industry judged themselves entirely by the speed and ruthlessness 
with which they could exact profit ... As the demand for profit grew 
relentlessly, year after year, the search for ways to maximise profit 
grew (Owen 1998, 181). 
In the years before 1994, corporate management had to ask permission to visit 
the newsfloor (Johnson 2006). Nowadays, editors occupy a much less lofty 
position and are rarely held in awe by management. As former Sunday Times 
editor Ken Owen put it: "During the apartheid era, the status of editors had 
steadily declined; the end of apartheid saw that status all but demolished" 
(1998, 178). It can be seen that the level of professional journalistic autonomy 
has been dwindling in South Africa since 1994. It is no surprise, perhaps, that 
charges of instrumentalism have been on the increase. 
Over the last three or four years senior South African journalists have 
repeatedly got themselves into difficulty over the issue of instrumentalism. The 
most glaring example took place in 2003 when a story was published in City 
Press by journalist Ranjeni Munusamy. The story, later the subject of a judicial 
enquiry known as the Hefer Commission, was proven to have been planted by 
supporters of the then deputy president Jacob Zuma. The story was specifically 
aimed at discrediting Bulelani Ngcuka, the director-general of prosecutions, who 
was busy preparing a probe into allegedly corrupt activities by Zuma. In the 
article, abusive allegations were made against Ngcuka including the accusation 
that he had been a spy for the apartheid government, a permanently damning 
allegation in the South African context. 
Evidence presented to the Hefer Commission by City Press editor Vusi Mona 
into the manner in which the information was authenticated "brought broad 
disgrace on the profession", according to Barratt (2006, 55). Examples of poor 
journalism have proliferated in the post-1994 period and have included 
repeated violations of privacy and of people's right to dignity. These excesses 
include the widely reported death of pop star Brenda Fassie (when she was still 
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alive) and the common naming of children involved in abuse cases (Bird 2004, 
58). A South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) statement in 2004 
conceded that the status of journalists had suffered as a result of the 
Munusamy story together with a number of other high-profile incidents of 
plagiarism and factual botchups: "It can be safely said that trust in the media 
and journalism among the broader public (our core constituency) and other key 
stakeholders is not what it should be" (Barratt 2006, 55). 
While there is a considerable degree of political instrumentalism in the post-
1994 period, it is worth pointing out that this was the case in the apartheid era 
too. In its publication of pro-apartheid propaganda, the Afrikaans press was a 
living monument to instrumentalism in the pre-1994 era. Die Burger was indeed 
known as the "mother of Afrikaner nationalism" (Tomaselli 1997, 60). In 1936, 
Prime Minister OF Malan described the Afrikaans press in these terms: 
Our newspapers were created by Nationalists for [National Party] 
purposes and are understood thereby to struggle for a national cause 
in accordance with the policy as stipulated by the representatives and 
official bodies of the party (cited in Stem met & Barnard 2004, 154). 
Stem met and Barnard contend 50 years later, the attitude remained unchanged 
(ibid). 'Traditionally and historically regarded, these papers had a very cosy 
relationship with successive NP governments" (2004, 155). Though this had 
started to cool by the mid-1980s, the bond remained strong right up until the 
collapse of apartheid (ibid). As Max du Preez has argued: "Until the very last 
few months of PW Botha's term as State President (in 1989), Afrikaner 
newspapers never opposed the NP or their security forces on any important 
issue" (cited in Stemmet & Barnard 2004, 164). 
In the transition period, too, the cadre of senior political journalists serving the 
mainstream media were the forum through which a political settlement in South 
Africa was largely conducted. In their efforts to secure the 'inside track' on 
multiparty, often behind-the-scenes negotiations, stories were published which 
tested ideas mooted by political figures, that felt out alliances and that operated 
as a chat-room and clearing-house through which elite political groupings could 
communicate. 
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It is also true, however, that Hallin and Mancini's most decisive example of 
instrumentalism, the use of media by commercial owners "to wield influence in 
the political world" has not been the case in South Africa. There have been 
some examples of this, for instance in the publishing of his statement in early 
2007 that media owner Cyril Ramaphosa was not interested in pursuing the 
presidency of the ANC (and therefore of the country). But I think it would be 
unfair to characterise proprietor manipulation of their titles with political intent as 
a feature of the current media system. 
Hallin and Mancini cite the operation and functioning of distinct professional 
norms as being another strong indicator of journalistic professionalism. There 
are important variations, they note, in the degree to which distinctively 
journalistic norms have evolved, the degree of consensus they enjoy among 
those who practice journalism, and their relative influence on news-making 
practices (2004, 36). While it is self-regulating, South African journalism is 
underpinned by an ethical framework, the principles of which are commonly 
adhered to in day-to-day practice. All newspaper companies, and in many 
cases individual titles (such as Die Burger and The Star), have ethical codes of 
conduct. Some titles have appointed Ombudsmen to hear complaints. All 
newspapers and magazines fall under the ambit of the Press Ombudsman of 
South Africa whose professional code of practice regulates the industry. The 
Ombudsman's office was previously the press council (until 1963), and then the 
media council (until 1983) before its establishment in 1996 (Motloung 2007, 14). 
The Ombudsman is appointed by the sector itself and an independent appeal 
process is available to challenge the Ombudsman's decisions and rulings. All 
newspapers and magazines are also signatories to the Advertising Standards 
Authority's code of conduct. 
The intensely legal dimension to journalists' rights and duties during the 
apartheid era, in which newspaper content was affected by a raft of of ten-
repressive laws, ensured a strong grasp of ethical and legal conduct among 
many journalists during this period. As the former editor of the Weekly Mail 
newspaper Anton Harber described it: "We were journalists acting as lawyers. 
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We studied statutes; we spent a great deal of time with lawyers ... we carved 
out a whole niche for ourselves simply by re-interpreting the law in an 
aggressive and pro-active way" (Louw 1991, 3). This was, of course, not true of 
all journalists, some of whom were in the employ of the state (such as The 
Star's crime reporter, later police Captain Craig Kotze). But the environment 
was such that there was a high awareness of the ethical and legal dimensions 
to reporting. 
In the post-1994 period there has been a marked deterioration in journalists' 
understanding and implementation of ethical guidelines. Problems caused by 
inaccurate reporting grew from being an irritation to the Press Ombudsman in 
1999 to constituting the majority of his work by 2004 (Barratt 2006, 56). In 2005, 
the Ombudsman received 200 complaints, up by 26% over the previous year 
and constituting the highest number of complaints received in the history of the 
office (Motloung 2007, 14). There have been allegations of plagiarism levelled 
at several senior South African journalists in recent years including columnist 
Darrell Bristow-Bovey, editor Cynthia Vongai and authors William Mervin 
Gumede and Antjie Krog. Journalists have further undermined their status in the 
community by repeatedly failing to turn up to events to which they had been 
invited to speak at or cover. In 2004, this had reached such crisis proportions 
that Sanef wrote an appeal to all journalists in South Africa urging them to 
address this problem. 
While the Press Ombudsman of South Africa has been leading the self-
regulation of the press for many years, it is clear that the authority and scope of 
the Ombudsman's powers have been challenged from a number of quarters 
and has therefore come under review. With the current Ombudsman, Ed 
Linnington about to retire, Sanef decided at an Editors' Summit in December 
2006 to establish a sub-committee to review the functioning and roles of the 
office. Several challenges have, however, been aired in recent years over these 
functions including calls for the improvement of the outdated professional code 
of conduct. The word "gender" was only included in the code's classes of 
discrimination clause in 2006, following a complaint from the appeal panel, and 
the emergence of tabloid journalism has caught the self-regulator short 
198 
repeatedly. Individual titles have also shown a growing disrespect for the rulings 
of the Ombudsman. 
In early 2006, the Oaily Voice was ruled to have been in breach of the 
Professional Code by publishing pictures of the dead, naked, face-down bodies 
of two young men on its front page under the banner headline of "Kalgaat 
Killers". While awaiting the commencement of the appeal process, the Oaily 
Voice again published the pictures on the front page, sparking great dismay 
from the general public (leading to a petition signed by hundreds of people), 
from the family of the deceased and from the Press Ombudsman 19. In fact, it 
has not been the relatively new phenomenon of the tabloids that have 
dominated complaints made to the Ombudsman. In 2006, 93 complaints were 
laid against urban daily newspapers, 41 against Sunday papers and only 21 in 
connection with tabloids (Motloung 2007, 14)20. 
The decline of effective self-regulation in an environment of rapid change has 
been noted, not just in South Africa but also internationally. As Frank Morgan 
has pointed out, "questions arise when the relaxation of regulation leaves the 
media - and their individual practitioners - to their own devices ... Journalism's 
benefits ... turn to harms, unless moderated by an internalised value system" 
(2004, 17). In their important book, Power without Responsibility, James Curran 
and Jean Seaton argue that "a rapidly changing industry needs to be guided ... 
something which daily intrudes into our lives in ever more sophisticated ways 
needs to be, itself, the subject of continual public surveillance" (1991, 4). 
But it's not just the Ombudsman and the Press Code that are under pressure. 
Recent research indicates a total disregard among South African journalists for 
key elements of the Advertising Standards Authority's code, in particular the 
sections on the blurring of advertising and editorial content (Hadland, Cowling 
and Tabe, 2006). Public service orientation is, I believe, about more than the 
19 I am a serving member of the Appeal Panel of the Press Ombudsman of South Africa and I was part of 
the appeal process for the Dai~v r 'oice hearing cited here. 
211 185 complaints were laid with the Ombudsman in total in 2006. but several of these were multiple 
complaints bringing the overall total to the previously cited figure of 200 (see Motloung 2007. l-l) 
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efficacy or autonomy of the regulator. It is also intimately connected with 
political parallelism and with a media model's history in this respect. 
As I mentioned in the chapter on political parallelism (Chapter Four), South 
Africa has two distinct traditions of political journalism: the neutral, objective 
Liberal stream and the advocacy-oriented, subjective one. The question of 
which of the two has more currency becomes important for deciding on the 
public service orientation of the South African press. It is certainly true that the 
Afrikaans press - formerly a bastion of advocacy, subjective journalism - has 
switched allegiance over the last decade and a half. This was probably 
inevitable as there was little to be gained by continuing to support a defunct, 
racially-based and globally-castigated movement. The change was, however, 
significant. As Max du Preez, the former editor of the alternative Afrikaans 
newspaper Vrye Weekblad told Opatrny about the post-1990 mainstream 
Afrikaans press: "A new generation of progressive young editors have taken 
over at Rapport, Beeld and Die Burger and dragged these publications into the 
New South Africa. They have become professional, modern newspapers in tune 
with the new society, and the differences between them and the Vrye Weekblad 
of today wouldn't have been that big" (Ou Preez 2003, 211, cited in Opatrny 
2007,81). 
It is clear that while journalistic norms have evolved in South Africa over the 
years and that these are held consensually by many working journalists, there 
is a creeping trend in the sector according to which ethical principles and 
practices along with the structures that police them are on the wane. This, for 
Berger, is a critical test of how effectively the media has performed its Fourth 
Estate duties in the post-1994 era: the question is "whether the media stayed 
true to liberal pluralist values - or whether it withered and bowed under illiberal 
pressures of a new government and neWly-empowered society" (1999, 2). 
The final indicator suggested by Hallin and Mancini concerns public service 
orientation. This orientation, they argue, has important consequences for the 
practice of journalism and for the relationship of the media to other social 
institutions. The mainstream press in South Africa publicly embraces the 
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principles and practices of the Liberal model in terms of public service 
orientation. But it is also evident that close connections exist between the media 
and the political world and that these are being developed perhaps closer and 
more rapidly than this model would traditionally allow. I have demonstrated 
these connections in Chapter Four. In the community media sector, South 
Africa has a history of public service activism. This continues to be the case, for 
instance in the imminent establishment of community television in South Africa 
(see Hadland, Aldridge & Ogada 2004), but the advocacy lobby remains 
marginalised from mainstream media power. It has, however, since 2000, 
begun to find strength in the political sphere and the lobby certainly holds sway 
in the state's main lever of intervention in the media sector, the MDDA. 
The mainstream press has also felt growing pressure from the state to adopt an 
orientation that is more in line with public service objectives and less adversarial 
to the democratic state. This harks back to the fierce debate between 
proponents of the national interest and those who support the public interest 
that has so often characterised relations between the mainstream media and 
the state (see Chapter Four). But there has been consistent and strong 
pressure applied by the state executive to ensure the South African print media 
withdraw from their traditionally Liberal antagonistic stance. 
In the late 1990s, President Thabo Mbeki (who was the deputy president at the 
time) stated that an anti-system attitude was no longer appropriate in the media 
and argued that this sector could best serve the country by practicing 
'''responsible journalism' rather than adversarial criticism" (Horwitz 2001, 290). 
According to Horwitz, "the culture of intense partisanship and secrecy that is 
necessary to sustain a liberation movement under armed attack makes it 
difficult to support the principle of a nonpartisan, adversarial press - even after 
the revolutionary struggle is over" (2001, 283). Indeed, argues Opatrny, "an 
adversarial role of the press was seen by many in the new dispensation as 
contrary to the developmental goals of the post-revolutionary government, 
which expected the press to participate in the transformation" (2007, 86). 
"Social reconstruction, economic development and political changes would 
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entail enormous shifts in both large policy matters and in the everyday 
understandings and expectations of the people on the ground. And government 
officials were concerned that this information and the government's intentions 
were not getting out to the public" (Horwitz 2001, 285). Concerns along these 
lines have seen the state pay R200-million rands to publish its own magazine, 
exceeding by ten times the R20-million set aside to bolster diversity in the 
media. 
It would seem that under pressure from the state, from advocacy activists within 
the community media and governmental sector, from the weight of journalists' 
own ignorance and lack of skills and also from the struggling self-regulatory 
authority and codes, that a public service orientation is growing in South Africa 
at the expense of autonomous, Liberal professional journalistic values. 
Hallin and Mancini remind us that, historically, the development of journalistic 
professionalisation has eroded political parallelism (2004, 38). It has done this 
by diminishing control of the press by political parties or by other political 
organisations. It has also created common practices, such as accuracy and the 
presentation of context in reportage that has blurred the political distinctions 
between newspapers. Where political parallelism is high, professionalisation is 
likely to be low. South Africa's experience is that political parallelism is in fact 
eroding journalistic profeSSionalism. Party control is on the rise and common 
professional practices are losing their currency. In this way, South Africa in the 
post-1994 period has experienced a loss of journalistic professionalism and an 
increase in political parallelism. The final question to be considered in this 
chapter concerns the classification of South Africa within the comparative media 
system matrix. Does it fit best in the Democratic Corporatist, Liberal or 
Polarised Pluralist cluster? 
Applying the Three Models Paradigm 
South Africa has little in common with the Democratic Corporatist model when it 
comes to journalistic professionalisation. The Democratic Corporatist countries 
of northern continental Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Holland, among others) 
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have high levels of journalistic professionalism including common consensus on 
standards and a high level of autonomy. They have strong, formalised systems 
of self-regulation, including influential press councils, as well as established 
journalistic qualifications and accreditation. Journalism is considered a public 
trust in the Democratic Corporatist models and the state intervenes strongly 
with subsidies to ensure diversity. Journalists are frequently involved in 
decision-making as well as in the ownership and management of media titles. 
Media content is frequently partisan and opinionated. 
Few of these elements apply to contemporary South Africa. There are pockets 
of journalistic professionalism, and a history of its nurturing, but also clear 
evidence of its deterioration. A formalised system of self-regulation is in place, 
suggesting a democratic corporatist inclination, but generally the system is 
weak, lacks teeth and, in some cases, is ignored altogether by industry players. 
The state intervenes, but not to inject substantial subsidies or to materially 
affect diversity, particularly in the mainstream. Journalist involvement in 
ownership or in strategic decision-making is rare. Media content is usually 
portrayed in the 'informational style' (neutral, objective Liberal) rather in the 
opinionated style of more overtly partisan titles. 
The Liberal model frequently has strong commercial papers that have 
developed with little interference from the state. Journalistic professionalism is 
high with strong traditions of political neutrality and a common informational 
writing style. Regulation of the print media is largely informal, in spite of the 
occasional state attempt to intervene with more formal structures, with peer 
culture usually being the determining factor. Journalists from the Liberal model 
are a "distinct occupational community and social activity with a value system 
and standards of practice of its own, rooted in an ideology of public service and 
with significant autonomy" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). While levels of 
professionalism have been declining for some years, journalistic 
professionalism is still relatively strong. Journalists generally possess their own 
set of criteria for the selection and presentation of news. The gradual 
withdrawal of owners from the day-to-day management of newspapers together 
with the rising importance of advertising income has seen a decline in 
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instrumentalism. Editors in the Liberal model have grown in stature, a trend that 
has frequently been synonymous with the development of independent 
journalism. An adversarial attitude toward state officials is a common part of 
culture of journalism in Liberal model countries. 
South Africa has much in common with this model though it also has some 
clear deviations. South Africa has commercial papers that have developed with 
relatively little interference (commercially at least) from the state. Journalistic 
professionalism has a long history though this is declining. Political neutrality 
has only been the hallmark of one of the two journalistic traditions. Journalists 
still do possess their own news selection and presentation criteria and do 
occupy a "distinct occupational community". However, self-regulation is much 
more formal in South Africa than in most Liberal model systems. Editors are 
diminishing in stature and, with them arguably, the extent of independent 
journalism. The adversarial attitude toward state officials still exists, though this 
too is under pressure as we have seen. Overall, though, there are strong 
similarities between South Africa and the Liberal cluster including the perceived, 
gradual diminishment of journalistic professionalism. 
Finally, South Africa does have a number of commonalities with the journalistic 
professionalism that is evident in the Polarised Pluralist model. The media in 
this model is frequently used as a tool to intervene in the political world. We 
have seen above how this is the case, increasingly, in South Africa. Polarised 
Pluralist systems have weak consensus on journalistic standards and limited 
develop of professional self-regulation. In South Africa, there is consensus on 
journalistic standards, but there is a marked deterioration of this consensus to 
the point where many senior journalists are commonly unaware of it. In general, 
the level of journalistic autonomy is lower in the countries populating the 
Polarised Pluralist cluster. South Africa's experience is certainly that its 
journalistic autonomy is under threat and instrumentalism is on the rise. 
Overall, and measuring South Africa's experience up against Hallin and 
Mancini's indicators of autonomy, it would seem evident that South Africa falls 
closest to the Liberal model in terms of its journalistic professionalism. 
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However, there are clear signs of a deterioration of many of these qualities and 
a certain drift toward the Polarised Pluralist model. Indeed, South Africa already 
has much in common with this latter model. 
Conclusion 
South Africa has a long and proud history of journalistic excellence in the print 
media. But since 1994 and the introduction of democracy, the rules and 
requirements of journalistic professionalism have changed. The relationship 
between the media and the state has shifted. The arrival of global investors, 
tabloids, client magazines and accelerated commercialism has thrown 
traditional practices into question and introduced new forms of journalism. 
The collapse of the major professional organisation for journalists only 
exacerbated the dwindling of journalistic standards. 
According to Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm, the extent and 
quality of journalistic professionalisation has key consequences for the 
functioning and development of a country's media system. During the course of 
this chapter we have defined Hallin and Mancini's four dimensions of journalistic 
professionalism: autonomy, the development of distinct professional norms, 
public service orientation and the degree of instrumentalism. We then applied 
these dimensions to the South African case study that is at the core of this 
thesis, comparing its characteristics to the main features of the three models, 
Democratic Corporatist, Liberal and Polarised Pluralist. 
We have heard how journalists in South Africa have achieved a significant 
degree of autonomy within their news organisations. Their work process is 
largely collegial and there is a formal and hierarchical structure in most 
newspaper newsrooms by which almost all material is subject to review. While it 
is extremely rare for corporate management to dictate the political content of 
South African newspapers on a day-to-day basis, there exists an unwritten 
consensus among senior staff of the print sector that determines attitudes to 
different political players. 
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In the post-1994 period South African journalists have less job security while 
the quality and skills of South African journalists are currently of an 
unsatisfactory general standard. The poor maintenance of skills levels in the 
sector has been matched by the painfully slowly progress within the sector as a 
whole toward standardising and formal ising professional journalistic 
qualifications. 
The lack of participation by ordinary journalists in strategic decision-making at 
newspaper companies demonstrates a general lack of autonomy in the sector. 
This is highlighted by the decreasing importance and autonomy of editors who 
have been marginalised for commercial and political reasons. 
Over the last three or four years senior South African journalists have 
repeatedly got themselves into difficulty with a series of high-profile incidents of 
political instrumentalism, plagiarism and poor ethical conduct which collectively 
have brought disgrace to the profession and diminished its social standing. It is 
clear that while journalistic norms have evolved in South Africa over the years 
and that these are held consensually by many working journalists, adherence to 
- and enforcement of - ethical principles and practices are declining. 
While the Press Ombudsman of South Africa has been leading the self-
regulation of the press for many years, it is clear that the authority and scope of 
the Ombudsman's powers have been challenged from a number of quarters. 
The mainstream press in South Africa publicly embraces the principles and 
practices of the Liberal model in terms of public service orientation. But it is also 
evident that close connections exist between the media and the political world 
and these are being developed rapidly in an environment that is sympathetic to 
this trend. The mainstream press has felt growing pressure from the state to 
adopt an orientation that is more in line with its public service objectives and 
less adversarial to the democratic state. And while Hallin and Mancini suggest 
that the development of journalistic professionalisation has historically eroded 
political parallelism (2004, 38), South Africa's experience is that political 
parallelism is in fact eroding journalistic professionalism. This is perhaps one 
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more example of the way in which the development of newly emerging 
democracies is qualitatively different from more established, stable states. 
Finally, in considering the question of where South Africa might fit within Hallin 
and Mancini's comparative media system matrix, this chapter found that the 
country's media system had little in common with the Democratic Corporatist 
model when it comes to journalistic professionalisation. By contrast, many of 
the characteristics associated with the other two models, in particular the 
Liberal one, can be found in South Africa's current media system topography. 
Journalistic professionalism has a long history and journalists still do possess 
their own news selection and presentation criteria. They do form part of a 
"distinct occupational community", do self-regulate and do maintain a frequently 
adversarial attitude toward the state. However, in common with media systems 
populating the Polarised Pluralist model, journalistic autonomy is under threat 
and instrumentalism is on the rise in South Africa. This all indicates that in 
terms of journalistic professionalisation, South Africa remains within the Liberal 
model, but only just. It is clear in which direction it is headed. 
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Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The application of Hallin and Mancini's Three Models paradigm to South Africa 
produces a worrying and perhaps controversial set of conclusions. One might 
have expected that democracy would be the midwife of a media that is 
increasingly robust, diverse and professional: one that is growing in confidence 
and increasingly autonomous from political life. That has been the experience of 
many countries that have enjoyed decades of stable democracy. Instead, the 
trends and inter-relationships highlighted by comparative media systems 
analysis suggest that South Africa's media is on a path that is far less 
agreeable. This is in spite of the country's deeply Liberal constitutional 
framework with its powerful set of clauses protecting the rights and duties of a 
free press. How is this possible? 
As Hallin and Mancini contend, every country's media system is the product of 
its particular and often complex history. Trends and attitudes that were in 
evidence decades or even centuries ago have a tendency to influence current 
circumstances. Technological, economic and political advances do not always 
reverse these underlying factors. Instead, they shape and adapt what follows. In 
this way, the future direction of the most Liberal constitutional democracy in the 
world can be changed by its history, and by the values and beliefs that it 
encompasses. 
Modernisation theory suggests that all media systems are on the same path. 
The forces of secularisation, differentiation, modernisation and globalisation all 
determine that the media, over time, will become more autonomous and more 
professional. Journalists will be less inclined to accept direction or favours from 
political players. Regulatory structures, supported by the maturation of rational 
legal authority, will in any case soon expose and punish such practices. As a 
result of journalism's improved status and standing, society will rely on it to 
provide a wider range of information-related functions and will therefore 
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demand of it a broad, catch-all appeal. The concurrent, technological process of 
convergence facilitates this dual requirement. 
There is a great deal that is compelling about this scenario. But there are also 
grave dangers in accepting its logic and simplicity without circumspection. Philip 
Meyer, for instance, in his insightful work The Vanishing Newspaper, argues 
persuasively that the erosion of professional values is an inevitable 
consequence of the commercialisation of the press (2004). It is possible, in 
other words that what Hallin and Mancini call counter-tendencies, may be more 
fundamental and more permanent. These counter-tendencies may not only stall 
the convergence of all media systems into the Liberal model, they may even 
reverse the process - and all this within authentic, if immature, democratic 
systems. 
Democracy, after all, is a deeply diverse notion. This is clear even from the 
systems that populate the Three Models paradigm. While based on similar 
principles, democracy is practiced very differently in the United States 
compared to Great Britain, or Germany, or Portugal. The heterogeneity of 
countries even within the same cluster has indeed been the subject of some 
criticism of the paradigm. The introduction into the model of newly emerging 
democracies, especially ones that experienced long periods of authoritarianism 
prior to their conversion, poses particular challenges to the Three Models 
paradigm. 
Hallin and Mancini claim only that their model has been derived from comparing 
the media and political systems of 18 developed countries. They not only limit 
their findings and methods to considering these countries but urge caution 
surrounding attempts to broaden the model to include other systems. However, 
the diversity of the democracies already included in the Three Models paradigm 
together with the importance of analysing more recent additions to the 
democracy club, makes it valid, indeed imperative, that Hallin and Mancini's 
framework is broadened. 
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All too often, contemporary theoretical and critical writing fails to take adequate 
cognisance of the experiences and knowledge of the developing world. 
Comparing Media Systems is a significant advance in media theory and it is 
imperative that it is applied more broadly than only to highly developed, 
wealthy, powerful and stable nations. If anything, the need is more pressing 
among new democracies. They have often sacrificed much to achieve their new 
political systems and may be more vulnerable to regression and more 
susceptible to change. Only by testing the universality of the Three Models' 
underlying principles by applying them to diverse systems, can the true 
authority of the paradigm be assessed. 
At the outset, this thesis set itself a number of tasks. It sought, initially, to outline 
the Hallin-Mancini Three Models paradigm and to contrast this with alternate 
critical methodologies. It then proposed to take the four major dimensions of the 
paradigm, namely the extent of political parallelism, the degree and forms of 
state intervention, the development of a mass media market and the state of 
journalistic professionalisation, and reflect on the South African experience of 
each. The thesis then hoped, by locating South Africa within the model, to make 
a contribution to the further extrapolation, and possibly modification, of the 
paradigm. Each of these tasks has been achieved within this thesis and will be 
reflected on below. 
In addition, I have posed a number of questions during the course of the work 
that will test the relevance, applicability and universality of the paradigm. These 
include: How neatly do South Africa and other emerging democracies fit the 
Three Model theory? What light is thrown on the paradigm by South Africa's 
inclusion? What are the noticeable deviations, explained and unexplained? 
What does the theory not account for? How are the mechanisms (of change) 
explained? I will tackle these questions, and their answers, in the last section of 
the thesis below. 
In concluding this thesis, I will first of all consider the theoretical value of the 
Three Models paradigm. I will then locate South Africa into the model before 
highlighting the conclusions and modifications that this thesis has generated. 
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Theoretical Frameworks and Underpinnings 
South African media scholarship has not considered the applicability nor 
usefulness of the Hallin and Mancini paradigm, mainly because of its newness 
as a perspective. Instead, it has relied upon more traditional methodologies -
political economy, culturalist and text-oriented - to understand the change the 
South African media sector has undoubtedly undergone over the last decade-
and-a-half. The result has been a corpus of work that presents a useful 
understanding of the dynamics and symptoms of change. But there has been 
little appreciation of the broader context. For this, there needs to a comparative 
dimension. There is no other way to consider whether the patterns of change 
experienced in South Africa are unique, or whether they match the experience 
of other countries and their systems. 
There is indeed much that South Africa holds in common with other countries 
about the manner in which its media and political worlds have developed and in 
the way they inter-relate. This is clear from the Three Models paradigm. 
Comparability also suggests predictability, a vital element when analysing a 
new and possibly fragile democratic system. 
This thesis has noted some theoretical weaknesses offered in recent critical 
reviews of Comparing Media Systems (see Chapter Two). These included 
problems surrounding the heterogeneity of countries within the three model 
clusters, around the subjectivity of decisions made about how to categorise 
countries and about the limited geographic and developmental range of the 18 
countries used in the model. Hallin and Mancini have attempted to preempt 
these problems by dealing with them in their work. On heterogeneity, Hallin and 
Mancini argue that the models were not meant to describe a fixed set of 
characteristics, but identify some of the underlying systemic relationships. The 
clusters, they suggest, are ideal types rather than specific categorisations. On 
the limited range of countries, Hallin and Mancini acknowledge this and call for 
scholarship that considers other nations in other regions. Finally, they have 
attempted to diminish the subjectivity of the categorisations by using as much 
quantitative, comparative data as possible. 
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I find these responses largely sufficient. Indeed the call to broaden the study is 
a major reason for the focus of this thesis. I did encounter the need for 
subjective decisions on how to categorise South Africa. But this was a task 
made easier both by the range of indicators contained in the paradigm as well 
as by the model's inherent capacity to crosscheck with the use of its four main 
dimensions. Hallin and Mancini point out some further difficulties with the 
paradigm to do with its inadequacy in dealing with power and also in the 
manner in which it defines and grapples with change. I will expand on these 
below. 
I did also uncover some weaknesses within the Three Models paradigm that I 
have pointed out in the thesis and to which I will allude below. Overall, however, 
I found it a useful framework within which to consider the development, state 
and future of a country's media and its relationship with its host political system. 
In concluding this thesis, I will undertake two more tasks. First, I will make a 
final decision on South Africa's precise placement within the comparative 
matrix. In doing so, I will weigh up the contending claims of the three ideal 
types. Finally, I will draw out the key conclusions and modifications that I have 
arrived at or sketched that will hopefully serve to strengthen and broaden the 
paradigm. 
Three Models: Where does South Africa fit in? 
There is much that is unusual and perhaps that is unexpected about the 
development of South Africa's political and media systems in recent times. 
Certainly, in the early 1990s, few expected the relatively peaceful removal of 
apartheid and its replacement with a constitutional democracy. But the 
existence of a mature, highly-developed and relatively diverse media industry 
makes South Africa an interesting prospect for inclusion in Hallin and Mancini's 
Three Models paradigm. 
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Let us first consider where South Africa might fit in the model before 
considering what this location says about the future direction of the state, of the 
media and of their inter-relationship as inferred by the assumptions of the 
model. 
In common with the Democratic Corporatist model populated by countries like 
Sweden and Denmark, South Africa has an electoral system based on 
proportional representation, a pattern of strong civic life and an interventionist 
state keen on supporting social welfare policies. It also has a Constitution in 
place that guarantees freedom of the press as well as a variety of connected 
liberties including freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom 
of access to information. While its formal, democratic Constitution is new 
(1996), the values it reflects go deep into South African history and are evident 
in declarations and charters going back to the turn of the 19th Century. Aspects 
of consensual, community decision-making can also be found in traditional, pre-
colonial governing systems. These elements had a strong influence on leaders, 
such as Mandela, who took part in the framing of South Africa's modern 
democratic dispensation. In addition, some social groups - such as the major 
trade union and the Communist Party - have been formally integrated into the 
policy-making and governing process and a high degree of political parallelism 
can be found in South Africa and in the countries occupying the Democratic 
Corporatist cluster. There have also been clear moments of deeply participative 
policy-formation involving a wide range of stakeholders and interested parties, 
not least in the realm of broadcast regulation and policy. 
Contemporary South Africa is, however, not part of the Democratic Corporatist 
ideal type. The electoral system does cater for a broad range of political 
interests, but the entire system is overwhelmed by the heavy two-thirds majority 
dominance of the biggest party, the African National Congress. There are no 
other serious contenders for power and the influence on policy of even the 
official opposition is marginal. South Africa does have a mass press, but it is a 
recent phenomenon. There is little public sector involvement in the print media, 
unlike in the countries that form part of the Democratic Corporatist cluster. What 
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subsidies are available are only paid to community newspapers through a 
statutory agency. 
South Africa does not possess the mass literacy of the Democratic Corporatist 
cluster nor is the local press dominant. The strong urban-rural divide that South 
Africa exhibits is not evident in Sweden, Denmark or in the other countries that 
populate the model. The level of journalistic professionalism is extremely high in 
the Democratic Corporatist states and strong protection is offered against state 
intervention. Press councils are active and powerful. Politically, compromise 
politics decides the day, religious cleavages are evident and powerful social 
groups have easy access to the media and indeed to all structures of social, 
political and cultural life. Media content is partisan and opinionated. Few, if any, 
of these features are applicable to South Africa with any consistency. It 
therefore cannot be considered to be part of this cluster. 
The South African media has always had a strong connection to the press of 
Great Britain. Many of its traditions and practices as well as a considerable part 
of its personnel have been drawn from its former colonial metropole over the 
years. South Africa's second newspaper, the South African Commercial 
Advertiser, was founded in January 1824 by George Greig, an English emigrant 
printer (Crwys-Williams 1989, 9). Indeed by 1921, 60% of South Africa's skilled 
printing craftsmen were British nationals who had emigrated to warmer climes 
(Hadland 1991, 26). In July 1828, editor John Fairbairn succeeded in securing a 
declaration announcing the freedom of the South African press guaranteed by 
the British government (Crwys-Williams 1989, 17). 
A connection that was established early on in the life of South Africa's 
newspaper history was strengthened over the centuries, not least during the 
two South Africa (Boer) Wars when a contingent of English correspondents 
were resident in the country for some years. South Africa's agreement to join 
Great Britain in both World Wars and its continuing membership of the 
Commonwealth (after a period of suspension during apartheid) is further 
evidence of the deep historical ties between the two nations. 
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Like Britain, South Africa developed its commercial press first and, initially, it 
kept at arms length from politics and the state. Fact-centred reporting and 
objectivity remain key touchstones of professional journalists. Like Britain, 
South Africa now has a quality press aimed at the elite, and a sensational 
tabloid press aimed at the working and middle class. Government's formal role 
in the press is limited in both countries and the history of journalistic 
professionalism is relatively strong. 
But there are also many dissimilarities between South Africa and the countries 
populating the Liberal model. South Africa's system of self-regulation is far 
more organised than the Liberal countries generally. The domination of local 
papers (that is also a feature of the Democratic Corporatist model) is not true of 
the South African market, thought this element grows by the year. The state is 
more interventionist in South Africa in terms of subsidies, exchange of 
personnel and in the advertising and media products it sponsors. The high 
degree of political parallelism between the media and the political world is not 
as evident in the US, Canada, Ireland and Britain as it is in South Africa. Finally 
the high degree of differentiation that characterises the Liberal country, in which 
the media is highly autonomous and in which social power is widely 
disseminated, is also arguably not true of South Africa. So while there are close 
connections and some shared characteristics, it is also clear that South Africa 
does not sit in the Liberal cluster either, at least not comfortably. 
This leaves the Polarised Pluralist model. Populated by countries like Portugal, 
Spain and Greece, the Mediterranean style of media system features a high 
degree of political parallelism, low literacy and readership rates, a late and 
contested transition to democracy and an authoritarian tradition of intervention 
by the state. These characteristics are all shared by South Africa. In addition, 
the media is used as a tool to intervene in the political world, there exists the 
political will and basic structure of a welfare state, legal actions against 
journalists are common and the state's grasp often exceeds its reach due to a 
lack of either resources or consensus. 
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In addition, there are close personal relations between politicians and media 
owners and often intertwining of elites. There is a heavy focus on politics in 
South African newspapers and the mainstream print media in particular is 
aimed at elites and political insiders rather than a broad, mass public. The local 
press is underdeveloped. The South African media has also historically served 
and participated in the process of national bargaining (most particularly during 
the transition period from 1985 to 1995) and is an important means by which 
elites exchange information, set agendas and test alliances. The history of 
conflict in South Africa, like in the other Polarised Pluralist countries, 
encourages high voter turnouts at elections and affiliational rather than issue-
driven ballot placing. 
There are a number of features that South Africa does not hold in common with 
the Polarised Pluralist cluster. There is no strong party political press in South 
Africa (though as I have argued most newspapers support the majority party). 
Unlike countries like Spain and Portugal, South Africa has strong commercial 
media markets and a tabloid press. The typical Polarised Pluralist political 
system which is made up of many contending parties often themselves made 
up of factions, does not describe South Africa's political topography. 
Furthermore, newspaper circulations are generally low and journalistic 
professionalism is much less developed than in other models. 
Hallin and Mancini have stressed the ideal type nature of the models so the odd 
discrepancy is allowable. In fact substantial inconsistencies are also permitted 
by the Three Models paradigm, directed as it is at the patterns and trends 
underlying the actual characteristics of each system. 
There is, however, enough data and material to indicate that of all the models, 
the Polarised Pluralist one is the model that most closely resembles South 
Africa's current media system. This, in turn, becomes the "explanation" for 
many of the features discerned in South Africa's media right at the beginning of 
this thesis: the deterioration of journalistic professionalism (quality and skills 
levels), the collapse of journalist trade union organisation, the growing 
incidence of ethical blunders, the shifting relationship between media and state, 
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the rising trend of state intervention and court actions, the interconnection 
between state and media elites and the development of a mass, non-political 
press: these are all hallmarks of media systems populating the Polarised 
Pluralist model. The features of South Africa's media system that do not match 
this model perhaps indicate the direction of change. Thus the strong Liberal 
elements are vestiges of the South African media's past (and, with intervention, 
perhaps its future). But the deeper South Africa sinks into the Polarised Pluralist 
cluster, the more predictable are the features of its media and political systems. 
What the Polarised Pluralist model did not predict, however, was the sudden 
collapse of newspaper sales in the months following South Africa's first 
democratic election in 1994. This was due in large measure to the transition 
fatigue experienced by many South African readers following the emotional 
roller coaster that was the political negotiations preceding the election (see 
Chapter Three). While the model does predict a gentle decline in the 
mainstream media, this is true across all three models and indeed in all 
mainstream newspaper sectors around the world. 
South Africa's media system certainly has features from the Liberal model, and 
for this reason I would locate it closest to the Polarised Pluralist cluster but with 
strong Liberal model influences. There is little South Africa has in common with 
the Democratic Corporatist model that is significant, so I would largely discount 
the third corner of Hallin and Mancini's triangular matrix. The resulting position 
is marked in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: Modified Hallin-Mancini matrix (based on Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 70) 
South Africa is contained in a shaded area within the matrix that I believe, on 
closer study, would probably include most of the newly emerged democracies. 
Many post-colonial independent states have embraced a form of democracy 
that allows a Single, majority party to dominate the country's political life, often 
for decades at a time. This is certainly true in southern Africa and in many 
regions to the north. It is likely, too, that other countries with a history of 
authoritarianism and recent conversion to democracy might also occupy this 
emerging democracy zone. I have not placed South Africa up against the 
righthand side of the triangular matrix as it does have some aspects that reflect 
a democratic corporatist inclination. Similarly, it lies some way from the 
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Polarised Pluralist apex as there are strong Liberal characteristics to which I 
have alluded above. 
Let me reiterate, too, that I have focused in particular on the South African print 
news media. The broadcast sector now contains in excess of 200 outlets 
including 100 community radio stations, three public broadcast channels, a free-
to-air commercial channel and dozens of satellite outlets. There is the likelihood 
that local television will be introduced during the course of 2007 with the 
imminent award of multi-year local television licenses in at least three or four 
regions. The story of the broadcast sector, which only developed in South Africa 
in the 1970s, is a rich and complex one. The connection between this diverse 
sector and the political world is also multilayered and has certainly changed 
over the 13 years since the advent of democracy. 
For a full and comprehensive assessment of how South Africa's total media 
system fits in to the Hallin and Mancini paradigm it would be important to 
assess the full extent and colouration of the broadcast sphere. I have not 
attempted to do this here, nor could I hope to do the broadcast and print sector 
full justice within the limitations of the current work. I have certainly alluded to 
the broadcast sector, in particular the public broadcaster, over the course of this 
thesis and I remain convinced that, in the end, its inclusion would not 
fundamentally alter the conclusions reached or the modifications proposed. The 
print news media, even with its scholarly over-emphasis on the English-
language media and its under-emphasis on magazines, still presents a good 
yardstick for measuring the depth and strength of important, underlying 
relational trends. We are able to assess to a considerable extent, by the shape 
and development of the print media sector and by its shifting connection to the 
body politic, why the South media system "is as it is". 
With this caveat in mind, it can be seen that South Africa can indeed be located 
within the Three Models paradigm, though the inherent flexibility of the model 
facilitates the application. Its placement also allows for a number of 
assumptions to be tested, conclusions to be drawn and modifications to be 
suggested. I will do this in the following, final section of this thesis. 
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Assumptions, conclusions and modifications 
The Hallin and Mancini Three Models paradigm is grounded in the concurrent 
processes of secularisation, differentiation, commercialisation and, to a lesser 
degree, homogenisation. It has been seen from the case study that these 
processes are demonstrably active in the South African context. They do not 
necessarily, however, match perfectly the anticipated trajectory posited by 
Hallin and Mancini. 
The process of secularisation is evident in South Africa and can be seen in the 
declining electoral turn-out, in the collapse of political parties and in the growing 
mass appeal of the media (see Chapter Three). However, the extremely 
powerful position of the majority party, the African National Congress (ANC), 
acts as a counter-measure to this trend. The ANC "has become a very broad 
church indeed" (Calland 2006, 114) and its largely antagonistic attitude to the 
media signals its reluctance to allow its traditional functions to migrate out of its 
ambit. As Johnston writes, the ANC "is caught uncomfortably between the 
demands and imperatives of popular and mediated democracy" (2005, 20). 
On the one hand [the ANC] prefers the political sphere to remain 
distinct and privileged, reported on by the media from the sidelines. 
On the other hand, it claims an authentic relationship with 'the people' 
and the media is seen as unnecessary to this relationship and are 
unwelcome in it (Johnston 2005, 19). 
Thus in one-party democracies, it may well prove - as is the case in South 
Africa - that a brake is applied to the secularisation process that impedes the 
media's inheritance of more traditional structures of organisation and 
information dissemination. 
Differentiation marks the maturation of rational legal authority and implies the 
development of a more autonomous press freed from political (but not 
necessarily from economic) determination. This is a process that is oiled by 
commercialisation, argue Hallin and Mancini, pulling the media's agency and 
role further from the political world. But, as we have seen from Chapter Five, 
commercialisation can have the reverse effect. Instead of closing off 
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opportunities for the state to build ties and influence with the media, 
commercialisation can provide the opposite. Indeed commercialisation offers a 
form of hidden subsidy without the political baggage but often with all the power 
to shape print media content and presentation. We saw in Chapter Five how the 
South African government is now the economy's sixth biggest advertiser. It has 
also established contractual, funding and content-based agreements with a 
range of local media. The deterioration of ethical practice and unraveling of self-
regulation that accompanies commercialisation (see Hadland et ai, 2005), 
further invites state co-option of the media and the predominance of its own 
agenda. 
The homogenisation, or Liberal drift, that is expected by modernisation theory to 
guide the direction and velocity of change within media systems is again 
challenged by the inclusion of South Africa in the matrix. I demonstrate in the 
thesis how ill-equipped the Three Models paradigm is to deal with media 
systems that have undergone dramatic, recent transformation. This in particular 
applies to countries emerging from authoritarian pasts. 
The Hallin and Mancini Three Models paradigm simply does not cope very well 
with media system change. This is mainly because the study compares 18 
countries that have enjoyed decades - and, in some cases, centuries - of 
relative political and media system stability. When one introduces countries that 
have endured far more rapid, more recent, more comprehensive change, the 
model struggles to cope. It generalises the causes of change, assumes that 
change leads to greater differentiation and overestimates the power of Liberal 
drift. It is possible that the combination of these counter-tendencies in anyone 
system will be sufficient to constrain, or at best permanently distort, the 
powerful forces of homogenisation and differentiation that underpin the model. 
This thesis suggests that media system change may be understood better and 
more easily compared with change in other systems when the notion of triggers 
is introduced. These triggers have been identified as the ongoing and profound 
influence of the state, the shifting priorities and structural change associated 
with globalisation, the powerful force of the economic system, the market-
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defining importance of business strategy, the consequences of commercialism 
and the fundamental impact of technology change. I argue in the thesis that 
each of these dimensions is underplayed by Hallin and Mancini and, 
furthermore, that the definition of triggers creates tools that are useful for 
comparative purposes. Gleanings and insights from the broadly sympathetic 
political economy paradigm support this notion of triggers. This school of 
scholarship, which has been a powerful influence on research in the South 
African context, has traditionally focused on change and is evidently a useful 
adjunct to comparative media systems theory in particular when it comes to the 
analysis of media markets. 
While it is not uniform across the models, Hallin and Mancini do argue that 
geographic proximity is often a relevant factor in assembling media system 
clusters. Related to this, some critics have pointed at the lack of consideration 
of issues such as regionalism and language as being weaknesses of the Three 
Models paradigm (Hampton 2005). This issue stems, in my analysis, from the 
limitations the authors pose in terms of the model's geographic and 
developmental status. Once the model is populated by a broader range of 
systems, and once a more diverse range of determining factors is inevitably 
employed, the full applicability and universality of the model will be more clearly 
determined. 
There are elements of this analysis that may - at this stage - be uniquely South 
African, such as the very recent development of a mass press. But there is also 
plenty of reason to suspect that these experiences, and the modifications they 
infer, may well be applicable not only to emerging democracies in Africa but 
elsewhere in the world too. The work of Tettey (2001), Suarez (1999) Chabal 
(1998) and Ihonvbere (1996) would certainly support this. Naturally, further 
comparative research involving other new democracies, particularly those 
emerging with authoritarian pasts and fragile presents, would allow the 
usefulness of the modifications I have suggested to be tested further. Certainly, 
scholars have expressed their anxiety that Africa "is in danger of backsliding 
democratically" (Berger 2002, 36) and this confers a certain urgency on the 
task. 
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Hallin and Mancini ask, "is media system change simply one result of .. 
changes in society and politics, or might it play some independent role?" (2004, 
267). The answer, from the South African case study, would seem to suggest 
that media system change is very much the dependent variable in a context of 
rapid political and social realignment. This was indeed the argument in Four 
Theories of the Press (Siebert et al 1956), the predecessor to Comparing Media 
Systems. Just as it posed the question, "why is the media like it is?", Four 
Theories continues to challenge comparative media analysis, though perhaps 
not altogether in the pejorative sense (stalking the landscape "like a horror-
movie zombie") that Hallin and Mancini describe (2004, 10). 
It also becomes evident in using the Hallin-Mancini paradigm that South Africa's 
print media is headed in the wrong direction, if one supposes that the Liberal 
model has come to constitute a consensual position on the ideal role and 
function of the press. This is the worrying and perhaps controversial aspect to 
this thesis's conclusions to which I alluded in the first sentence of this 
concluding chapter. The evidence in this thesis suggests that instead of groping 
its way toward utopian media Liberalism, South Africa is slipping toward 
polarised pluralism. This can be gleaned from many traits that characterise 
South Africa's media system and its inter-relationship with the world of politics. 
It would seem that political parallelism in South Africa is on the rise (see 
Chapter Three), that state intervention is increasing (see Chapter Four), that 
journalistic professionalism is declining (see Chapter Six) and that the media 
system is shifting in a manner that will heed, and possibly reverse, the 
processes of differentiation and indeed of democratisation. This is a very 
different tale from the inexorable convergence on a homogenised Liberal model 
that modernisation theory anticipates. Even though factors are evident that 
would support this, including technological and global journalistic trends, these 
may not be enough to propel a new democracy far across the matrix. Indeed, 
polarised pluralism beckons. Hallin and Mancini refuse to rank the models 
normatively in terms of their democratic purity. But it is evident that predictions 
of the Liberal model's eventual triumph as the natural and indeed inevitable 
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end-point of a global, democratic media may be wishful thinking given the great 
power of historical trends and legacies and the new form of democracy 
represented by the latest generation of adherents. 
There has been much new information contained in this thesis that has been 
used to populate the Hallin-Mancini paradigm with the data it requires to work. 
In collecting and evaluating this information, I would like to suggest that in 
addition to the Three Models paradigm being refined, South African scholarship 
has been advanced. I have revisited the traditional race-based categorisation of 
the South African media and proposed an alternative that more accurately 
reflects the two main Liberal-oriented and advocacy-based traditions. I have 
demonstrated the political and social contract that the South African press has 
bought into in the post-1994 era and described the parlous state of internal 
pluralism that has been the result. I have started to address the paucity of 
scholarship addressing the interconnection between politics and the media as 
well as redress the overly-subscribed use of political economy as a critical 
method. From the range of interviews and the primary research undertaken, I 
have been able - in many cases for the first time - to describe important 
historical moments of policy and media industry development. 
Finally, the Hallin-Mancini paradigm provides an interesting take on a question 
that has vexed South African media studies practitioners and journalists for 
decades. This is the question surrounding the extent of the South African 
media's role in the consolidation of its pre-1994 political system, namely 
apartheid. The Three Models paradigm and my development of it, indicates that 
media systems are the progeny of political systems. Yes, they are symbiotic in 
the sense that change on the one side may cause change on the other. And, 
yes, there are triggers of change that are not inherently political, such as 
commercialisation and the framing of business strategy. Hallin and Mancini 
acknowledge the power of precedent: "Media institutions evolve over time; at 
each step of their evolution, past events and institutional patterns inherited from 
earlier periods influence the direction they take" (2004, 12). 
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But South Africa's experience in the early 1990s, in which massive change in 
the political system provoked equally far-reaching and rapid change in the 
media system, indicates a decisive allocation of causality. This is not to 
understate the great complexity of both political and media systems nor the 
great variety of factors that can influence either or both. It does, however, serve 
to illustrate that the relationship between the media and the political system is 
not a union of equals. This perhaps explains why the Three Models theory fails 
to attend adequately to the question of power: because power may be 
transmitted, reflected or even utilised by the media but its source probably lies 
elsewhere. 
At the outset of their important work, Hallin and Mancini argued that they didn't 
wish their analysis "simply to be applied to other systems without modification" 
(2004, xiv). In addition they appealed for some consideration to be given about 
the "consequences for democratic politics" that their paradigm might infer. This 
thesis has performed both of these tasks. It has taken a new, theoretical 
framework and tested its assumptions and its mechanics. In so doing, a range 
of conclusions and a set of modifications have been proposed. In the end, the 
exercise has sought to illuminate South Africa's own location in the comparative 
matrix. This has been done with a view to appreciating the forces under which 
its political and media systems operate, and to understanding the implications 
of this for the future. The model infers that for single-party, emerging 
democracies, the consequences for democratic politics may be a cause for 
concern. 
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